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
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From William Bartlet Esq.
to the
Theological Institution.

MR. SPRING'S

DISQUISITIONS.

MORAL

DISQUISITIONS:

AND

STRICTURES

ON THE

REV. DAVID TAPPAN'S LETTERS

TO

PHILALETHES.

BY SAMUEL SPRING, A. M.
PASTOR OF THE NORTH CHURCH IN NEWBURYPORT.

HANC VENIAM PETIMUSQUE DAMUSQUE VICISSIM.....*Horace.*

SECOND EDITION.

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MORAL DISQUISITIONS.

SECTION I.

STATE OF THE QUESTION IN DEBATE.

AS the author designs, in the course of the following disquisitions to make several strictures on Mr. TAPPAN's letters, he thinks it proper to state the question in this section. For, if the reader do not understand the nature of the question in debate, he cannot examine the justice of the strictures.

1. The question is not this: Whether unrenewed sinners are under obligations to keep the divine commands? For, we both grant, that they are moral agents, and consequently obliged to speak the truth, to pay their honest debts, and to perform every action required of man.

2. The question is not this: Whether sinners are profitable members of civil society? For, they frequently make useful husbandmen, merchants and statesmen; and, under the guidance of Providence, are made the instruments of great natural good.

3. The question in debate is not this: Whether parents and ministers are required to instruct their wicked children and people? "For, whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear," we are directed to point out

their duty and to press it home upon them by every motive and argument laid before us in Scripture; * "if God peradventure will give them repentance."

4. Nor is this the question: Whether it is desirable for sinners to be the subjects of conviction? For, it is more probable that convinced sinners will be saved, than those who are careless and openly vicious.

5. Nor is the question this: Whether sinners are destitute of holiness? For Mr. T. expressly grants (page 8) that the best exercises of sinners fall essentially short of holiness.

6. Nor is this the question in debate: Whether sinners have natural ability to repent? For, I hold that they have natural ability to repent as well as to perform actions which are destitute of repentance; and Mr. T. grants the same sentiment: For he says, (page 96) that the sinner "*has natural faculties for the one as well as the other.*"

Neither of these questions is debated: But, the question in debate is precisely this: "*Is any thing required of men, as duty, which does not involve holy love?*"

This, in Mr. T.'s words, is the state of the question, which I frankly adopt, because it is concise, plain and just. But, the difference between us is wide. For, he affirms, and I deny, that somewhat is required of men, as duty, which does not involve holy love. For love is the fulfilling of the law. In this debate he pleads for actions which are totally destitute of

* *Ezekiel* ii. 5. 2 *Timothy* ii. 25.

holiness; while I plead for holiness only. He pleads for actions which are not connected with salvation; while I plead for those actions only which are connected with salvation. In a word, he pleads that God requires those actions which are common to his enemies; while I plead that he requires those, and those only, which are peculiar to his friends. This is the ground of the debate: and, the reader will judge, whether his theory or mine be supported by scripture.

Having adopted the question as Mr. T. states it in the course of his defence, he will not complain that I do not adopt it as he formally states it at the beginning of his defence. For, if the question be precisely this, as he states it in the 21st page: *Whether any thing be required of men, as duty, which does not involve holy love?*" It cannot be precisely this, as he states it in the 7th page: "*Whether the unconverted ever do any thing which God has commanded, or which is, in any sense, or degree morally right?*"* For even Mr. T. must grant that hypocrites eat, and drink, and speak, and do a thousand external things from bad motives, which God requires to be done from good motives. He will also grant, that sinners do many things which are morally right, if we judge according to the appearance; but which are morally wrong, if we judge righteous judgment. But though I disapprove his methodi-

* "ANY THING," *ought to be restricted to something: and* "MORALLY RIGHT IN ANY SENSE," *to that which is morally right in* SOME PARTICULAR SENSE.

cal statement of the question, because it is ambiguous and equivocal, yet I approve and adopt this: viz. "*Is any thing required of men, as duty, which does not involve holy love?*" For, as love is the fulfilling of the law, it is obvious, to impartial and judicious men, that actions, destitute of love, are not required.

SECTION II.

Total Depravity Explained.

As no calvinistic doctrine has been more frequently misrepresented, and misapplied than total depravity, it must be carefully explained, For, though the heart of man be wholly depraved, it does not follow that his intelletcual and animal exercises are depraved any more than his finger nails: For, they are not of a moral kind. To prevent mistakes, therefore, relative to this doctrine, the reader will excuse me while I premise the following observations.

1. Total depravity does not imply that the bodies of men are depraved. For the bodies of men and their corporeal faculties merely, are as incapable of moral action, as machines. When the Bible, therefore, imputes sin to the tongue or any bodily organ or member, we are to understand it in a figurative sense.

2. The total depravity of man does not imply that his reason, judgment, or conscience is depraved. For exercises of this class are merely natural, and must not be confounded with those which are moral. Conscience, for instance, is so distinct from the heart, that it appears from scripture and experience, to be a

man's judgment respecting the nature of his heart. For it compares the heart with the law of God, and approves or disapproves it, accordingly as it agrees or disagrees with this standard. The difference between conscience and moral exercise is as obvious, as the difference between knowing our duty and performing or omitting it. For instead of performing or omitting duty, conscience points it out, and approves the heart that performs it and condemns the heart that neglects it. When conscience, therefore, is called pure or defiled, it is used in a figurative sense for the heart. For, as it is a false heart which makes a false tongue, so it is a defiled heart which makes a defiled conscience; and a pure heart which makes a pure conscience.

3. Nor does total depravity imply, that the subjects of it treat either pleasure or pain with indifference. For all living creatures, rational and irrational, desire pleasure and dread pain and distress. Even the devil, whose total depravity no one will dispute, desires present relief, and trembles at the thought of his future doom. A good man is not more virtuous, merely because he desires happiness; nor is a wicked man more criminal, merely because he dreads misery. For mere desires to enjoy pleasure and to escape misery are natural exercises, and not moral.

4. Nor does total depravity necessarily imply, that the subjects of it are destitute of natural gratitude, sympathy and natural affection. For exercises of this class are not of the moral

kind, because they are as common to beasts and birds, as to men. All animals love their tender offspring, and frequently sympathize with each other in distress. Several species of them are evidently capable of gratitude. For they notice their masters, and gratefully acknowledge their benefactors. To conclude, therefore, that sinners are not totally depraved, merely because they are the subjects of natural gratitude, and other exercises of a kindred nature, is neither wise nor safe. Exercises of this class and total disobedience, are found in the same subjects. For, not to mention the grateful and sympathetic feelings of some of the most abandoned wretches on earth, the parable of the rich man teaches us, that even the reprobates in despair anxiously desire the happiness of their particular relations. Neither;

5. Does the total depravity of man consist in the destitution of any faculties or abilities which are necessary to constitute a moral agent. For, if men were not moral agents, or were destitute of natural ability to keep the divine commands, they would be incapable of moral action. It is not possible for men to be disobedient, except they have natural ability to be obedient. For the commands of God never exceed the natural ability of man. God does not require the improvement of more talents than he has given. "For to whom much is given much shall be required." The depravity of man, therefore, does not consist in the destitution of natural ability to obey the divine command; but in those volitions or exercises

which are opposed to it. It is the will or heart of man which is depraved. Accordingly Christ does not condemn sinners because they are destitute of natural ability to come to him; but because they refuse: therefore he says, "Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life." Sinners are able to do their duty, but not willing. For God requires no natural impossibilities.

Having premised these observations, which, according to the obvious style of scripture, confine all moral exercises to the heart, or make the heart the only source of moral actions, we are prepared to say that, *The total depravity of man consists in his heart being wholly selfish, or wholly under the influence of self-love.*

To support this definition, it is only necessary to ascertain the nature of self-love, or selfishness; and to shew that self-love is the source, or sum of all wickedness.

As some authors use self-love in a good sense, though the genius of language makes no difference between self-love and selfishness, it must be carefully explained.

1. SELF-LOVE is not a mere love of happiness and aversion from pain and misery. For this, as before observed, is common to mere animals as well as to men; and is not of the moral kind. To support a favourite theory, some writers have pleaded, that because men are made capable of pleasure and pain, that mere desires to enjoy the one and escape the other are morally good. But, with equal pertinency they may plead that feeling warm in summer

and cold in winter is moral goodness. For the principle is the same. But, as a man is neither better nor worse in a moral light, only because he feels warm or cold; so he is neither worthy of praise nor blame, merely because he desires happiness and dreads misery. For, all desires of this nature are natural and not moral. If the conclusion therefore be necessary, self-love is not a man's loving what he loves. For all beings, rational and irrational, good, and bad, love what they love; and not what they hate.

2. SELF-LOVE does not consist in a man's regarding his present and future happiness according to his value in the scale of *Being*. For this is the criterion of disinterested love. Accordingly Christ says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself." Men are required to love God with all the heart, because he is infinitely great and excellent; they are required to love their own souls because they are precious: and they are required to love their neighbours as themselves, because their souls are equally precious. God requires no man to love himself as himself, with a separate private affection. For all love of this nature is nothing but selfishness. Since therefore, there is no possible medium between private affection and public affection; or between selfish and disinterested exercises, any more than there is between motion and rest, love and hatred, it is obvious that the love which God requires a man to have for himself is of the disinterested kind. Who can describe an

object which is neither small nor great? Or a distance which is neither short nor long? And who can describe the love which a man has for himself, if it is neither selfish nor disinterested? But enough has been said to shew that the love which a man is required to have for himself, is disinterested love. For, how can a man love his neighbour as himself and not love himself as his neighbour? And, how can he possibly treat himself as his neighbour and his neighbour as himself, and not be truly disinterested? For the nature of disinterested love is, to love without partiality. To call that love, therefore, which a man is required to have for himself, self-love, is departing from the propriety of language. It is just as proper to say, that the love which the command requires us to entertain for God, is self-love, as to say that the love which the command requires us to entertain for ourselves, is self-love. For the second command is like the first. Obedience therefore to the second command, is of the same nature with obedience to the first. But who will plead, that loving God with all the heart, is self-love? And who may say that the love, which a man is required to entertain for himself, is self-love? For the Apostle not only says, love is the fulfilling of the law; but he says, "She seeketh not her own:" And in addition to this he says, "Let no man seek his own." If then self-love does not consist in merely desiring happiness, nor dreading misery, nor in loving ourselves according to our value in the scale of being, it is evident that self-love is an

ultimate and chief regard to one's own private personal happiness. That man who loves his own happiness merely, because it is his own, or more than he loves God and his fellow-creatures, is a self-lover; and a self-idolater. For he is required to love God supremely, and his neighbour as himself.*

Having defined self-love or selfishness, nothing farther is necessary to explain the doctrine of total depravity, but to prove that self-love is the sum or essence of all iniquity. And as this is the hinge on which the weight of the controversy turns respecting the nature of duty, I hope to present the arguments with perspicuity and precision.

1. That sin consists in self-love is evident from this consideration, that it is impossible for it to consist in any thing else. Sin, every one grants, whatever be the nature of it, is inseparable from volition. It is a wrong choice or volition. When a man sins, he chooses *somewhat* that is forbidden by God. But instead

* To the liberal gentlemen who entirely discard the doctrine of disinterested love, we have only to reply as follows. 1. If they mean that there is no disinterested love in their own breasts, we rather believe that they speak the truth. 2. If they mean that the phrase "disinterested love" is improper, we refer them to the most celebrated dictionaries and authors in the English language. 3. If they mean the Bible disapproves the doctrine, we make our appeal to that charity which seeketh not her own, to that wisdom which is without partiality, and to that command which requires a man to deny himself and to love God with all his heart. For, is it possible for a man to love God with all his heart and to love himself and his neighbour impartially, or without seeking his own, and not to be disinterested?

of being forbidden, we are commanded to seek impartially the glory of God and the highest happiness of all men, not excepting ourselves. It is hence evident that sin consists in one's choosing or seeking his own separate or private happiness. For, between a man's choosing to gratifiy himself privately, and choosing the good of others, there is no moral medium: For, private interest and public interest are the only moral interests in the universe. Accordingly says Christ, "He that is not with me is against me." If then sin be voluntary; and if there be no interest but that which is public and that which is private, the argument is conclusive, that sin is nothing but self-love in some shape or other; for it cannot possibly be any thing else.

2. That all sin consists in self-love, is evident from this consideration, that self-love is the *only* exercise which is hostile to disinterested love. As disinterested love, therefore, is holiness, self-love is sin. For holiness and sin are opposites, and the only moral opposites in the universe. This argument will bear examination, if holiness and sin are opposite volitions; and if holiness be disinterested love. But, that holiness and sin are opposites, no one disputes: and that holiness is disinterested or impartial love, is easily proved. For,

1. Christ, in teaching men to be holy, taught them to act upon disinterested principles. For, how can a man forsake his honour, pleasures, riches and friends, and all that he hath and carry his cross after Christ, without being disin-

terested? Is it possible for a man to love God with all his heart, or more than he loves himself, and to love each one of his neighbours as himself, who is not under the influence of disinterested affection? Who but the impartial character loves his enemies, and treats all men according to the spirit of the golden rule? For this rule, as all can testify who adopt it, and choose to be measured by it, is, to exchange places with our neighbour, and to love, without partiality. But,

2. That holiness is disinterested affection, is evident from the example of Christ. For, he fulfilled his mission and displayed his holiness, not in seeking his own; but in seeking the glory of the Father. Accordingly when the Apostle disapproves selfish affections, and approves disinterested ones, by saying, "Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others:" He adds, "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus: who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."*

3. That holiness consists in disinterested love is evident from the nature of charity; for she seeketh not her own; and fulfils the law. Holiness and disinterested love are then the same: For holiness fulfils the law.

* Phillipians, ii.

4. That holiness and disinterested love are the same is evident from the general testimony of conscience. All men, except those who are destitute of conscience, feel themselves obliged to prefer the interest of thousands before the interest of an individual. Hence men of genius who avowedly discard the doctrine of disinterested benevolence; yet at the bar, in the pulpit, and in deliberative assemblies zealously plead the cause of the public interest. There is nothing more common, than for the enemies of disinterested religion, to espouse her cause without knowing it, in the very style of her real advocates. And it is to the everlasting honour of disinterested religion, that no man can speak or write with pertinency on any moral subject without adopting disinterested principles. As far as any sermon, plea or address, savours of good sense or solid argument, the speaker is indebted to the principles of disinterested religion. And, hence even all the ingenious writers of novels and romances have enriched their publications, and commanded the attention of mankind, by making their heroes the most disinterested and impartial characters. For common sense disapproves that character who is selfish or interested, and approves him only who is disinterested and impartial.

It is evident that self-love is the sum of iniquity, from Paul's reasoning in the 13th of Romans. For, upon saying, "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law," he adds, "For this, thou shalt not commit adultery,

thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not covet. And, if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." Thus the Apostle reasons: And it is evident that when he says, For *this*, thou shalt not covet, steal, nor kill, he means that it is wrong to steal, kill and covet, because we are required to love our neighbour as ourselves. If therefore all the commandments are comprehended in this, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself;" and, if killing and stealing are forbidden because they are hostile to disinterested love, it is evident that self-love is the sum of wickedness. For, disinterested love, which is the fulfilment of the law has no opposite but self-love. By knowing what is required we know what is forbidden.

That self-love is the sum or essence of sin, is evident from fact and experience. Self-love constituted the sin of Adam. For, to exalt himself, he ate the forbidden fruit. This constituted Cain's crimson guilt. For he hated his brother because God loved him and accepted his offering. This was the cruel monster that tore Joseph from the embraces of his tender parents and sold him to strangers. This was the spirit which refused to let Israel depart from iron bondage. This constituted the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah. This stained the character of David. This was the sin of

Saul. This impelled Judas to betray his Lord, and Peter to deny him. Was not this the spirit of the Jews when they presented Christ a royal diadem, when they crowned him with thorns, and when they wickedly nailed him to the cross? in a word, self-love is the essence or root of every sin: and, it is not possible to violate the divine commands by any other spirit. For, men sin, only for the sake of private advantage. Sin always presents itself as a good, and promises a generous reward. In short, men never sin except when they seek their own and not the things of Jesus Christ. For, sin is a wrong choice: and between choosing our own and the things of Christ there is no medium of a moral kind.

These are our arguments to prove that self-love is the essence of iniquity. And if sin consists in a wrong choice; if selfishness and benevolence are not of the same nature; and if men are not the subjects of those volitions which neither terminate upon public interest nor private interest; these arguments must stand. For sin being a wrong choice, it must consist in self-love. For disinterested love is holiness, and between self-love and disinterested love there is no medium of a moral nature. But the reader will judge for himself.

SECTION III.

Total Depravity Proved.

1. That man is totally depraved is evident, from these texts of scripture, which plainly assert, that his heart and all his moral exercises

are wholly sinful. Gen. vi. 5. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great, in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." This is the character of all unrenewed men without exception: and this text alone fully establishes the doctrine. For, the heart which is evil and nothing but evil continually, is totally evil. Is it possible for language to establish any truth more fully than this text proves the doctrine under consideration? Satan, all grant, is totally depraved. But, is there a text in the Bible which more incontestibly establishes his entire depravity than this proves the total depravity of man? Are not the angels of light perfectly holy? But, what scripture proves the perfection of angels if this text does not prove the total depravity of human nature? For, is not that character perfectly holy every exercise of whose heart is holy, and only holy and holy continually? And, is not that character totally sinful every exercise of whose heart, is evil and nothing but evil continually? But, yet, Mr. T. explains the text very differently. For, he says, "1. *It is immediately spoken of the abandoned sinners of the antediluvian world—It cannot then be just to apply what is said of the most profligate as a literal description of all.*"† But, this construction can never obtain. For, the text does not teach us, that God saw that the wickedness of the most profligate was great in distinction from others: but, it says expressly, God saw that the wickedness of man was great. The

† Page 72.

sense is obviously this, God saw that the wickedness of *mankind* was great. But, to convince every attentive reader that Mr. T.'s sense of the text is arbitrary we will apply it to the word man through the connexion, and display the absurd consequences. "And God saw that the wickedness of the most profligate was great in the earth: And it repented the Lord, that he had made the most profligate on the earth: And the Lord said I will destroy the most profligate whom I have created from the face of the earth. And God looked upon the earth, and behold it was corrupt, for all the most profligate flesh had corrupted their ways upon the earth. And God said unto Noah the end of all the most profligate flesh is come: And the flood was forty days upon the earth; and all the most profligate flesh died that moved upon the earth." According to this construction none were destroyed except the most profligate. For Mr. T. pleads that "*It cannot be just or safe to apply what is said of the most profligate as a literal description of all.*" But, it is needless to pursue this construction any further. For, it is obvious that the antediluvians, who were destroyed, were those who were threatened, and described under the term man. But all were destroyed, old and young, even infants, except Noah and his family, who were *graciously* saved in the ark. It is therefore evident, that all unrenewed men were included in the description. The scripture teaches us that man is born like a wild ass's colt: and will Mr. T. plead that the most profligate only

are born in this wild and ignorant state? The scripture also says, "The sabbath was made for man:" and will he plead that it was made only for the most profligate? Further, the prophet says, "What doth the Lord require of thee, O man, but to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God?" And will Mr. T. plead that the most profligate only are required to be just, merciful and humble? He must therefore withdraw his arbitrary construction of the term man, in the text under consideration. But, not feeling perfectly easy with this sense of the text, he adds, "2. *Should this text include all the unrenewed, it concludes nothing in your favour. For, though every imagination of the thoughts of their hearts while destitute of holiness must needs be evil in that respect, yea, only evil, continually, this does not prove that all their exercises are evil in every respect.*" This objection involves in it two palpable absurdities. For, 1st. It supposes that thoughts which are nothing but evil continually, are yet in some respects good and not evil. But, who may plead that thoughts which are evil, and only evil, and continually evil, are yet in any respect good and not evil? 2. The objection also supposes that every one of the sinner's imaginations does not include all his moral exercises, or that he is the subject of more exercises than every one of which he is the subject. For as every one of the sinner's moral exercises is evil, and nothing but evil continually, it is evident that he must be the subject of a few more than every one, or he

will not be the subject of any moral goodness. But, he adds, "3. *On your plan of construing scripture, I have an equal right to apply the character given of the wicked in the* 50th *Psalm to all the unconverted, and from hence prove that each one is a partaker with thieves and adulterers, which would make shocking work both of the Bible and common sense.*" To convince the reader that we shall violate scripture and common sense both if we do not apply the character in this Psalm to all the unrenewed, I shall insert and examine the passage.

"VER. 16. But unto the wicked God saith, what hast thou to do to declare my statutes, or that thou shouldest take my covenant in thy mouth?

"17. Seeing thou hatest instruction, and castest my words behind thee.

"18. When thou sawest a thief, then thou consentedst with him, and hast been partaker with adulterers.

"19. Thou givest thy mouth to evil, and thy tongue frameth deceit.

"20. Thou sittest *and* speakest against thy brother: thou slanderest thine own mother's son.

"21. These *things* hast thou done, and I kept silence; thou thoughtest that I was altogether *such a one* as thyself: *but* I will reprove thee, and set *them* in order before thine eyes.

"22. Now consider this, ye that forget God, lest I tear *you* in pieces, and *there be* none to deliver.

"23. Whoso offereth praise glorifieth me, and to him that ordereth *his* conversation *aright*, will I shew the salvation of God."

The reader is now desired to examine these queries by the passage. 1. Are not the characters who are described, without any interruption from the 16th to the 21st verse, the same characters whom God in the 22d verse, threatens to destroy forever? 2. Do not all impenitent sinners forget God, and does not he threaten to destroy them because they forget him? If, therefore, the men who are threatened are the men who are described, and if all the unrenewed, without exception, are the characters threatened, is it not evident, that the character given of the wicked in this Psalm, applies to all impenitent sinners? Mr. T. has no more warrant to deny that all the wicked are included in the description, than to deny that they are all included in the threatening. For the Bible knows of but two classes of men, the righteous and the wicked: and makes no distinction between good and bad sinners, any more than between good and bad christians. The Bible invariably stiles all the renewed, righteous men, and all the unrenewed, wicked men. And if Mr. T. do not recall what he has granted, viz. That all the unrenewed are destitute of holiness, and prove that his better sort of sinners, who being too good to be stiled wicked, or partakers with thieves and adulterers, are the subjects of a small degree of holiness, his theory cannot be supported. For in the last chapter of Revelation all those who

have no right to the tree of life are denominated dogs, and sorcerers, and murderers, and idolaters.* Any other strictures on his construction of the text are needless. For if he can only plead that it describes the most profligate, in distinction from other sinners: that exercises which are nothing but evil continually, are yet in some respects good: and that every imagination of the thoughts of the sinner's heart does not include all his moral exercises, we have already paid him ample respect. For it is evident, that every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart includes all his moral exercises; it is also evident, that exercises which are nothing but evil continually, are in no respect good: And it is equally evident, that Mr. T. has no more warrant to restrict the description of the wicked to the most profligate, than to restrict the destruction of the wicked to the most profligate. God de-

* As Mr. T. adds much weight to his objection by asserting that, "It will make shocking work of common sense to apply the character given of the wicked in the 50th Psalm, to all the unconverted:" I will insert the sense of President Edwards, which has occurred in the course of reading, since I wrote what has been presented. "It is reasonable," says the President, "to suppose that by wicked men in this psalm is meant, all that hate instruction, and reject God's word, and not merely such wicked men as are guilty of stealing. The words in the conclusion of the paragraph are expressly applied to all that forget God, so as to expose themselves to be torn in pieces. We can no more justly argue, that because some gross sins, are specified, that no sinners are meant, but such as live in gross sins, than we can argue from Rev. xxii, that none shall be shut out of heaven, but only those who have lived in the gross sins there mentioned.

For the Apostle never hints at any moral exercise which is neither flesh nor spirit. The flesh is the whole unrenewed man.

But what is Mr. T.'s sense of the carnal mind? He says (P. 64) "*The carnal mind is the actual minding of carnal things.*" And to examine this construction, we will attempt to carry it through the passage. "The carnal mind (or minding carnal things) is enmity against God. For, minding carnal things is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then, they that mind carnal things cannot please God. But ye, beloved brethren, do not actually mind carnal things, if ye actually mind spiritual things. In different words, which contain the same thoughts: Actual sin is sin against God. For actual sin is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then, actual sinners cannot please God. But ye, beloved brethren, are not actual sinners, if ye are actual saints. Is this Paul's Logic? Is this the Apostle's Divinity? He never contrasted flesh and spirit in this pointed manner, to teach us that actual sinners are sinners, and that actual saints are saints; but to shew us, agreeably to what Christ taught Nicodemus, the total depravity of the unrenewed nature of man, and hence to establish the doctrine of free grace in the justification of believers.

Further, that sinners are totally depraved is evident from such texts as these, which reprobate all their moral actions without exception. "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination

to the Lord." Inspiration does not say the sacrifice of the profligate; nor does the Bible say some of the sacrifices of the wicked, in distinction from other sacrifices; but the sacrifices of the wicked. For, it does not appear that even Solomon was acquainted with the distinction between good and bad sinners. For without the least discrimination he says, "The plowing of the wicked is sin.* He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer shall be abomination to the Lord." To hear the law, as Mr. T. must grant, is holiness. For the scripture says, "Hear and your souls shall live." The prayers, therefore, of all who do not hear in a holy manner, are abominable in the sight of God. All the prayers therefore, of all the wicked, fall under this predicament. To the same purpose is this striking passage of the prophet. "He that killeth an ox is as if he slew a man: He that sacrificeth a lamb as if he cut off a dog's neck: He that offereth an oblation as if he offered swine's blood; he that burneth incense as if he blessed an idol." This is the prophet's view of the sacrifices of sinners; and, that he means the sacrifices of all men who are destitute of the contrite spirit, is evident from the contrast which he makes between acceptable and unacceptable sacrifices. For, upon describing the acceptable sacrifice which is godly contrition, he immediately adds, "But, he that killeth an ox is as if he slew a man," &c. The

* *Not the lamp of the wicked, nor their prosperity: This is unnatural and strained.*

instruction is obviously this, the sacrifice of a humble spirit is acceptable and grateful to God. But, all sacrifices destitute of humility or holiness, are hateful and abominable in his sight. For, the very best of them are compared with murder and the grossest idolatry. The God of Israel is not an advocate for duties destitute of love. For he both reprobates and absolutely forbids any moral actions of this nature. "When ye come to appear before me, who hath required this at your hands to tread my courts? Incense is an abomination to me; and when ye spread forth your hands I will hide my eyes from you; yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear. And thus says the Lord Jesus, "Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?"

Now, why does the scripture teach us that the hearts and thoughts of sinners are totally evil; and that all their moral actions are abominable in the sight of God; and why does God reprobate and utterly forbid all their sacrifices and prayers, if they are not totally depraved?

II. That sinners are totally depraved is evident from the frequent confession of the Apostle, that christians before regeneration were wholly disobedient. "And you," saith he to the Ephesians, "hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins: wherein in times past ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience, among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lust of

the flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature the children of wrath even as others." The Apostle neither excepts himself nor any other christian; but speaks in universal terms. Since therefore life and death are opposites; since spirit and flesh are opposites; and since all natural men are dead in sin, and fulfil the lusts of the flesh, they are totally depraved. The Apostle's own personal confession is, if possible, more full to the point. "For I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." If therefore there is no good thing in the flesh, after regeneration, there can be none before it. Mr. T. to keep pace with himself, must plead that the Apostle only meant that there is no holy thing in the flesh, or in sin. But this construction will not obtain among real Calvinists. For they understand the flesh, as both Christ and the Apostle use the word, to import the sinful unrenewed nature of man. Agreeably, says Edwards in his reply to Arminians, "Christ's meaning in saying, that which is born of the flesh is flesh, is this, that which is born in the first birth of man is nothing but man, as he is in himself depraved, debased, sinful." Accordingly he concludes thus, "It will not only follow that natural men are corrupt, but wholly corrupt."

III. It is evident that sinners are totally depraved, from the 3d of Romans. I make this a distinct argument, merely because the doctrine is handled here more fully, than in any other passage of scripture.

At the 9th v. the Apostle puts this question, "Are we better than they?" Are we Jews better than those wicked Gentiles just described, who are even destitute of natural affection? "No, in no wise." For we have before proved, both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin. Then he draws the moral features of all natural men, both Jews and Gentiles, without exception, in these striking colours. "There is none righteous, no, not one. There is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way: They are together become unprofitable. There is none that doeth good, no, not one." He closes the description by saying, that their throats, their tongues, their lips and their mouths, are wholly employed in the service of sin: that destruction and misery are in their ways; that they have not known the way of peace, and that there is no fear of God before their eyes.

It being evident that the characters here described are totally depraved, since language cannot paint total depravity, as we have explained it, in a more glaring light, the only question is this, What characters does the Apostle here describe? Does he describe those men only who appear to be the most vicious, or does he describe the unrenewed nature of all men? The answer is already given. The description was not designed only for the most visible sons of Belial, but for all natural men without exception. For as in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man. Accordingly the Apostle says, "For we have

before proved, both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin." As Jews and Gentiles therefore included all, the description was designed for every unrenewed man without one exception. To invalidate this argument, Mr. T. pleads, "*That the Apostle's design is sufficiently answered if we understand these verses not as an exact literal description of every unrenewed human creature, and all his moral exercises, but as a just picture of mankind in the gross.*" (P. 73.)

This the reader will remark is the only plea he pretends to make against my argument. And to do Mr. T. justice, we will read the passage according to his construction, and furnish him with the notable consequences. For, if his sense of the passage be just, it will harmonize with every part of the description: if not, we shall detect the fallacy. "What then, are we better than they? No, in no wise. For, we have before proved, both Jews and Gentiles, "*in the gross*," that they are all under sin. As it is written, there is none righteous "*in the gross*" no not one. There is none "*in the gross*" that understandeth. There is none "*in the gross*" that seeketh after God. They are all "*in the gross*" gone out of the way; they are together, "*in the gross*" become unprofitable. There is none "*in the gross*" that doeth good, no not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre, with their tongues they have used deceit. The way of peace they have not known. There is no fear of God before their eyes, "*in the gross.*" But how shall we close

this solemn passage "*in the gross?*" For the Apostle does not shift characters; but speaks of those at the close of the passage whom he described at the beginning of it. "Now we know what things soever the law saith, it saith to them in the gross, or in general that are under the law, that every mouth in general may be stopped, and all the world in general may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh in general shall be justified in his sight. For, all in general have sinned and come short of the glory of God. But it is needless to detain readers in general with this gross sense of the passage. Nor will I urge it any further, because I charitably believe Mr. T. adopted the construction without examining the connexion or dreaming of the intolerable consequences. For, to talk of all mankind in general, and of every one in general, is like a man's seeing the truth with all his eyes in general, with both of his eyes in general, and every one of his eyes in general. Agreeably, says President Edwards, while shewing that the Apostle intended every natural man, instead of mankind in general, "What instance is there in scripture where the meaning is only a much greater part, and this meaning is signified by repeating such expressions? They are all; they are altogether; every one; joined to multiplied negative terms, to shew the universality to be without exception; saying, There is none, there is none, there is none, there is none, four times over, besides the addition of, no, not one, once and again!"

And to expose the absurdity into which Mr. T. has slidden, by supposing that these universal and negative terms were used by inspiration to describe mankind in the gross or collectively, he adds with his usual keenness. "If a man speaking of his two feet should say, all my feet are lame, they are all lame, altogether become lame; none of my feet are strong, none of them are sound, no, not one, would he not be thought to be lame in his understanding as well as his feet?" He further adds, while treating of the 3d. of Romans. "Before I leave this passage it may be proper to observe, that it is not only a most clear and full testimony of the natural depravity of man; but, also plainly declares that depravity to be total."

IV. That unrenewed men are totally depraved is evident, from this obvious consideration, that God will disapprove all their moral actions, in every respect, at the great day. The design of the last day is to display the hearts and thoughts of men, and to treat them according to their merit or demerit. Christ will then approve or disapprove every man according to his works. Since, therefore, the description of the final judgment is as silent respecting any obedience, which is destitute of holiness as it is respecting men who are neither virtuous nor vicious: and since no one may say, that the description of the final judgment is silent respecting any moral actions which are eternally interesting to the souls of men, it is evident that all moral actions which are destitute of

holiness, are totally sinful. As the best exercises of sinners therefore are destitute of holiness, they are totally depraved.

V. That sinners are totally depraved is evident from this incontestible fact, that they are destitute of holiness, or the least holy desire to accept salvation.* I am willing to rest the whole weight of the doctrine on this single argument. For total depravity is nothing more nor less than total selfishness of heart. Those who do not love Christ more than they do themselves, or for the sake of his infinite goodness and excellency are totally depraved. But, this is the character of all sinners. For when God sets before them eternal life and eternal death; when he promises to save them if they will only love CHRIST; and threatens to destroy them if they refuse; they slight the promise and disregard the threatening. Accordingly says Christ, "Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life." Depravity, as before observed, belongs to the heart only. Nothing prevents the salvation of sinners but their own aversion from it. They love themselves supremely and not God. Therefore they say unto God "depart from us for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways."

* To prove that sinners are destitute of the least holy desire to be saved by Christ, is needless in this debate. For Mr. T. grants it! And Christ says, "Whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely." The term of salvation is holy desire and not any particular degree of holy desire. The scripture does not say, he who has ten or an hundred degrees of faith shall be saved; but he that believeth shall be saved. It is the nature and not the degree of the exercise which constitutes the term of salvation.

The argument in a more pointed attitude stands thus; sin is a moral exercise; but, there are no moral exercises except those which terminate on private personal interest, and those which terminate on the good of the universe or the glory of God. Sinners therefore are totally depraved. For, by concession they are entirely destitute of holiness. Mr.T. therefore in granting that sinners are destitute of holiness has wholly destroyed the foundation of his theory. For it is impossible to prove that sin is not a volition: and it is equally impossible to prove that there are any volitions which are neither selfish nor benevolent. For, what is sin if it be nothing of a voluntary nature? And what is that interest or good which is separate from public interest and private interest both? is it of a moral nature? is there any moral medium between a child's being dutiful and undutiful; between a servant's being faithful and unfaithful; and beween the obedience and disobedience of subjects? Is it not as difficult to describe a servant who is neither faithful nor unfaithful, as to describe one who neither moves nor rests; or who is neither dead nor alive? But it is needless to query any further. For, as there is no medium between light and darkness, motion and rest, life and death; so there is no medium between virtue and vice. For every moral exercise terminates upon some object which pertains to public interest or private interest. Accordingly Christ says, "He that is not with me is against me." But Mr. T. has

several objections to this doctrine, which deserve consideration. He pleads,

1. "*That we see sinners capable of performing many offices of justice and truth.*" (P. 74.)

I grant it. For we also see them capable of perfection. But does it follow that they are perfect because they are capable of perfection? And does it follow that they do their duty in any respect, because we see them capable of doing it? but his meaning, according to explanation, is this, that "*Sinners often voluntarily refrain from acts of wickedness, because they view them as morally wrong, and connected with the just wrath of God.*" What he intends by acts of wickedness in distinction from wicked exercises of heart, I know not. If he mean such acts as those from which Pharaoh and Balaam refrained only because they dreaded the wrath of heaven, I readily grant it. For those were merely external, because it is evident that their hearts were disobedient. But if by acts of wickedness from which sinners refrain, he means cordial acts, I deny it. For every imagination of the thoughts of their hearts is evil continually. It is common for sinners to refrain from one sin for the sake of another, or rather to prefer one sin before another. But they never refrain from sin for the sake of duty. But Mr. T. pleads

2. "*That it would be ridiculous to pretend that their depravity incapacitates them from such acts as they are known to perform every day.*" Very true. It would be ridiculous indeed to deny that they perform what they perform. But

what do they perform, is the question? do they perform acts of justice and faithfulness, in the sight of God, who regardeth not the outward appearance? By no means. For their hearts are wholly evil. It is therefore evident, that the justice or goodness of which sinners are the subjects, is apparent, and not real. But, that they perform the offices of justice, as the civil law requires, is not debated. I had granted in the dialogue; I granted in stating the question; and I now grant once for all, that sinners are frequently just men in the sight of the civil law. But what is the chaff to the wheat? What is the shadow to the substance? What are visible things to those which are invisible? For, "Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and tho' I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing," saith the Apostle.

SECTION IV.

Containing several Inferences.

INFERENCE 1. If sinners are totally depraved, Mr. T.'s theory is totally groundless. The truth of this doctrine saps the foundation of every one of his arguments. For, what duty is there in those actions which are wholly sinful? But, all the moral actions of sinners fall within this description. For, the heart of man, which is the sum or aggregate of his moral exercises, is totally evil. Accordingly the scripture teaches us in a most commanding and convincing style, that sinners not only hide their talents, but that the leading faculties of their minds

and the principal organs and members of their bodies are wholly employed in the service of sin. "Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit: the poison of asps is under their lips. Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness. Their feet are swift to shed blood. Destruction and misery are in their ways; and the way of peace they have not known. There is no fear of God before their eyes." Thus Paul describes the total defilement of sinners, in his letter to the Romans; and to Titus he says, "Unto the pure are all things pure; but unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure. But even their mind and conscience is defiled. They profess they know God, but in works deny him; being abominable and disobedient, and unto every good work reprobate." The Bible also represents sinners to be as blind as stones; to have hearts as hard as stones; to be as deaf as adders; to be full of envy and malice; and in a word, to be dead in trespasses and sins, and to be the children of the devil. This being the character of sinners it is easy to see why God reprobates all their actions. For if the tree be totally corrupt, the fruit will not be in any measure good. Accordingly says Christ, "Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or else make the tree corrupt and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his fruit." And to the same purpose though God commands sacrifices, offerings and oblations; yet he abhors them when presented by sinners, who are destitute of a hum-

ble and contrite heart. For he says, "He that killeth an ox is as if he slew a man; he that sacrificeth a lamb as if he cut off a dog's neck; he that offereth an oblation as if he offered swine's blood; and he that burneth incense as if he blessed an idol."

INFERENCE 2. It is evident that Mr. T. finds by experience that his theory of duty, destitute of holiness, cannot be supported on Calvinistic principles. For to support it, he obviously departs from the first and most capital principle of Calvinism, and adopts the reasoning of uniform Arminians. To make the truth of this inference obvious, I have only to compare his construction of several cardinal texts with the construction of Armenian writers. This will display his leading principle to advantage. For every theory of sentiment depends upon the construction of a few cardinal texts of scripture.

1. He pleads that this text, "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually," applies to the most profligate. For he says, "*It cannot be just to apply what is said of the most profligate, as a literal description of all.*"

Doctor Taylor, the most distinguished advocate for Armenian tenets, while opposing the Calvinists, confines the description to the most profligate.*

2. Mr. T. treating of the description of human depravity in Rom. iii. says, "*The A-*

* Scrip. Doct. page 12.

postle's design is sufficiently answered if we understand these words not as an exact literal description of every unrenewed human creature, and all his moral exercises: but as a just picture of mankind in the gross." Dr. Taylor has the same sentiment in these words, "This I say is not to be understood of every individual; but only of those of whom it was true, who might be great numbers. "Dr. Whitby, another notable defender of the Arminian faith, while opposing the Calvinists, says, "This is almost the continual mistake of these men, that they ascribe that to man's lapsed state which belongs only to the worst of men, who had corrupted themselves by a long course of continual impiety." Thus said these learned Doctors and thus says Mr. T. But what are the sentiments of Calvin and Edwards on the 3d. of Romans? "Paul enveigheth not (says Calvin) against certain men; but against the whole nation of the sons of Adam; neither declaimeth he against the corrupt manners of one or two ages, but accuseth the continual corruption of nature." President Edwards to shew that the Apostle intended every natural man instead of mankind, "*in the gross*" as Mr. T. explains the passage, says, "It is the Apostle's manifest design to shew these three things. 1. That all men are by nature corrupt. 2. That every one is altogether corrupt. 3. That they are in every part corrupt in an exceeding degree."

3. To invalidate our argument from this text, "The carnal mind is enmity against God," Mr. T. says, "The carnal mind is the actual

minding of carnal things, or the positive exercise of corrupt inclination." Dr. Taylor says, "The carnal mind is the minding of the flesh, or the choosing and following fleshly gratifications." These constructions are perfectly coincident; and wholy exclude from the flesh the idea of personality. But what is the carnal mind according to Edwards? Is it a mere quality, or is it a nature? He says, "It is most manifest that by the flesh the Apostle means some nature, that is directly opposite to the law and holy nature of God."* Calvin has the same view of the text, for he says, "It is the Lord's argument that man must be born again because he is flesh. For the flesh is so compared against the spirit that there is left no mean (or middle thing) between them; therefore whatsoever is not spiritual in man is after the same reason called fleshly: but we have nothing of the spirit but by regeneration. It is therefore flesh whatsoever we have of nature."† The striking difference between Calvinists and Arminians as far as these most cardinal texts are concerned, is now ascertained. And since Mr. T. evidently departs from the Calvinistic construction, and treads so hard upon the heels of the Arminian Scribes and Doctors, we must conclude that experience hath taught him the impossibility of supporting his theory on Calvanistic principles. For if Calvin and Edwards patronize him, why does he desert them and flee to the strong hold of their enemies? Is it common to defend a post by forsaking it?

* O. S. page 201.

† Book 2d. Chap. 3d. Sect. 1.

INFER. 3. It is evident that Mr. T. does not treat the Arminians with deserved honour and respect. For though he has actually fled to them for help, and makes his defence on their ground, and with their weapons, he has not self denial enough to assume their name. That this is just, I appeal to obvious facts. For he chooses to be called a Calvinist, while no judicious Calvinist will adopt his sense of these cardinal texts; because it strikes at the foundation of their theory, and unhinges the door of Grace. If we follow Mr. T. in his explanation of Gen. vi. and Rom. iii. that the most profligate, or mankind in the gross, are intended in distinction from all the unregenerate; we must also follow Dr. Taylor, and explode the necessity of regeneration by the special influence of the Spirit: and other smiliar articles of the Calvinistic creed. For only grant Dr. Taylor's first principles, as displayed in his sense of these capital texts, and we must necessarily allow those consequences which cut up Calvinism by the roots.*

INFER. 4. It is evident that Hopkinsian sentiments are only the genuine, flourishing and fruitful branches of the Calvinistic tree. For we plead that there is no duty in the actions of sinners, because they are totally depraved. As total depravity, therefore, is the great pillar in the Calvinistic theory, there is no more difference between Calvinists and Hopkinsians, than

* Mr. T.'s only salvo is this, that Romans iii. is a "proof that human nature is depraved in all." But this salvo will not avail. For we have proved, if I mistake not, that the characters described are totally depraved; and that the description was designed for all the unrenewed, without exception

there is between a tree and its branches, or between first principles and consequences. The broad foundation which supports our ample superstructure was long since deeply and most firmly laid in the first principles of Calvinism. To support my theory I need no first principles, except those which Calvinists have adopted and improved against Pelagians and Arminians.

Without derogating from the honour of several Calvinistic writers, I have liberty in this connexion to grant that Mr. T. can pick up many scattered sentences from them which correspond with his theory. For no authors, except the inspired ones, uniformly treat things according to their first principles. But I challenge him to fetch a single article from the first principles of Calvinism which clashes with my theory. For their first principle is literally this in the language of President Edwards: "Natural men are God's enemies. Their wills are contrary to his will. They are enemies to God in their affections. Every faculty and every principle of action is wholly under the dominion of enmity against God. This enmity against God has the absolute possession of the man. A natural man has the heart like the heart of a devil." Calvin says, "whatsoever man thinketh or doeth, before he be reconciled to God, is cursed."* Thus Calvinists have laid the foundation: and if every part of the superstructure does not correspond with it, the fault is not mine. The first principles of Calvinists I heartily approve and avowedly adopt: but the incoh-

* Book 3. Chap. 14. Sect. 4.

sistencies with which some of them are chargeable by denying several of the most interesting consequences of their theory, I wish to escape.

INFERENCE 5. It is evident that Mr. T. mistakes the appearance of moral goodness, for moral goodness itself. For though he grants that there is no morality in mere externals, yet because sinners frequently perform the apparent offices of justice, and beneficence, he pleads that they do some part of their duty. But this rule is very fallacious. For, sinners often perform these external actions from bad motives which christians perform from good motives. If depravity in any measure consisted in external action, this rule might be adopted. But, since depravity consists wholly in internal action, and not in external action, we must not judge according to the appearance, but according to the hearts of men as described by the inspired writers. And, if we judge of the characters of sinners not from the appearance which they make to us, but from the description which the Bible gives of their hearts, we shall judge righteous judgment, and conclude that they are totally depraved. For the carnal mind is enmity against God.*

SECTION V.

The Doctrine of Motives, Ends or Actions.

As the characters of men depend upon the nature of their motives, ends or actions; and as these words are frequently misapplied in mo-

* Since we have proved that the Apostle, in the third of Romans, describes the unrenewed nature of all men: since we have proved that the morality of actions lies whol-

ral disquisitions, it is particularly necessary in this debate, to ascertain the different acceptations in which they are properly used.

1. What are motives? as the term motive is very differently used, it must be differently explained.

1. Motive denotes the object of choice, or volition. It is somewhat which terminates volition; and is therefore different from it, according to this acceptation. For instance, the motive of one man in going a journey is his farm, the motive of another is his friend, and the motive of a third is his bride. The first chooses to take care of his farm, the second to visit his friend, and the third to obtain a bride. These are objects of choice, and these are motives, as the word is frequently used. Mere objects of choice or volition, therefore, are motives. For, the motive of the agent, according to this acceptation of the word, is the object which terminates his choice or volition. When we

ly in the will or heart of the agent; that there is no moral excercise which is neither holy nor sinful, because there is no interest which is neither publick nor private: In a word; since Mr. T. may as pertinently talk of three hundred kinds of moral excercise as of three kinds, his grand plea, that "Some natural men may do good in a moral sense by common grace, exciting and assisting to it," is groundless. For the resemblance between the restrained and unrestrained sinner, is like the resemblance between the natural and artificial course of the same stream. As the nature of a stream is not changed by being turned out of one channel into another; so the heart of a sinner is the same whether his visible character be good or bad. The Israelites were the same characters in the sight of God, who looketh on the heart, when they adored him in the time of adversity, that they were when they adored their idols in time of prosperity.

therefore say, that a man never acts without motive, using the term in this sense we mean only that every volition has its object, or that we never choose without an object of choice. For the justice and propriety of this definition, and explanation of the term, I appeal to the verbal and written use of the word. But,

2. The term motive denotes not only an object of choice, but it denotes the choice of an object. This moralists call the subjective sense of the term. Accordingly, Mary's motive when she embraced Christ, was good; and the motive of Judas was bad: Daniel's motive in fasting, was right; and Jezebel's was wrong.

These are the two senses in which the term motive is frequently used, by those who write and speak with propriety. And if the word be used properly in a third sense, I wish to see it pointed out, and exemplified. Motives are objective and subjective. When they are considered objectively, they only denote those objects or qualities which the agent chooses: And, when they are considered subjectively, they denote the agent's choice of some object. In the former sense, motive imports an object of choice; in the latter sense it imports the choice of an object. In one word, motive sometimes means the object of volition, and sometimes the volition itself. The difference, therefore, between motive in the objective and subjective sense, is as great as the difference between the choice of an agent, and the object which he chooses. For instance, the miser goes a journey to get money; money is his objective motive; and the

choice of money is his subjective motive. There is, therefore, as great a difference between his objective, and subjective motive, as there is between money and the love of money. Those writers therefore who use the word motive, in moral disquisitions, without marking the precise meaning of it, to say the least, are chargeable with ambiguity and obscurity. For motives, in the objective sense, are destitute of volition, and consequently destitute of morality.

I have only to add, relative to motives, that there is a subordinate motive, an ultimate motive, and a chief motive. In the subjective sense, a subordinate motive is any choice which the agent possesses for the sake of another exercise: An ultimate motive is any choice which he indulges for its own sake: A chief motive is that choice or volition which affords him the most pleasure: and, in the objective sense, of the term, subordinate, ultimate and chief objects, respectively correspond with subordinate, ultimate and principal volitions. For instance, a man purchases a valuable library that he may acquire knowledge, for the sake of being extensively useful to the public.

2. What is the import of the word end, as used by moral writers? having ascertained the different acceptations of the word motive, the import of the term, end, will be easy. For the difference between the motives and ends of an agent, in the same action, is verbal and not real. Accordingly when authors tell us, that their motives in writing are to communicate knowledge, or to gain a reputation, we know their

ends. When a man says, his motive in going a journey, is to visit a friend, or to secure an estate, we know his end. David's motive and end, in setting Uriah in the front of the battle, were the same. Absalom's motive and end, respecting the kingdom, were the same. But, any other instances are needless. For, by knowing a man's motive we know his end; and by knowing his end we know his motive. A subordinate motive is a subordinate end; an ultimate motive is an ultimate end; and a chief motive is a chief end. For every end of the agent either supposes the mere object of volition, or volition itself. And the impossibility of describing any end of an agent which is neither volition itself, nor the mere object of volition, must convince any one who will attend, that ends as well as motives, are only objective and subjective: and, therefore, that the difference between motives and ends is merely nominal and not real. For, what is the end or motive of an agent, which neither consists in volition nor in the object of volition? Who can describe it?

3. What is a moral action? A moral action is an exercise of the will, or heart of man. For, the heart of man is the only source of moral exercise. It is the heart of man which God requires; and with the heart we obey or disobey the divine command. Accordingly saith Christ, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good, and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that

which is evil. For of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh."

In other words, a moral action is the volition of a moral agent: and, not any animal, intellectual, visible, or external motion. For, the law of God, which is the only standard of moral exercise, requires the heart.

Having ascertained the import of motives, ends and actions; and shewn that moral actions, motives and ends, are the same things, because they are all the voluntary exercises of a moral agent; Having also shown that objective motives, ends and actions, are destitute of a moral nature, I beg leave to present the following inferences.

SECTION VI.

Containing several obvious Inferences.

1. We infer that Mr. T.'s argument which depends upon "*a morality in actions themselves abstractly from their motives,*"* is entirely groundless. For, we have seen that moral actions and motives are the same things. To establish the morality of actions abstractly from motives, he pleads in his sermon, as follows: "*The divine law requires that the action itself be right, as well as the motives and ends of it.*" But it is not less absurd to say, that the law requires that the action itself be right, as well as the motives of it, than to say, that the law requires that the action itself be right, as well as the action itself. For, there is no difference between moral actions and motives. Further,

* Letters, page 10.

he pleads that "*There is a right and wrong in action as well as in temper, and principle.*" He does not surely mean, that there is a right and wrong in temper, as well as in temper: He therefore must mean, if we take his meaning from his words, that there a right and wrong in mere external actions, abstractly from the volition of the agent. He adds further, that "*The omission of the external part of duty is in itself sinful, distinct from the want of right ends.*"* But what is the external part of duty distinct from right ends, or distinct from right volitions, except mere external motion? for, moral ends and volitions are the same.

In the 9th page of his letters he asserts, "*That duty consists, in some degree, in the performance of external commanded actions, distinct from the motive or end.*" Duty, therefore, in some measure consists in mere external motion. For, actions which are distinct from motives, or which are distinct from volitions, are nothing but visible motions. In the 18th page, where he unfolds and displays the contents of his theory beyond what any one has done before him, he has this notable sentence: "*What I contend for is, that the voluntary designed performance of something right in itself, and absolutely commanded by God, is an act of duty.*" This is his definition of the matter of duty. But, what is this something right in itself, the voluntary performance of which is an act of duty? it is not any thing of a voluntary nature. For, the voluntary performance of something voluntary, is a gross absurdity. His

* Sermon, page 10.

something right, then, is nothing of a moral nature. For, nothing is moral which is not voluntary. The something right in itself, therefore, for which he so earnestly contends, is something merely external. This corresponds with what he, in the 22d page, calls "*Objective goodness, in outward acts of obedience.*" It also coincides with the 23d page. For, he says, "*Actions are good not merely as expressions of love; but love chooses and performs them because they are objectively good in themselves.*" But here let us pause a moment——————What is the objective goodness of actions?————is it a volition? is it an exercise of the heart? this cannot be: for volition or exercise of heart, is the property of a moral subject; and not the property of a natural object. If then objective goodness is not subjective goodness, it is nothing of a moral nature. For, the actions of moral subjects only, are of a moral kind. It is therefore evident, that the objective goodness of actions themselves, for which he pleads, depends upon his unhappily confounding objects and subjects, or the objects of choice and the choice of objects. He loses sight of the distinction between the objective and subjective motives of the agent; and calls those actions moral which are merely natural. Hence he says, "*Actions are good, not merely as expressions of love; but love chooses, and performs them, because they are objectively good in themselves.*" But, he must see that the objective actions which a benevolent man chooses to perform, are not only destitute of love,

but destitute of volition, and consequently destitute of morality. They are nothing more than visible and bodily motions. For, they are not his volitions, but the objects of his volitions. He chooses to give bread to the hungry, for instance, not because there is any morality in bread, nor in the motion of his hand that extends it; but, because he loves his neighbour as himself. And, to ask why love chooses to give rather than to steal, if there be no moral goodness in the external act of giving separate from love, it is only to ask why love is love and not hatred, or why holiness is not sin.

But it is needless to urge the absurdity of there being any morality in actions, separate from the motive of the agent, any further. For,

II. We infer with justice, that Mr. T.'s theory of duty, destitute of holiness, depends upon uniform inconsistency, or that he is still chargeable with the abuse of words, in pleading, for "*A morality in actions themselves abstractly from their motives.*" That he has pled for "*A morality in actions themselves abstractly from their motives,*" is evident from these quotations. "*The divine law requires that the action itself be right, as well as the motives and ends of it.*" Again he says, "*There is a right and wrong in action, as well as in temper and principle.*" Further he pleads, that "*The omission of the external part of duty is in itself sinful, distinct from the want of right ends.*" He also says, "*That duty consists, in some degree, in the performance of external commanded actions, distinct from the motive or end.*"

Again, he pleads, that "*Actions are good, not merely as expressions of love, but love chooses and performs them because they are objectively good in themselves.*" And, to add no other quotations of this class; in the 10th page of his letters he contends for "*A morality in actions themselves abstractly from their motives.*" But all this he unhappily contradicts. For, in the 9th page he says, "*I fully coincide with you, that moral agents never act as such without motive, and that if men could thus act, there would be no moral good or evil in such actions any more than in the shining of the sun, or a flash of lightning.*" In the very next period he confesses, that "*The principle and motive are necessarily supposed, and inseparably united in every moral action.*" And, to crown the whole, he says, (page 14) that no judicious man, "*Unless fast asleep, ever thought of applying the name either of action, or of morality, to any thing short of the voluntary acts of the heart.*" The reader will judge for himself. But if moral agents never act as such without motive; and if the motive of the agent is inseparable from moral action; and if no man of sense, unless fast asleep, ever thought of applying the name of morality to any thing short of the heart, what becomes of Mr. T.'s argument? for he pleads for a morality in actions themselves abstractly from the motives, and that love chooses actions and performs them because they are objectively good in themselves.

III. We infer that Mr. T.'s grand attempt to support his theory by the *effective acts* of

the will, abstractly from the *particular, leading motive*, or end, of the agent, is totally groundless; and originates from a wrong view of the nature of motives. Upon the imperate or effective acts of the will abstractly from the agent's particular prompting motive, he puts great dependance. Accordingly he says, (p. 9) "*Common reason and conscience perceive a duty in the very matter of some voluntary exercises, for instance, in the designed payment of a just debt; and, a moral obliquity in others; for example, in the voluntary commission of theft and murder, which renders the agent guilty in the view of all mankind, abstractly from the particular motive or end of the commission.*" His theory is no longer mysterious. For, this explanation, in connexion with the following illustration, taken from the murder of Joash, is the KEY OF KNOWLEDGE, which unlocks and displays the fallacy of his reasoning. Reason and conscience, he says, perceive criminality in the voluntary commission of theft and murder, which renders the agent guilty in the view of all mankind, abstractly from the particular motive, or end of the commission. That is, when we see the commission of theft, we can determine that the thief is criminal, though we do not know the *particular use* which he intends to make of his stolen goods. For instance; we see a man break open his neighbour's desk and steal money (and we know he is a thief, and that the action is criminal) tho' we do not know that he steals it, to purchase a dagger, to kill the officer, to escape the judge, and the sen-

tence of death to which he is exposed for murdering his father in a distant land. This is, no doubt, our author's meaning, where he says, that "*The voluntary commission of theft renders the agent guilty, abstractly from the particular motive of the commission.*" But, what follows from our knowing that theft is criminal, without knowing whether it was committed for the sake of escaping the avenger of blood? does this prove that there is any criminality in theft, abstractly from motive? by no means. For, the criminality of stealing consists only in the agent's motive, or volition: and, though we do not know the *particular* NAME of his motive, yet we know the NATURE of it, because theft, as well as all other sins, is the fruit of selfishness. Accordingly when the apostle, in the 13th of Romans, says, "For he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law;" he immediately adds, "For this thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, &c.

That Mr. T.'s meaning has not escaped us, respecting the effective and antecedent motives of motives, of motives, of motives in the same series, it is evident from the most notable use he makes of the murder of king Joash. For, he says, "*Whether the characters and motives of the agents were good or bad, we are totally ignorant:*" and then puts this rare question: "*Now sir, let me ask you, and others in your sentiments, cannot we determine this act of murder to have been criminal, let the unknown motives of the authors have been what they may? yea, let them have been ever so conscientious and pure?*"

Were I ignorant of his past and present efforts to support his theory from this rare position, that a man may sin from good principles, I should think the printer had not done him justice. For, it is as impossible to commit murder from good motives, as it is to love God and prepare for heaven from bad motives. For murder consists in a bad motive, or volition, and not in a good one. A good murderer is a monster. And it is happy that he is known only in theory. For, his actions fall under the cognizance of no law, human or divine.

But, to return; what is the import of the question respecting Joash? Mr. T. does not mean to ask us 1. whether we can tell that the murder of Joash was criminal abstractly from any volition of the agents: for, he says, (page 10) that "*The bare act of stabbing another is confessedly indifferent in itself.*" Nor, does he ask 2. whether murder is criminal abstractly from criminal volition. For, to adopt his own phrase, it is "*The voluntary commission of murder*" of which he is treating. Nor 3. does he ask whether murder is criminal adstractly from any motive whatever? for, he says (page 9 & 14) that "*Moral agents never act as such without motive;*" and that "*Choice or voluntary action implies and arises from motive.*"

If, then, his question be not this, whether murder be criminal, abstractly from volition; nor abstractly from criminal volition; nor abstractly from motive, he means to ask us whether we cannot tell that the murder of Joash was criminal, though we do not know that

his servants killed him for the sake of honour, profit or revenge——And, I willingly answer that we can determine the criminality of their conduct in murdering their king, though we do not know the NAME of the *particular* motive by which they were actuated. For, murder is criminality itself. But, what is the consequence of our knowing that murder is murder, or that murder is criminal, though we do not know the *name* of the agent's motive? Mr. T. replies, "*If you say you can determine this act of murder to have been criminal, let the unknown motives of the authors have been what they may, you allow a morality in actions themselves, abstractly from their motives.* To say that I deny the consequence, and that Mr. T. is chargeable with a great mistake, is needless. I do not allow the morality of actions, abstractly from *their motives.* For, motives belong to AGENTS and not to *actions:* and the moral actions and motives of agents are the same. All that I allow in answering his question is this, that murder is a criminal action or motive, though I do not know whether the agents were actuated by pride, or revenge. But, this will never establish the morality of actions, abstractly from the morality of mtioves, any more than it will establish the morality of actions, abstractly from the morality of actions. For, the effective motive and volition of the agent are the same. And, though we do not know the particular *name* of the motive, or volition, by which these Regicides were influenced; yet we know the *nature* of it. For, all

motives forbidden by the sixth command, are by scripture and *universal consent*, styled murder. Mr. T.'s question therefore is finally reduced to this, whether the effective volition of an agent is not as really moral as any volition which precedes it in the same series? but this no one disputes: nor is it to his purpose. For, it does not follow, that there is a morality in actions, abstractly from motive, because we can determine the moral quality of one action, without knowing the name of another. And, if he had accurately defined his terms, and marked the difference between objective and subjective motives; and used words steadily, according to the common acceptation, he would escape the heavy tax of advocating that theory which requires so much help from ambiguity and obscurity.

But, what are the grounds of his mistake in his first argument? 1. He takes it for granted, that the morality of the agent's motive, and his voluntary choice, are not the same. Accordingly, he says, (page 14) "*The choice implies motive, yet it is not the same thing, but plainly distinguishable from it.*" But, tho' he was repeatedly urged to define his terms, and to point out the supposed difference between motive and choice, yet he has not done it. But, shall he be blamed? for, who can ascertain the difference between good motives of heart, and good exercises of heart? for, we have all been taught by the best authorities, to say, that Mary's motive in saluting Christ was good, and the motive of Judas was bad. But,

2. The original ground of his mistake lies in taking it for granted, that mere externals, which are the natural expressions of the heart, are of a moral nature. Accordingly he says, (page 11) "*That duty or sin consists, in some degree, in the performance or omission of external commanded actions, distinct from the motive or end.*" But, this every one must see, who can examine things, is deeply erroneous. For, it proves that hypocrisy is a duty; because hypocrisy consists only in performing those external actions with a bad heart, which are the genuine expressions of a good heart. Agreeably, while God requires sacrifices and offerings, as expressions of love, he utterly forbids and rejects them when destitue of love. But, the following narration will perhaps display the mistake to advantage. "A noted vintager, at a proper time, directed his servants to go to his distant vineyard and gather grapes. They attended to his command with apparent obedience only: for, they had no intention to comply with it. A went a mile, B two miles, and C three miles, toward the vineyard. But, gladly meeting with their vicious companions, spent the day with them in idleness, and never went into the vineyard. At night they all returned, and the master asked them whether they had done their duty? they unitedly pled that they had done part of their duty. What part have you done, said the master? I went a mile toward the vineyard, said A, I went two miles, said B: and C pled three miles of duty. But, the master called them idle villains, and told them, up-

on ascertaining their motives, that they had done no part of their duty in the least degree. Query, were not the servants acquainted with Mr. T.'s theory either by nature or education? and did not C. perform three times as much duty as A.? "*For duty, says our theorist, consists in some degree, in the performance of external commanded action, distinct from the motive or end.*"

From this view of Mr. T.'s reply, it appears quite needless to vindicate those particular illustrations, which were improved against it in the first part of the dialogue. He pleads that they are not pertinent: but, when the reader remembers that they were intended to expose the notion of external duty, abstractly from motive, for which Mr. T. so often and ernestly contends, the pertinency of them will be allowed in the face of his liberal exceptions. He says, they are calculated to catch and impose on vulgar minds, and has laboured hard to expose them; but, I can cheerfully submit them, when restored to the connexion in which they were used, to discerning minds. For, the morality of actions is nothing more nor less than the morality of the agent's motives, or the morality of his volitions. Moral actions, motives, ends and volitions, are the same: and these are good or bad, not according to the rule of appearance, but accordingly as they are conformed or opposed to the law of God.

SECTION VII.

Containing several other Strictures on the Defence of his First Argument.

The next thing which merits attention is, the dilemma to which he is evidently reduced, by discarding, and yet retaining his darling position, that a man may sin from a holy principle. This position he has made the very basis of his first argument. For, he pleads, "*Though a person should exercise a good principle, in the neglect of any external action which God has commanded, his neglect would still be sinful.*" Then he concludes thus: "*Now if the omission of external actions, commanded by God, be in itself sinful, it necessarily follows, that the doing of them is a duty.*" This is his method of proving, that there is a right and wrong in action as well as in temper and principle. But, the fallacy of this reasoning was detected in the dialogue, by shewing the impossibility of a man's sinning from good principles. For, all sin consists in a bad principle or temper, and not in a good one. And, to set the matter in a clear light, the following cases were put, the pertinency of which he has frankly allowed. Mendicus is a real beggar, and consequently a proper object of charity: and Generosus is a man of fortune, who loves to help the needy. But, though Mendicus appears to others to be an object of charity, he does not appear in this light to Generosus. He does not therefore impart his favours to Mendicus, because he thinks it wrong to encourage needless beggars. Now,

the question is not this; whether Generosus is faulty not in seeing that Mendicus is a real object of charity? For, according to the supposition, Mendicus is a real beggar, and exhibits ample evidence to others of his distressing poverty. But, this is the case of conscience; whether it is the duty of Generosus to bestow his charity upon one, who he conscientiously thinks, does not need it? And, it is easy to see, that it is not his duty: for it is certainly wrong for a man to act contrary to the present light and voice of conscience. In this given case, then, Generosus does not neglect his duty, from a good principle. It is not his duty to violate conscience. For, whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. The other case which I put was of this nature. A certain express is obliged to cross the wilderness in so many hours, to deliver a packet to an officer whose detachment is in the greatest danger of being cut off by the enemy. The general directs him to go twenty miles to the parting of the way, and then to take the right hand, and not the left hand path. But, in consequence of criminal inattention to his seasonable instructions, he really thinks, when he comes to the parting of the way, that he was directed to take the left hand and not the right. Now, what is his duty at the division of the way, while he really thinks he was directed to take the left hand? shall he take the left hand, according to his present judgment, or shall he take the right hand, contrary to it? the case is obvious; and there is no dilemma. The least child, as well as the most

able casuist, says, it is his duty in present circumstances to take the left hand. In this given case, then, he is not faulty. For, he acts according to his best judgment. But, in not paying proper attention to his seasonable instructions, he was very faulty.

But, let us now attend to Mr. T.'s reply. For, he must either approve this reasoning or disapprove it, or approve and disapprove it both, and make the best he can of a most intolerable dilemma. He says (page 12) with his usual freedom, "*I shall just observe, that all your reasoning is easily answered by only distinguishing between those practical errors of the judgment which are invincible, and therefore innocent; and those which are voluntary and criminal. If a person is invincibly ignorant of the rule of duty in any given case, it does not reach him in that case; it is to him no law, and therefore no transgression. With respect, then, to the cases you put, if a real object of charity exhibit evidence of his being so, you are bound by the law of God to treat him as such. Nor is your obligation cancelled by want of full evidence, that he is such an object. For you had sufficient means of instruction presented. And yet, if you help him in contradiction to your present erroneous judgment, you sin, because you do it not conscientiously.*"

But, where is our Theorist now? If I mistake not, he both sees and feels the force of a dilemma. For, must Generosus sin in giving to Mendicus, and sin in not giving too, amid the same circumstances? if he act according to his conscience, he sins, and if he act con-

trary to his conscience, he sins. This is a hard case indeed. Is there no way for him to escape sin, in *this* given case? let us then, for the sake of relief, appeal to Mr. T.'s rule of invincible ignorance just stated. If, says he, "*If a person is invincibly ignorant of the rule of duty in any given case, obligation does not reach him in that case; it is to him no law, and therefore there can be no transgression.*" The application of this rule to the case before us is easy and natural. For, is not Generosus invincibly ignorant that it is his duty to treat Mendicus as an object of charity, while he conscientiously thinks that he is a needless beggar? withholding charity, therefore in this given case is not sinful. For, says Mr. T. "*If you help him in contradiction to your present judgment, you sin because you do it not conscientiously.*" But, let us apply this "*invincible rule*" to the kindred case. Is not the express at the parting of the way, invincibly ignorant of the rule of direction? is it not naturally impossible for him to think that he ought to take the right hand, while he conscientiously thinks that he was directed to take the left? it is therefore evident, according to Mr. T. whose authority I prize in this instance, that the rule of direction does not reach him in this given case. It is to him no law, and therefore there can be no transgression, in his taking the left hand path, according to his present judgment. The consequence is then obvious, that in all given cases of this nature, persons do not neglect duty from a good principle. For, it is never a man's duty to violate

his conscience. It is also equally obvious, that Mr. T. has supplanted himself. For, he thinks he has proved that there is a morality in actions, distinct from motive, because it would be sinful for a person to neglect any part of his duty from a good principle.

On the whole I thank him for his happy distinction between vincible and invincible ignorance: and am pretty sure he will never plead again, that it is possible for a man to sin from a good principle. But, if he should renew his plea *conscientiously*, I shall apply the foregoing rule and impute no iniquity.*

The reader will keep in mind, that the question in debate is this, "*Whether any thing is required of man as duty, which does not involve holy love?*" to prove that God does not require any thing but what involves holy love, I cited this text, "Love is the fulfilling of the law." And, I still think it saps the foundation of his theory. For how can love be the fulfilment of the law, if any actions be required which are

* But, according to this doctrine, says the objector, Paul did his duty in persecuting Christ; for he verily thought, that he ought to do many things, contrary to the name of Jesus. Answer. By no means. For, duty neither consists in an erroneous conscience, nor in a rightly informed conscience; but, duty invariably consists only in good motives, or in good exercises of heart. Paul did not, therefore, do any part of his duty in persecuting christians. For the spirit of persecution is a wrong motive, or exercise of heart. Accordingly that he was exceedingly mad against them, he amply and most humbly confesses. The objection destroys itself. For it is as impossible to persecute Christ from good motives, as it is to love him with all the heart, while we hate him with all the heart. The spirit of persecution is a bad motive and not a good motive; and is invariably forbidden.

beg leave to remind him of this parallel one, in the 11th of Luke. "Ye Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness." It was obviously the heart, which Christ directed them to cleanse first, and not the inside of their cups and platters in a literal sense. As often therefore as Mr. T. directs sinners to perform any actions which are destitute of repentance, he departs from the plain direction of Christ, who says, "Cleanse first that which is within."

But Mr. T. has another construction at hand. For he says, "*If the sense frequently given the words should be allowed, they would not conclude against the duty of sinners to reform their lives 'till their hearts were first purified. For, the word* PROTON *as properly and commonly signifies chiefly as first, and I grant, internal purity ought to be the chief concern of every man.*" But, this is granting all that I desire. For, if internal purity ought to be the chief concern of every man, his theory is groundless; and he has no warrant to direct sinners to perform any actions antecedently to repentance. For, that which is of the most importance, may not be neglected or postponed for any thing else; but it must be done immediately.

The sense of this text, "Cleanse first that which is within the cup and the platter, that the outside of them may be clean also," will give us the meaning of another in the same chapter, which has by Mr. T. been pressed into the service of his theory. The text referred

to is this, "These ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone." Now, to what duties does the word *these* refer? Mr. T. supposes that it refers to the tithes of mint and other herbs. But, he is evidently mistaking the matter. For, judgment and the love of God are spoken of last in the connexion, and are the antecedents of the relative *these* according to grammatical construction, as the famous Dr. Guise, and others, have observed. Agreeably, says the Dr. "The greatest of all woes hangs over your heads, ye hipocritical Pharisees, for ye are wonderful exact in paying tithes of mint and rue and at the same time shamefully neglect justice, righteousness, and sincere affection to God. Whereas ye ought to have done *these* duties in the first place.' This is all natural and easy. Their tithing is condemned as hypocritical, because they tithed without love to God. To say, therefore, as Mr. T. does, that the word *these* refers to tithes, is to say that tithing, without love, is a duty, while it is the very hypocrisy for which Christ condemned the pharisees. For, Christ styled them the blackest hypocrites, because they tithed without love. When Christ says, "These ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone," the import is obviously this: Ye ought to love God and man sincerely, and to pay your tithes as expressions of your love; but since you are destitute of love, your tithing is nothing but the most hateful hypocrisy. On this principle *only*, Christ charged them with hypocrisy. And we canno

prove, that tithing without love is a duty, without proving that the charge was groundless.

To reduce this cardinal text to the level of duty, destitute of holiness, Mr. T. has laboured hardly, namely, "Whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." But, his labour is in vain. For, if God directs men to do every action with love to his glory, no one has a scriptural warrant to direct them to do any actions, which are destitute of love. The argument is short, but conclusive. But, Mr. T. has an easy answer at hand. For, he says, (page 27) "*Our being directed to do every thing as christians, no more concludes against directing sinners to do some things previous to their exercising the christian spirit, than our being commanded to do all things as sinless creatures concludes against the requirment of the imperfect, though holy, exercises of christians.*" This is his reply: but it will not bear examination. For, it takes it for granted, that God requires imperfect holiness, and that it is proper to direct men to perform actions which are sinfully imperfect. But, this supposition is inadmissible. It is not true that God requires any thing short of perfect holiness. For, God is perfect and his law is perfect, and man has natural ability to be perfect; and God can no more require less than perfection, than he can cease to be the perfect Governor of the universe. I therefore demand plain and positive proof, that God requires of man, in any instance whatever, less than perfect holiness. And, if Mr. T. cannot produce an imperfect

command which requires imperfect holiness, his theory cannot be supported by scripture.

But Mr. T. says, "*God requires the performance of right actions, as well as a regard to right ends in them: and the sinner's neglect of the latter does not vacate his obligation to the former, which is equally and absolutely commanded.*" This reasoning is fallacious. For moral actions, and moral ends are the same. And, to say that God requires the performance of right actions as well as the performance of right actions, is saying nothing which in this place merits a reply.

The next thing which occurs, is, our author's method of treating this obvious truth, that the sinner, who is confessedly destitute of godly honesty, does no part of his duty in the sight of his heart-searching Judge by paying a just debt, according to the mere demand of the civil law. This sentiment he has harped upon in very popular strains. For, he says, (page 27) "*Are not the common sense, and feelings of mankind, shocked by the assertion, that it is wicked for an unconverted man even to do justice, and speak the truth to his neighbour?*" But is this solid argument, or only popular declamation? For, the question is not this, as I have carefully remarked in stating the grounds of the debate; whether sinners are under obligations to pay their honest debts and speak the truth; for we all know that they are as much obliged to keep the divine commands, as saints. But this is the question; Whether men, while wholly destitute of godly honesty, do any part

of their duty in the sight of God, by only paying their just debts, according to the mere requirement of the civil law? and, it is obvious that they do not. For, the civil law requires the mere external payment of debts only, without any regard to the nature of the agent's motive. But, the divine law requires godly honesty, and nothing short of it, in the payment of every debt. With equal pertinency, therefore, Mr. T. may ask, "*Are not the common sense and feelings of mankind shocked by the assertion,*" that the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord? for, God as really forbids a man's paying his debts from wrong motives, as sacrificing or praying from wrong motives.

The truth is this, as stated in the 44th page of the Dialogue. The sinner is under obligations to love God immediately. He neither has therefore a divine warrant to pay his just debts, nor to omit paying them with an unjust heart; to pray, nor to omit praying with a prayerless heart; to perform the externals of religion without love, nor to omit them without love. He must therefore repent immediately, and pay his debts, and pray, and do every thing else with love to the honour and glory of God, according to the apostle's direction.

This is plain truth. For, God requires no actions now which he will not approve and reward, for the sake of Christ, at the great day.

We as warmly plead, that sinners ought to pay their just debts, and discharge all their moral obligations, according to the divine re-

quirement, as Mr. T. or any other man: and no one has a right to insinuate the reverse. But, we cannot digest his sentiment, that a man does some part of his duty in the sight of God, by delivering a sum of money to a creditor, with views directly base and wicked. Nor are we willing to be hampered with his inconsistency on this subject. For, he says (page 18) "*If a person should attend the christian sacrament with carnal views, however punctually he might perform the external actions required in it, yet he would not discharge any part of commanded duty, because a religious manner of eating and drinking belongs to the very substance of the ordinance.*" But in the 19th page he says, "*Suppose a person does an action, the very substance of which is right and good, such as the payment of a just debt without any regard to its moral fitness; yea, with views directly wicked; can he be said to do the matter of duty?*" Then he answers thus: "*A man may do such an act of justice from a moral sense of duty.*" These sentences display a most palpable inconsistency. For, God requires us to perform every action of life to his glory. A *religious manner* of paying debts is therefore as much required of debtors, as a *religious manner* of attending the sacrament is required of communicants. To say, therefore, that a man does some part of his duty, in the sight of God, in delivering money to a creditor with carnal views, and that the man who goes to the sacrament with carnal views, does no part of his duty, is only to beg the question in dispute. It is as much impossible for a man

to pay a civil debt in any respect, as God requires, without holiness, as it is to go to the sacrament in any respect, as God requires without holiness. For, God requires, us to do both with a single eye, to his glory. Mr. T.'s mistake, therefore, appears to be this, that he makes a mere civil command of that command of God which requires us to pay our honest debts. But, we must remember that God, as well as Cæsar, requires us to pay our debts. The command, therefore, is a holy command: and *a holy manner of paying debts belongs to the very substance of the duty enjoined:* no debt is paid, in any respect in the sight of God without holiness.

In a word, to prevent all future mistakes respecting this matter, it is not Cæsar's command which we say a man does not in any respect obey, while he pays his civil debt with wicked views: for Cæsar is satisfied with the mere external payment, and has no respect to the temper of the agent. But it is God's command which we say a man does not obey in any respect who pays a civil debt without holiness. For, God requires the heart, and judges not according to the appearance. And, if Mr. T. can be persuaded not to blend and confound, externals and internals, and mere civil actions and moral actions together, we shall meet with no difficulty. For, 1. It has been proved, and he has granted, that there is no obedience to God in mere external actions. And 2. It has been proved, that there is no obedience to God in the effective volitions or motives

of the sinner, because they are like other exercises of his heart, which is totally depraved.

In his first publication, Mr. T. had tacked to my theory, this unnatural consequence, viz. "*That a man ought to have preponderating evidence that he is in a regenerate state, in order to his warrantably doing any external action whatever. For he that doutbteh is damned if he eat.*"

This consequence I needlessly adopted; and to defend it, advanced a number of things which he has ingeniously invalidated. For his pertinent remarks in this particular instance, I give him honour, and hope never to withhold it in a similar instance.

But, with justice, I now deny the consequence. For the command of God, and not the evidence of regeneration, is the rule of duty. My theory is this, that no action is a duty in the sight of God, which action is destitute of love. For, love is the fulfilling of the law. And, does it hence follow that a man who is destitute of love, has no warrant to begin to love God, till he has evidence that he has loved him? It does not, any more than it follows that it was not Adam's duty to be perfect till after he was perfect, because his duty consisted in perfection; or, that it was not Noah's duty to make the ark, till he had made it, because it was his duty to make it. If my theory were this, that the evidence of obedience is the rule of obedience, the consequence would be inseparable and undeniable, that a man may never do any thing without

evidence of his previous obedience: and not only so, but that he who is destitute of love to God, has no liberty to begin to love him. But, this sentiment has no connexion with my doctrine. For, as just remarked, I plead, that love only is the fulfilling of the law, or that there is no duty in actions which are destitute of love. It is evident, therefore, that the command of God is a sufficient warrant for any man to begin to do his duty, who has always neglected it, and to do it perfectly. To illustrate the sentiment, if needful, we will take a case from scripture. "Men and brethren," said the distressed multitude, "what shall we do?" Then said Peter unto them, "Repent," &c. To repent, therefore, according to his direction, was their duty. And, thus in every instance the command of God authorizes a man to do what is required, whether he has evidence of having been the subject of obedience or not. Mr. T. has most impertinently, therefore applied this text: "he that doubteth is damned if he eat." For, the apostle means only, that a man condemns himself who does an action while he doubts whether it be commanded. If this were the meaning of the text, that a man condemns himself who begins to obey God, before he has evidence that he has obeyed him, it would have been pertinently quoted by our author; but, now it is not. For, it is one thing to doubt, whether God commands us to love him with all our hearts, and our neighbours as ourselves: and another to doubt, whether we have acted

accordingly. I will only add, that he who knows his Master's will, must do it immediately, whether he has evidence of having done it before or not. For the command of God is the rule of duty. And no man can be at a loss what he ought to do first, except the one who forgets the Bible, and is bewildered with Mr. T.'s theory. For Christ says, "Cleanse first that which is within, and seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness."

The strange and unnatural branch, therefore, which Mr. T. has attempted to graft upon our olive, is the natural growth of his own wild tree. For, while he pleads for the morality of actions, abstractly from motives, and yet flatly denies that moral agents ever act as such without motive; while he pleads for the objective goodness of actions as in themselves; and yet calls actions indifferent which are destitute of good or bad design, what poor sinner can tell the matter of duty from the matter of sin? for, a theory which depends upon the sliding and obscure use of these numerous terms and phrases, the matter of an action, the manner of an action, the motive of an action, the end of an action, the principle of an action, the circumstance of an action, the substance of an action, the objective goodness of an action, the negative goodness of an action, and the moral goodness of actions abstractly from motives, must necessarily subject unlearned sinners, to several doubts and difficulties respecting the practice of the matter of duty. *

* As Mr. T. has attempted to make his readers believe

SECTION VIII.

The Defence of Mr. T.'s Second, Third, and Fourth Arguments Examined.

"*My second argument*, he says, *was drawn from the acknowledged encouragement which God has given sinners to attend the means of grace while unregenerate, as the only likely way to obtain regeneration and salvation. From whence I concluded, that such an attention must be a duty, since God never encourages men to sin.*"

The specious influence of this argument, to prove that God requires actions of men which are destitute of holiness, depends upon the ambiguous use of the word *encouragement*. For, Mr. T. must know, that according to the inspired use of the word, divine encouragement is equivalent to a divine promise. Hence it is repeatedly said, "Charge Joshua, and encourage him, and strengthen him; for, he

that I make "Full assurance of faith" a necessary qualification for sacramental communion, I take this opportunity to inform tender minds, that at his own expense he inserted the phrase "*Full assurance.*" For, I never made use of the phrase *full assurance* in the connexion. Nor do I think that churches ought to make it the term of admission. The least preponderating evidence of gracious sincerity, authorizes a person, according to the rules of the gospel, to ask for admission to christian communion, and when the church have the least credible evidence, that he is really the subject of gracious sincerity, they are authorized to receive him as the friend of Christ. To hear proponents talk of their infallible knowledge and full assurance, is not grateful. For, bold confident professors have too often outlived their religion, and deeply wounded the cause of truth. The little trembling tree has generally taken the deepest root in the garden of the Lord, an d born the most and the best ripe fruit.

shall go over before this people." It was also upon the immoveable footing of the divine promise, that David encouraged himself in the Lord his God, and that Josiah encouraged the faithful service of the Levites in the house of the Lord.

Having, therefore, *once* more corrected the *wrong* and *dangerous* use of the word *encouragement*, we will carefully state his argument, and try the strength of his defence. *Probability* is the word which properly expresses the sentiment under consideration. For, he does not hold that salvation is promised to the faithfulness of the unrenewed. The argument then is this in all its strength: *It is more probable that sinners who perform the mere externals of religion will be saved, than those who do not; those, therefore, who perform them, do some part of their duty.* I am cordially ready to grant as before, that it is much more probable that sinners will be saved who read the Bible, and steadily hear the gospel, than though they were wholly inattentive, and stupid. But, does it follow, that sinners do their duty merely because they are the subjects of that attention which increases the probability of their salvation? By no means. For, it is more probable that profane persons, who read the Bible and hear the gospel preached from Sabbath, to Sabbath, only to get an opportunity to ridicule the truth, will be saved, than though they did neither. How many instances have been recorded of the conviction and conversion of profane men, in consequence of going to the house of God, when

they went only to catch an opportunity to defame christianity? And, does it follow, that they did any part of their duty merely because they were more likely to be saved, than tho' they had not given this attention? it does not; any more than it follows, that a wicked man does his duty, who cultivates his land to raise a crop only to feed his lusts; and yet cultivating his land is the only probable method to obtain a harvest. The reader is sensible that Mr. T.'s argument is founded wholly upon the doctrine of probability. Since, therefore, many actions which are confessedly wicked, are evidently connected with the probability of great good to the agents themselves, as well as to others, his argument fails. Probability will not support it any more than possibility or impossibility.

But, says Mr. T. "*Can any one in his senses believe, that God is constantly encouraging men to sin; and even binding them to it, by the ties of their own everlasting interest; that he is continually letting them know, that they must do that which is nothing but sin, or else their is no probability of their salvation!*" To this pathetic petition I willingly reply: no person in his senses can believe it. For, God can no more encourage men to sin, than he can promise them a reward for sinning. But, what then? what has this to do with the argument fetched from probability? for, cannot God offer Christ to sinners and encourage them to receive him by the motive of everlasting life, without encouraging them to reject him by the motive of

everlasting death? if so the objection is groundless, as observed in the Dialogue, p. 55.

But where lies his mistake? he evidently takes it for granted, that it is both contrary to fact and the rectitude of Providence, that the same sinners are ever more likely to be saved when their sins are greater, than when they are less. But he must grant, that it is more probable that gospel sinners will be saved, than untutored heathens: he must also grant, that gospel sinners are more guilty than ignorant heathens; it is, therefore, evident that Providence renders it frequently more probable, that greater sinners will be saved than less ones. Who does not see that the Africans, who are brought into a land of light, where they are favoured with the best family and public instructions, are both greater sinners, and yet more likely to be saved, than they were before their removal from their native land? Mr. T. therefore, must not conclude, that the probability of conversion depends upon the decrease of sin. For, it is a fact that the increase of the probability of salvation is frequently attended with the increase of sinfulness. Nothing, therefore, can be more groundless in this connexion than that maxim of our author, "*That God's providence is a sure explanation of his will in his word.*"* p. 36. For,

* President Edwards says, "God has not given us his Providence, but his word to be our governing rule. God is a Sovereign in his dispensations. He bestowed this blessing on Jacob, even when he had a lie in his mouth. He was pleased to meet with Solomon and bless him, while he was worshipping in an high place. He met with Saul

while God in his word commands sinners to repent and come to Christ immediately, his providence waits on them all their lives. While God sent the prophet, by his word, to tell the Jews to reform; he sent him in his providence to make blind eyes blinder, and hard hearts harder. While, God, in his word, directed Pharaoh to let his people go, in the course of divine Providence, he hardened his heart that he refused.

On the whole, as long as Mr. T. makes the ground of his argument mere probability, it will inevitably follow, that the wicked who plow and sow with the basest designs, are in some measure obedient, because the cultivation of the earth is the only probable method to obtain a harvest. It will also follow, according to his argument, as shewn in the Dialogue, that the Jews were in some measure obedient to God, in killing the Lord of glory, because there was no probability, nor possibility of salvation without his death.

Mr. T. says (page 37) "*I may venture to say, you do not cordially view the cases as parallel.*" Answer. But this is a venture indeed, and

when going to Demascus to persecute Christ. The conduct of Providence, with its reasons, is too little understood by us, to be improved as our rule. God has his way in the sea, his path in the mighty waters, and his footsteps are not known: and he gives no account of any of his matters. But, God has given us his word to this very end, that it might be our rule: and therefore has fitted it to be so; has so ordered it that it may be understood by us. And, strictly speaking, this is our only rule. If we join any thing else to it, as making it our rule, we do that for which we have no warrant, yea, that which God himself has forbidden."

no argument. For, the parallel certainly holds good in point of probability, and it is needed in no other respect. He undertook to prove, that sinners do their duty by attending to means from this single consideration, that the probability of their salvation depends upon their attention. But, we find the argument will not bear examination. For, to recall the cases referred to; it will follow from this method of reasoning, that profligates who attend to means only to ridicule religion, do their duty in some measure, because it is more probable they will be saved, than though they did not attend: it will also follow, that those who cultivate their land to get a crop, only to feed their lusts, do their duty in some measure, because cultivating land is the only method to obtain a harvest. They *are* parallel cases: and the parallel holds so strong that it destroys his argument fetched from probability. These therefore are his only alternatives: he must either give up his argument from probability, or run in a circle. But he prefers the latter. Accordingly he says (page 35) "*Though there may be a probability of reaping in case of tilling with the basest exercises of heart, yet this probability has no connexion with such wicked exercises or ends.*" This he says to shew that the probaility of reaping, when men sow with bad views, is not so great as when they sow with good views. Then he concludes "*So a diligent attention to means is encouraged: and this encouragement or probability of conversion bears some proportion to the seriousness, and earnest-*

ness of such attention: for, the mock attention of the profligate by no means presents such a prospect of conversion as the solemn attention of awakened souls." But, where is our author now? for, instead of proving that the attention of sinners is duty, from the probability of salvation in consequence of their attention, he proves that the probability of their salvation is greater or less in proportion to the degree of their serious attention. Since, therefore, his second argument proves the duty of sinners from the probability of their salvation: and the probability of their salvation from their duty, we must leave it. For, arguments which depend upon running in a circle, need only to be explained and not to be confuted.

"*My third argument*, says Mr. T. *was built on the received doctrine of a divine influence which operates on the minds of sinners under the gospel assisting, and exciting them to many serious exercises, both internal and external: from whence I concluded that such exercises are not sinful but right.*" The fallacy of this argument as shewn before, is obvious from this consideration, that agreeably to the third section, the moral exercises of sinners are totally wicked. Sinners always resist the Holy Spirit. Instead, therefore, of doing their duty under conviction, they greatly enhance their guilt. Accordingly, says the spirit of inspiration "to him that knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin: and he that knoweth his master's will and doth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes:" and "ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." This immoveable difficulty lies in his way.

But I will once more attempt to disclose the ground of his mistake. His argument evidently rests upon this groundless supposition, that those actions which are caused or influenced by the spirit of God, must be morally good. Accordingly he says, (page 33) "*You must intend, that these exercises though influenced by the Holy Ghost are in no respect right, but sinful.*" But this reasoning will not hold. For 1. it will equally prove that the heavens are morally good, because God garnished them by his spirit: and that the waters are morally good, because the spirit of God moved upon the face of them in creation. The maxim is false, that all those exercises must be morally good, which are caused by the spirit of God. Agreeably, says President Edwards, whose authority has its weight: "The spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters: and so he may act upon the minds of men many ways, and not communicate himself any more than when he acts on inanimate things. (Religious affections, page 137.) But, 2. If the exercises of sinners are morally good, merely because they are caused by God, they must be holy exercises. As the moral quality of the effect is argued from the moral quality of the cause, so it necessarily follows that convictions are holy exercises, because the author of them is holy. But this I suppose proves rather more than Mr. T. expected. There is in short nothing more false, than this maxim of our author, that the effect is of the same quality with its cause. For, if the essence of virtue does not lie in the very nature of virtue itself: And if

the essence of vice does not lie in the very nature of vice, it is easy to shew that there are no virtuous nor vicious exercises in the universe. Agreeably, says Edwards in his opposition to Arminian writers: "That which makes vice hateful, is it's hateful nature: and that which renders virtue lovely is it's lovely nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity which is inherent in the good or evil will, which is the soul of virtue and vice, and not in the occasion of it which is their worthiness of praise or dispraise according to the common sense of mankind."* And I wish Mr. T. would not only read, but digest that section of Edwards "*on the essence of virtue and vice.*" For, it destroys the principle of his third argument.

On the whole we have no more reason to conclude that the exercises of convinced trembling sinners are duties, than we have to conclude that the exercises of convinced trembling reprobates are duties. For the nature of these exercises is the same, whether the subjects of them are the prisoners of hope or the prisoners of despair. Accordingly, James compared the exercises of sinners with the exercises of devils: and when Mr. T. proves that the apostle's comparison is unjust, I will withdraw mine.

His fourth argument to prove that God requires duties which are destitue of holiness, presents next, as follows:

"*The Holy Spirit is the great convincer of sin: hence, if there was nothing right in the best exercises of the unregenerate, we may con-*

* Freedom of Will, page 274.

clude the Holy Spirit would always convince men of this, when he operated on their minds in conviction. But, is this the case with awakened sinners? surely, no."

To this we replied, not from the mere experience of men; but, from the inspired declaration of the apostle. "For, though Paul, before his conversion, was an advocate for actions destitute of holiness, yet after his conversion he thought very differently: and under the guidance of inspiration, calls actions, destitute of love, nothing." But Mr. T. says, (page 42) "*You have a little misquoted the apostle's words: For, he styles himself nothing without love, that is no true christian.*" What Mr. T. says here, relative to my citing the identical words of the apostle, is not pertinent. For, there is no difference between Paul's styling himself *nothing*, and his graceless actions NOTHING: because, if his graceless actions were something in point of obedience, he could not with propriety call himself nothing.

I further proved, that good men repent of all their unrenewed sorrow in consequence of sin, from this consideration, that all sorrow must be repented of, but godly sorrow. For, the apostle evidently knows of no sorrow but godly sorrow, and the sorrow of the world. The former, he tells us, worketh repentance not to be repented of; but the latter worketh death. And who can warrantably plead for the duty of that sorrow which worketh death? but, what is our author's reply? he says (page 43) "*Calvin understands this godly sorrow to mean that*

grief for sin which is previous and preparatory to saving repentance." To this I cannot but reply; if Mr. T. had quoted the authority of Dr. Whitby, that distinguished Arminian, to remove his difficulty, he would have hit it exactly. For, the doctor says, in opposition to calvinists, "Godly sorrow though it arises from the motives which God and his good spirit suggest is yet the sorrow of the convinced sinner." (page 266.) But, whether Mr. T. had a right to refer to Calvin as an authority, without quoting a word from him, the publick have now an opportunity to judge. For, *Calvin* says, (page 284)* while treating of conversion; "But because the turning beginneth at the abhorring and hatred of sin, therefore, the apostle maketh sorrowfulness such as is, according to God, the cause of repentance. And he calls the sorrowfulness according to God, when we are not only afraid of punishment, but do hate and abhor sin itself, for as much as we understand it displeaseth God."† This passage is quoted from the very section which Mr. T. refers to in *Calvin's* Institutes, without quoting him. The most favourable construction I can put upon the matter is this, that M. T. was in too great haste to examine *Calvin* carefully. For, that godly sorrow, which according to *Calvin*,

* Norton's Translation.

† Quoniam vero a peccati horrore et odio conversio inchoatur, ideo tristitiam quæ secundum Deum est penitentiæ causam facit Apostolus. Tristitiam autem secundum Deum appellat, ubi non pœnam modo exhorremus, sed peccatum ipsum, ex quo displicere Deo intelligimus, odimus and execramur. *Instit. Lib. 3. Cap. 3. Sect. 7.*

consists in the hatred and abhorrence of sin itself, not only because we are afraid of punishment, but because sin displeases God, never was, and never will be, the sorrow of the impenitent sinner. The apostle himself, who says, that "Godly sorrow worketh repentance," was never the subject of godly sorrow, if it did not consist in hating and abhoring sin itself, because it displeases God. But, beside what has been said, it is a violation of scripture to say, that godly sorrow is destitute of holiness. For, with the same propriety Mr. T. may plead, that godly fear, or godly jealousy, or godly sincerity, and even godliness itself, is destitute of holiness; and refer to *Calvin* without quoting him for authority. "But it is as evident that godly sorrow is a holy exercise, as that godly fear and godly sincerity are holy exercises.

As Mr. T. had challenged an instance of christians confessing, that all their moral actions, before regeneration, were sinful in all respects, I cited a passage from *David Brainerd's* life, which he carefully revised and fitted for the press, (under the eye of president *Edwards*) just before his death. I saw, said Mr. B. "I saw it was selfishness had led me to pray. O how different did my duties now appear from what they used to! I used to charge them with sin and imperfection; but it was only on account of the wanderings and vain thoughts attending them. But, when I saw, evidently, that I had regard to nothing but self-interest, then they appeared vile mockery of God, self worship, and a continual course of lies. I saw

the whole was nothing but self-worship and a horrid abuse of God."

Mr. T. in replying to this human authority, is the most unfortune. For, from some cause or other, he unhapiply mistakes Mr. *Brainerd's* renewed exercises for his unrenewed ones, though the distinction is clearly marked in the relation. Mr. *Brainerd* in this passage, as every kindred heart can testify, is modestly contrasting his renewed and unrenewed exercises. Accordingly he says, "Before *this* the more I did in duty the more I thought God was obliged to me. But, *now* the more I did in prayer, &c. the more I saw I was indebted to God for allowing me to ask for mercy." But, says Mr. T. upon this very sentence: "*Here observe, he not only calls his performances duties; but says, that God allowed him to ask for mercy, and he was greatly indebted to him for it. Surely he does not mean that* HE WAS GREATLY INDEBTED TO GOD FOR ALLOWING HIM TO SIN!!" I have only to desire Mr. T. to read that relation of experiences with impartiality; and he will find that Mr. B. thought himself a good man, when he said, "But *now* the more I did in prayer, the more I saw I was indebted to God for allowing me to ask for mercy."*

* Mr. T. cites several expressions of Mr. Brainerd, which shews that he had not critically examined the question in debate. But, it answers our purpose, since an instance of the nature was challenged, that the publick relation which Mr. Brainerd gave of his own personal experience, does not coincide with Mr. T.'s theory nor judgment.

Further, to shew that his challenge was the effect of haste, rather than prudence, I cited these words from the thirty-nine articles of the church of England. "Works done before the grace of Christ and the inspiration of the Spirit are not pleasant to God. For, they spring not of faith in Christ, neither do they make men meet to receive grace. As they are not done as God hath commanded them to be done we doubt not but they have the nature of sin." His reply is this: "*The article sufficiently explains itself.*" But, I ask, how do the most of his readers know, according to his insinuation, that the article coincides with his theory? for, instead of making a generous quotation from the article, he has only inserted these words; "*Not being done as God hath commanded them to done,*" in the middle of one of his own qualified periods: and then quits it.

Before I leave the testimony of men which he had challenged in the argument under consideration, I beg leave to subjoin a question and answer from the Heidelbergh catechism. "Question 8. Are we then so corrupt that we are wholly incapable of doing any good and inclined to all evil? Answer. Indeed we are, except we are regenerated by the spirit of God."

But, to the law and the testimony: what saith the apostle? "This is his description of the only moral nature of the unrenewed. He calls it flesh: and says, the carnal mind is enmity against God. The flesh lusteth against the spirit: and in describing the remaining

part of his own unsanctified nature he says, "But I am carnal, sold under sin. For, I know that in me, that is, in my flesh dwelleth no good thing. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" this is the character of unrenewed nature: and since this is the only moral nature which man possesses antecedently to regeneration, it is absolutely impossible, but that Paul and every other good man, repents of all the moral exercises of which he was the subject before conversion. Mr. T. has no way to defend his argument, but to prove that there is a moral nature in man which is neither flesh nor spirit. But, this is not possible. For, flesh and spirit are the only moral natures hinted at in the bible.

SECTION IX.

"My fifth argument, says Mr. T. *was drawn from Romans* ii. 14, *where the apostle represents even the heathen Gentiles, as doing by nature things contained in the law.*" Answer 1. The character which the apostle gives all the unrenewed Gentiles, without exception, in the preceding chapter, forbids Mr. T.'s sense of this text. For, those who are full of all unrighteousness do not obey the divine law in any respect.

2. His sense of the text proves too much. For, the doers of the law in the 13th v. & those who do the things contained in the law in the 14th v. are characters of the same moral complexion: But, the doers of the law, the apostle says, shall be justified.

3. The phrase, "by nature," does not in this connexion, import an unrenewed state; but a *national*, Gentile state. Accordingly, the apostle says, in the same chapter: "And shall not uncircumcision which is by nature, if it fulfil the law, judge thee?" That is, shall not the obedient Gentiles condemn you disobedient Jews? The phrase is used in a *national* sense in the 11th chapter, when he says to the Gentiles: "For if thou wert cut out of the olive tree, which is wild by *nature* and wert graffed contrary to *nature* into a good olive." In a national, and not a moral sense we find the phrase used in Galatians ii. 15. "For we, says the apostle, who are Jews by *nature* and not sinners of the Gentiles." Paul certainly did not mean to call himself a heathenish sinner: for he was a Jew, and christian both. In all these places the phrase "*by nature*" evidently imports a *national* and not a moral state.

4. The Gentiles, whom Mr. T. calls heathenish sinners, are said to have the law written in their hearts. But, this is a mode of expression, which scripture applies to good men. Accordingly, God says, Jerem. xxxi. "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." In the 8th of Hebrews we have nearly the same words repeated.

Hence it appears, that Mr. T. has no warrant to call the Gentiles, who did by *nature* the things contained in the law, and manifested conscientious, obedient conduct, that the law was written upon their hearts, heathenish sin-

ners. But let us attend to his laboured defence.

1. He assumes authority to transpose the written order of the Bible. The present order is this;

Verse 11. For there is no respect of persons with God.

12. "For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law.

13. ("For not the hearers of the law are just before God; but, the doers of the law shall be justified.

14. "For when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves.

15. "Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts.")——Romans ii.

This order of the verses Mr. T. is obliged to transpose. For, if we read the verses as the Bible presents them, it is as evident, that those in the 14th verse are good men, as those in the 13th. For, there is no moral difference between the doers of the law, and those who do the things in the law. But, the former are good men: for they "shall be justified." To obviate this difficulty, he says, "*You have rather taken it for granted than proved, that the 13th verse intends by the doers of the law, justified believers.*" This is his mistake. For, as observed in the dialogue, it is the apostle's direct design in this connexion to shew, that

there is salvation for all good men, whether Jews or Gentiles. Accordingly he says, "glory, honour and peace to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile. For there is no respect of persons with God—for not the hearers of the law are justified before God; but, the doers of the law shall be justified." Then he gives an example in the pious Gentiles, in the verse under consideration, who were then branches of a wild olive, in comparison of the Jews. This is all natural and easy. Thus we find the inspired passage, and thus we read it without any violence or transposition.

But, Mr. T. says, "*This causal connexion cannot be made out between the* 13*th and* 14*th verses, but rather between the* 12*th and* 14*th.*" I beg the reader now to take his Bible and follow him. 1. He reads the 12th verse, and slides over the 13th to the 14th; and reads on, I know not how far. 2. Then, he either returns to fetch in the 13th by main strength or leaves it unread entirely. 3. In addition to this new method of reading, he does not mind his stops, and even strides over the beginning of a parenthesis* to take a piece from the middle of it to complete his connexion. But, is it lawful to use the Bible with such freedom? for, upon this principle any thing can be proved, however false, and any thing disproved, however true.

In further defending his construction, he pleads that the phrase, by nature, in the 14th v.

* Marked thus ( ) which incloses the 13th, 14th and 15th verses.

requires a different sense from the same phrase in the 27th verse. For he says, "*The dative case* PHUSEI *in the 14th, which is governed by the verb* POIEE, *must be understood to denote the instrument or manner of doing; and so must intend by the mere force of nature; whereas, it ought to have been joined with the preposition* EN *in order to its easily admitting your construction.*" Very well: this operates properly.—For, if Mr. T. or any other Grecian, will turn to Galatians ii. 15, he will find the same original word in the dative case, and yet governed by the verb without the preposition: EMEIS PHUSEI IOUDAIOI." That is "we who are Jews by nature and not sinners of the Gentiles. Here we all know the apostle means Jews by birth and education, and not Jews by unregeneracy. But this Mr. T. *could* not see, though the text was quoted in the 77th page of the dialogue. But we hope he will now see and remember it, that we may not have the same ground to go over again hereafter.

3. How could our author boldly say, that the authority I quoted from the synopsis, militates as much against my sense of the text as against his sense? For, this is the authority. "*Of what people does Paul here speak? of the Gentiles converted to Christ, as is evident from the whole connexion, where the doers of the law are both said to do good and to be justified.*" Mr. T. was rather hasty in this matter. For, if they were pious Gentiles, though uncultivated in comparison of the Jews, they were not heathenish sinners, as he *attempts* to prove. If

they were good men, I want no more of them at present, whether baptized or unbaptized.*

4. He pleads that good "*Gentiles had the advantages of being instructed from the scriptures;*" and therefore could not be said to be a law to themselves. Answer. This is but assertion. For, though Gentile converts received great advantages from the scriptures, they were Gentiles still by education in comparison of the Jews. Accordingly the apostle calls them the uncircumcision and the wild olive.

In fine, since the doers of the law are good men, and not hypothetical ones: since the phrase *by nature* denotes a national and not a moral state: since the law, according to scripture, is written upon the hearts of good men; and since the apostle contrasts the phrase, "By nature," with the letter of the law, I leave the reader to judge, whether this text be not fairly taken out of his hands?

His sixth and last argument, that God requires duties of men which are destitute of holiness, "*Was drawn*, he says, *from the design of many gospel commands and prescriptions.*" That the reader may have a just view of his

* This does not come with the best grace from Mr. T. because he has lately told us, in an Ordination Sermon, that Cornelius the Roman officer was unquestionably a good man, while in an unchristianized state. And, how does he know, that Cornelius was not one of the good Gentiles intended by the apostle? For, if as Mr. T. says, (while preaching and not disputing) "The character given by inspiration of this Roman officer and the illustrious marks of the divine favour with which he was hououred, leave no room to question the goodness of his heart; he surely did by nature, or in a Gentile, unchristianized state, things contained in the law.

strength in this argument, I will insert every text he had quoted to support it in his first publication. The first text is this, "*Search the scriptures.*" But this was addressed to the Jews, as observed in the dialogue, relative to the evidence of Christ's divine mission: and, this direction no more proves that it was their duty to search the scriptures, destitute of love, than Philip's direction to Nathaniel proves, that it was his duty to go and see Christ, destitute of love. His second text is this, "*The scriptures were written that ye might beleive that Jesus is the Christ.*" Very true; But this does not prove that they were written to direct men to perform actions destitute of the least degree of holiness. His third text is this, "*Faith cometh by hearing the word God.*" Very just: but this does not prove that men do their duty in hearing the word of God impenitently. It only proves, that it is the method of providence to bring men to Christ under the preaching of the gospel. For the providence of God, which he stumbles at, is not the command of God; because God in his providence waits on sinners during life, though in his command he requires them to repent immediately. These texts, therefore, which only point out the course of providence, are nothing to his purpose; but are evidently opposed to his theory. For just as long as sinners follow his directions, in performing actions which are destitute of repentance, they violate the command; because no sinner is destitute of natural ability to repent and love God, though the heathens are not

able to believe in him of whom they have not heard.'

These* are the only texts which Mr. T. had quoted under his sixth argument to prove, that God requires actions which are destitute of holiness. And, as these are neither many nor few gospel commands to his purpose, I publickly called on him to produce one, at least, of the great number which he claims in his argument. If, therefore, after this necessary and most publick challenge, he does not shew us a command which plainly requires actions which are destiute of holiness, we must conclude, that his theory cannot be supported by scripture. For, every body knows, that he would meet the challenge by some plain command, if possible. But, I now declare to the discerning publick, who will not spare me, if the declaration be unjust, that he has not, in his laboured defence of this argument, produced one such command. Nor, do we blame him because he has not. For, God commands nothing now which he will not approve at the great day. God requires nothing now, which he will not accept for Christ's sake, when the chaff shall be separated from the wheat.

But, Mr. T. instead of going to the bible to fetch any gospel command to support his argument, adopts a very different method. He even recurs 20 years to an early publication of Mr. Hopkins to obtain assistance. I love and revere the gentleman he quotes, and need not

* The Berean text excepted, which will be considered directly.

say he is the Metaphysician, the Divine, and the Christian. But, though he has extended and shielded the Calvinistic theory, in some important points of view, his writings are not perfect. As there are spots in the sun, so there are some defects in all human compositions. And, what if Mr. *Hopkins*, like other men, in the morning of his improvements, did drop a sentence which will not bear his present examination; does this authorise Mr. T. to step aside from his debate with me, for the sake of exposing him publickly? For, Mr. T. says, "*I have the clearest right to avail myself of such plain inconsistency.*" But, granting for a moment that the sentence quoted from Mr. *Hopkins* does not correspond with his riper publications: does this prove that Mr. T.'s theory is right, and that mine is wrong? is this a solid and manly method of reasoning and handling the debate? I think not: and for the sake of enlightening Mr. T. we beg his attention to a kindred instance, where he will have the advantage of his own experience. He doubtless remembers that for the sake of inducing his people to pray for himself, he published these excellent things. "*Your prayers for the success of the christian minstry must be attended with christian holiness and virtue, in your tempers and lives. What a shocking adsurdity is it for any to pray for the divine assistance, and success of the gospel ministry while they neither heartily believe the doctrines, nor obey the precepts of that very religion which their prayers seem to befriend! what egregious trifling, what*

solemn mockery, what odious hypocrisy is this"! It is evident according to this description, that all the prayers of sinners are egregious trifling, solemn mockery and odious hypocrisy. For, the best christians on earth do no more than heartily to believe and obey the dictrines and precepts of the gospel. To apply the matter, then; what if I should quote these most excellent things of Mr. T. against Mr. T. where he as warmly pleads for duties which are destitute of any holy or hearty obedience, and of any hearty or saving faith? what point would it settle? what end would it answer? what would it prove more than this, that Mr. T. is not so evangelical now, as he was ten years ago, or that his good sense will not allow his people to pray without faith when they pray for him.

But, to return: what had Mr. *Hopkins* said in that early performance, which does not coincide with our theory? these are the words upon which Mr. T. harps. "If God commands all men every where to repent, then he requires of them all that is necessary to repentance." But, query, since Mr. T. professes to be so well acquainted with books relating to this debate and assumes liberty to charge us all with deficiency in point of liberal reading, ought he not to have noted Mr. Hopkins' own defence of this passage, in his answer to Doctor Hemmenway? page 197. There Mr. Hopkins says, "The command to repent does not infer an obligation to attend on the means of conversion with a heart wholly opposed to repentance. Nor is this necesary in order to a compliance

with the command, unles opposition to the command is implied in the command, and is the means of obedience to it. But, the duings of the impenitent are impenitent doings, and wholly opposed to repentance: therefore are not implied in the command to repent." Thus far Mr. Hopkins: and whether Mr. T. has helped himself by his rash and irregular attempt upon Mr. Hopkins, let others judge.

But to return to our own business: let us now examine Mr. T.'s method of proving that God requires that attention of sinners to the means of grace which is destitute of holiness. He says, 1. "*It is a stubborn fact that sinners are influenced to this attention by a conviction of conscience, that this is their duty:*" and 2. "*That this conviction is impressed on their consciences by the command of God.*" These positions of argument, Mr. T. thinks are invincible: and I rather think he meant to fright us into his opinion. For, he charges us with blasphemy in case we reject it. But, I openly deny his proposition: God has not commanded any attention to means which is destitute of holiness. I do not deny that Mr. T. thinks that God has commanded graceless attention to the gospel: nor do I deny, that sinners who are destitute of genuine conviction fondly indulge the same opinion. But, neither his opinion nor the sinner's in this case may be considered in the light of inspiration. And though he unfortunately mistakes his own opinion, and the sinner's, for the divine command, he cannot, either as a logician or divine, desire us to commit the like

mistake. For, 'till he produces some divine command which requires that attention to means which is destitute of holiness, it no more follows that such attention is a duty, because sinners think it is, than it follows that the sacrifices forbidden in the 50th Psalm were duties, because sinners thought they were; or than persecuting Christ was a duty, because Paul once verily thought it was a duty. His argument is entirely groundless, till he points out a command which requires actions which are destitute of holiness. For, as just hinted, neither his judgment, nor the sinner's, is inspiration. But, lest he should complain, I will present his argument in logical form, as nearly as the materials will allow, viz. "God requires some actions which are destitute of holiness: for sinners perform such actions, from a conviction that God requires them: ergo, there are such duties, because sinners think there are, and they think rightly." If Mr. T. does not like this form of his argument, I am quite willing that he should mend it, provided he does not mistake the erroneous conscience of the sinner, for "*many gospel commands*."

But let us attend him further; for he says, *I had strengthened this reasoning, by observing that the word of God written and preached, is a standing ordinance, appointed for the conversion of sinners, as well as edification of saints, which infers an obligation on the former to attend it before, and in order to conversion, as well as the latter in order to their edification.*" The fallacy of this reasoning was exposed in the di-

alogue, by shewing, that it does not follow, that sinners do their duty, in attending to the gospel with tempers destitute of holiness, because christians do their duty in attending to it with holy tempers. But, Mr. T. now says, "*You entirely overlook the obvious import of my reasoning, which in this case was founded wholly on the ordinance of God.*" Answer. This is his mistake; for there is no ordinance of God, without a command requiring obedience to it as such. And when he produces a command which requires any attention which is destitute of holiness, I promise him that it shall not be overlooked or winked out of sight. What he improperly calls the ordinance of God in this case, is only the course of providence. But, this has been considered in the examination of his second argument. The case he presents is not parallel. For there is a plain command for christians to hear the gospel with a holy temper; but there is none for sinners to hear it without a holy temper. The least thing which God requires of sinners, is repentance: accordingly, when Christ opened his mouth as publick teacher, the first word which dropped from his divine lips, was this, REPENT. The apostles also followed his example, and directed sinners to repent, and never directed them in one instance to perform actions destitute of a penitent holy temper. For no man is destitute of natural ability to repent and love God. It is therefore to be wise above what is written to direct sinners to actions which are destitute of a penitent holy temper. Mr. T. as shall be

shewn fully in a subsequent section, goes on the supposition that sinners have not natural ability to repent: for he says (page 56) "*They never can repent in a saving manner, until they see their obligations and encouragements to this exercise in a scriptural light.*" He therefore takes it for granted that they are as really commanded to hear the gospel as well as they can without repentance, as that christians are required to hear it with repentance. But, this is petition, and not argument. I therefore once more publickly call on him to produce a command which requires actions which are destitute of holiness. For to pretend that there are "*many gospel commands*" requiring actions which sinners must perform, while impenitent, and yet not to produce any of them is neither treating himself nor the publick with proper respect. He says, (page 94) that "*I should esteem my business as a spiritual guide very cheap and easy, if it consisted merely in giving the sinner such a direction as he could not follow and be lost.*" Let him then only shew us a divine command which the sinner may obey and yet be lost, and he will gain his point.

But, 'till he does this, his theory rests only upon his own bare assertion. For, though he supposes that duty is made up of many distinct parts, or ingredients, such as *principle, substance, matter, motive, circumstance, manner, end and design*, &c. and that some part of the command is obeyed, when either of these component parts is presented, yet the apostle says, that love is the fulfilling of the law; and that

every thing destitute of love profiteth him nothing. Splitting duty into so many pieces, that every sinner may have a share, is a human invention. For the bible never considers duty as a divisible quality. Duty is love; and love is of God and every thing else is of the world.

The last thing which pertains to the defence of his sixth argument is *one more* attempt to prove that the noble Bereans were unrenewed sinners. Before we examine it, the reader will give me leave to recall the leading things which were advanced in the dialogue, to prove that they were good men.

"1. The Bereans received the apostles with great cordiality; and consequently acted like the friends of truth. For, Christ said when he sent them to preach the gospel, "He that receiveth you, receiveth me."

2. They received the word with all readiness of mind. But, this is the character of good men. For, in 2. Cor. viii, 11, 12. and ix. 2. the same original word is used to signify godly-forwardness, and readiness of mind and will.

3. The character of the Bereans answers to the character of Cornelius and other acknowledged converts, who "Received the word of God" in the morning of christianity.

4. That the Bereans were good men, is evident from this, that they were diligently engaged to compare the doctrine of the apostles with the law and testimony; to try the spirits; to prove all things and hold fast that which is good. For, "they searched the scriptures daily to see if these things were so."

5. To shew the publick that I was not singular in my judgment relative to these noble characters, I inserted the concurrent sentiments of Dr. Guise and Dr. Clark. These Jews, says the former, were (EUGENESTEROI) of more sublime and noble birth, as being born of God. I see no reason, but that these noble Bereans were of a truly religious spirit before Paul preached to them; and, therefore, cheerfully embraced Christ as soon as he was revealed to them. The whole account given of them is such as might be expected from persons whose hearts were already turned to God, and rejoiced to find that Jesus was the Christ, and accordingly were converted to him." I might subjoin the coincident testimony of other able expositors, if needful.

But let us examine Mr. T.'s defence. "*I remember, says he, that your remarks on this article forcibly struck my mind on first hearing, and almost persuaded me to give up the noble Bereans into your hands as good men. But when I find similar, if not equally favourable accounts of unregenerate persons: when I read that Herod heard John gladly, and that the stony ground hearers received the word with joy: when I find that the word here rendered noble is never used by inspired writers to describe the regenerate; I think it probable that the Holy Ghost did not intend to characterize these Bereans as good men.*

1. Is there any thing like this said of Herod and the parable-hearers, that they were more noble than others in consequence of

their diligent attention to the word? 2. Is any thing like this said of them, that "They received the word with all readiness of mind?" This is a strong mode of expression, and denotes something very different from the gladness of Herod, and the joy of the parable-hearers. When Paul therefore commends his brethren for their pious readiness and godly forwardness to do good and communicate, he uses the same original word (PROTHUMIA) which characterizes the Bereans. And when Christ says, "The spirit truly is ready:" when the apostle exhorts ministers to feed the flock, not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind, the same original word is used. 3. Is any thing like this, said of Herod and the stony ground hearers, that they searched the scriptures daily to ascertain the truth? 4. And is the word GLADLY which refers to Herod, and the word *joy*, which refers to the hearers in the parable, derived directly from that original word which signifies the new birth? Mr. T. cannot possibly answer these questions according to truth, without retracting this, that he finds "*similar, if not equally favourable accounts of unregenerate persons.*" For the character given of the Bereans is uniformly good. There is nothing said against them: and who shall style them wicked men without evidence, and that too when the bible has so much in their favour?

But Mr. T. adds, "*What fully decides this question is, that only many of them are said to have believed the gospel in consequence of their noble temper; whereas if the character given of*

them implied such a divine temper as you suppose, surely all *the subjects of it would have embraced Christ as soon as he was revealed to them, and the account of them would have concluded accordingly.*" It is rather singular that Mr. T. did not see the impossibility of proving that the noble Bereans were unregenerate sinners, from this slender circumstance, that *many of them believed.* For,

1. It no more follows that every inhabitant of Berea was *noble*, because the bible says the Bereans were more noble than the Thessalonians; than it follows, that every one of the Samaritans, and every one of the Gentiles spoken of in the preceding chapter, was converted to Christ; because the scripture says, Samaria and the Gentiles had received the word of God. This argument proves too much to be true, and destroys itself by its own weight.

The examination of his defence is concluded. The sum is this: 1. There is no morality in actions, abstractly from motives: for, moral actions and motives are the same things. 2. Sinners do no part of duty in their attention to the gospel, merely because it is more probable they will be saved when they attend than when they do not. For it is more probable that men who till their land with selfish views, will obtain a crop, than those who neglect tilling their land. 3. The exercises of sinners, under conviction, are not duties, merely because God excites them: For, the moral quality of effects, does not lie in the moral quality of their cause, but in their own nature. 4. The attention of sin-

ners to religion is not duty, as he asserts, merely because convinced and converted persons do not reprobate it. For Paul condemns all the exercises of unrenewed nature, on this principle, that they are the fruits of the flesh, which is sin. 5. It does not appear that the Gentiles who did by nature things contained in the law, were unregenerate: for the apostle says, the doers of the law shall be justified. 6. It does not appear that there are any commands which require actions which are destitute of holiness. For, the commands of God are all holy, and can require nothing but holiness.

SECTION X.

An Examination of Mr. T.'s reply to a number of Objections.

"I. We objected, that the doctrine of total depravity, as stated in scripture, destroys his theory. For if every imagination of the thot's of man's heart be evil and only evil continually, they are not the subject of any obedience to the divine will, antecedently to regeneration." Whether this objection be supported, the reader is desired to have recourse to the third Section of these disquisitions, where the doctrine of Total Depravity is handled at large.

Let us now examine that part of his defence relative to depravity, which was not attended to in the third section. He says, (page 60) "*I have stated the corruption of man's nature to consist strictly and radically in the privation of that holy temper which it originally possessed.*" This is his definition of depravity. The depravity

of man consists strictly and radically in his being destitute of holiness. Depravity, therefore, according to this, is not a positive quality. But, who cannot see that this definition of depravity is defective and exceptionable? For, if man's depravity consist radically in his being destitute of holiness, he is not a sinner; because sin is a selfish exercise of heart. The definition is totally false. For, the mere withdrawment of holiness, will no more make man a sinner, than it will make him a corpse or nothing. Mere privation is nothing: and we may as wisely say, that taking seven, which is the number of perfection, from seven, leaves something, as to say, that the mere withdrawment of holiness from man, left him a sinner.

For previously to the fall, man was the subject of no moral exercise but holiness. But, as taking seven from seven leaves nothing, so the mere withdrawment of holiness from man, who had no moral exercise but holiness, must leave him neither holy nor sinful. This is conclusive reasoning according to Mr. T.'s principles: and till he gives a new definition of depravity, sin is nothing, as proved in the dialogue. For, privation is nothing.

But feeling uneasy with his abstract definition of sin, because privation is not any exercise or quality, or any thing else in the universe, he says, "*The natural principles of the soul though innocent in themselves, being left alone destitute of the guidance of a holy disposition, became of course rebellious, and so positive sources of sin.*" This is singular enough to be remembered with

case. For, he just told us that sin strictly and radically consists in the absence of holiness: and now he tells us, that it consists in innocent principles becoming sinful ones "*Of course*," in consequence of being left alone. Sin therefore according to him has been constituted twice; once by the absence of holiness, and once by innocent principles becoming sinful ones "*Of course*" in consequence of being left without a guide. But, this is once more than is necessary.

But, since he has evidently given up his definition of sin, namely, that it is strictly and radically the privation of holiness, and says that man's innocent principles *of course became sinful* in consequence of being left alone, we must inquire what he means by this phrase "*Of course.*" What is this course? Is it a cause or is it no cause? If it be a cause, it must be an effective cause. For an ineffective cause is no cause at all. Is it an established course in the moral system, or is it the course of chance? Mr. T. dares not say it was the course or law of chance: for this would unhinge all first principles at once. Nor can he say, that it was the law of nothing: for he says, (page 62) that "*Sin or sinful affections or actions are positive realities;*" and he will not plead, that nothing can produce positive realities. If his words, therefore, have any meaning, this *course* he treats of which introduced sin upon the withdrawment of holiness, is an established law in the moral system. According to him it was as much the established law of the moral system, that man should be the

subject of a sinful nature upon the absence of his holy nature, as it is the law of the natural system that man should have a sickly body upon the absence of health. Nor do I assert this without authority. "*For he says the natural consequence of this privation (of holiness) is a depraved state of the human faculties; even as a bodily disease while it deprives the blood and humours of their purity and right temperament, necessarily induces a corrupt state of the vital juices.*" This illustration I approve: for it is just. Since therefore that course of things in the moral system which necessarily introduced the sinful nature of man, in consequence of the absence of holiness, was not a fortuitous, but an established effective course; since by the singular help of his *abstract* and *concrete* terms, he says (page 60) "*That, depravity consists fundamentally in privation, and is not in itself any thing positive, and* (page 62) *says, that sin is a positive reality*;" I readily leave him to make peace with himself. For, I only plead as in the dialogue, which plea he has strengthened, instead of invalidating, that man's nature became as positively sinful upon the withdrawment of holiness as it was positively holy when he came from the hand of his Maker: and consequently that all his moral exercises are sinful. For, between holy and sinful exercises there is no medium. But, lest Mr. T. should think we apprehend danger from his scholastic distinction between sin in the *abstract* and *concrete*, it shall be carefully examined.

I. To abstract is to draw from, or separate. Any object or quality is therefore considered in an abstract light, when it is separated from its subject. For instance, when abstract writers tell us of mere whiteness without adhering to any thing whatever, and when they tell us of sin separately from any volition or exercise of a moral agent, they treat of whiteness and sin in the abstract. And with these abstract gentlemen we must rank Mr. T. For, he says, "*sin in the abstract is a moral defect, or privation. It is not itself any thing positive, it is not any thing real.*" This is his account of sin in the abstract. And, who but an abstract being is the wiser? For that which is not in itself any thing positive, which is not any thing real and is only a defect or privation can do no real injury to God or man. It is nothing. And I defy Mr. T. or any other abstract writer to give a more accurate definition of nothing than he here gives of sin. For what is nothing, but a hypothetical something, which is not any thing positive or real? That I say, which is neither positive nor real, and is nothing but privation, is strictly nothing. But this is sin according to Mr. T. Sin therefore in the abstract, is nothing but nothing. For, it has neither life, motion, nor being. But enough has been said to expose this abstract notion. For, it is as absurd to talk of sin separate from moral exercise or volition, as it is to talk of whiteness separate from any thing which is white, of greatness separate from any thing which is great, or of deformity separate from any deformed subject. We shall therefore take our

leave of sin in the abstract. For it belongs to the region of absurdity and obscurity, and has no connexion with light and truth.

2. Concrete quality, is any quality considered with its subject. Thus when we say white snow, white chalk, and white lead, we use the word white in the concrete, in distinction from mere whiteness. Snow, chalk and lead are the subjects; and whiteness is the quality which is used in the concrete. Sin, therefore, in the concrete, is the positively selfish exercise of the sinner. This Mr. T. authorizes: for he says, (page 61) "*That sin in the concrete, or the sinful affections of a moral agent are positive realities.*" We thank him now for his orthodoxy. But what advantage does he derive from these scholastic terms which puzzle common people? For, sin in the *abstract*, as we have just clearly seen, is nothing but nothing: and sin in the *concrete* is a positive reality. This is all I ever attempted to prove. For if sin be a positive reality, and if there be real positive principles of sin in depraved men as he expressly grants (page 62) the depraved nature of man *is* positively sinful. For, between the principles of depraved man which are positively sinful, and his positively sinful nature, there is no difference.

As Mr. T. has generously undertaken to point out the cause of moral evil, and to untie the gordian knot in theology, it must not be passed over without grateful notice. His method is this, as the want of wisdom is the cause of folly, so the want of holiness is the cause of sin. But, if he had not told us that the want of wis-

dom in an idiot is the cause of folly, we should still think that the want of wisdom is only the *occasion* of folly. For, it is as much too late for a person to begin to be an idiot, after he is destitute of wisdom, as it is for a man to begin to be blind after he has lost his eyes, or to begin to die after life is gone. But, whether the want of wisdom is the cause of folly; or, the want of health the cause of sickness; or, the want of sight the cause of blindness; or, the want of hearing the cause of deafness; or, the want of life the cause of death; or the want of existence the cause of nothing, are questions which I dare not answer in the affirmative! My timidity need not however discourage Mr. T. For, I believe the man who can clearly perceive that the want of reason is the cause of folly, can as clearly see that privation is the cause of sin, of holiness, of matter, of spirit, and of every thing in the universe without exception.

II. "We objected that the end denominates the action: the unregenerate, therefore, do no part of their duty; for their end is always wrong." This objection cannot be invalidated as long as God commands us to perform every action of life to his glory. But Mr. T. replies: "*That the whole moral good or evil of an action does not lie in the end of the agent; for we are accountable to God for what we do, as well as for our intention in doing it.*" This is his mistake. For, there is no moral good or evil in actions separate from the motive, end or intention of the agent. For instance, what morality is there in giving bread to the poor separate from the

motive or intention of the giver? not the least, if we may believe Mr. T. for he says, (page 9) "*Moral agents never act without motive; and if they could, there would be no moral good or evil in such actions, any more than there is in the shining of the sun, or a flash of lightning.*" As there is, therefore, no difference between moral ends and moral motives, because both are the volitions or intentions of the agent; and as Mr. T. grants that there is no morality in actions separate from motive, it is evident that we are only accountable for our intentions or ends. But, he says, this "*Directly leads to that wicked tenet that a good end will sanctify the most irregular means, and that it is a holy action to lie for the glory of God.*" Answer. This consequence is the most unjust. For, it is as much impossible to lie for the sake of the divine glory as to lie for the sake of speaking the truth.

As shewn before, the man who loves the divine glory will not hate it to love it: and he who loves the truth, will not lie to speak it. But, Mr. T. adds, "*Nothing is more certain than that a good intention is not an effectual security in all cases from wrong conduct.*" To this I reply, nothing is more certain than that a good intention, as long as it continues, is a sufficient security against wrong conduct. For, wrong conduct is bad intention: and certainly there is no room for a bad intention in a good one. In proportion to a man's intentions being good he cannot be the subject of evil ones. Mr. T.'s mistake in this instance is twofold. 1. He takes it for granted, according to the false ground of his first argument, that there is

a right and wrong in action distinct from motive. 2. He recurs to his false maxim, that a person may sin or perform wrong actions from good motives. But, I have a right to say we have plainly shewn, that there is no morality in actions separate from motive, because moral actions and motives are the same : and that it is as absurd to plead that a man can sin from good motives, as that there is no difference between good and evil motives, or between holiness and sin.

To prove that sinners act from a proper end he had pled, that " *They are commanded to seek life and flee from the wrath to come.*" My reply to this was as follows : " sinners are not commanded to seek after that life which they will lose if they do not repent, but they are directed to seek after a heavenly life." And 'till he points out a command which requires sinners to seek for a life, which they will lose if they continue to seek it 'till death, what he says is not to the purpose. But he replies, " *If you cannot deny that the life and death set before us in scripture include happiness and misery, as well as holiness and sin ; if they are exhibited as motives of human activity ; and if sinners are capable of regarding them in this view, then they do in this respect, act a lawful and scriptural part.*" Answer : I am under no necessity of denying that the life and death set before us in scripture include happiness and misery, in order to support the objection. For to say that sinners are capable of pleasure and pain, and that they desire the former and dread the latter, it is only saying, that

they are moral agents. For if they were incapable of pleasure and pain, they would not be subjects of moral government, any more than stocks and stones. But does it follow that they do their duty merely because they are afraid of pain and desire to avoid it? No, it does not any more than it follows that they do their duty in feeling warm in Summer and cold in Winter. Let common sense judge. Is the malefactor a better or a worse man, only because he trembles at the sight of the gibbet? Every body knows that mere love of pleasure and aversion from pain is not of a moral nature. For it is as common to mere animals as to moral agents. Since, therefore, there is nothing of a moral nature in the mere dread of pain, it is easy to see that men are commanded to avoid it with the same temper that they are commanded to do every thing else. And hence Christ condemns all selfish motives to escape pain, by saying, "He that seeketh to save his life shall lose it:" and enjoins unselfish motives by saying, "He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."

The duty for which Mr. T. pleads on this ground is as common to devils as to sinners: for they are afraid of pain and really desire to be delivered from it.

The most notable part of his defence against the second objection must now be tried. As I demanded an instance of God's requiring any action of men from a less motive than his glory, Mr. T. it seems, has found one. He says,

(page 79) that "*The promise annexed to the fifth command is a striking instance that God requires us to act from a less motive than his glory.*" This is a striking instance I must confess. For according to Mr. T. the fifth command is perfectly obeyed without holiness, because long life is the only motive expressly annexed to it. But who, except the man whose theory really labours, would ever think of flying to the fifth command, to prove that God requires us to act from a less motive than his glory? for, 1. Are not children commanded to obey their parents in the Lord? and can children obey their parents in the Lord without holiness? 2. Was not length of days in the promised land the type of eternal life, and the summary motive to all good? for inspiration says: "Fear the Lord thy God to keep all his statutes and his commandments, that thy days may be prolonged." I therefore once more publicly call upon him to produce a command which requires any action from a less motive than the divine glory. For, the fifth command is nothing to his purpose. For according to inspiration the motive annexed to it is the sum of spiritual good, and not as Mr. T. hastily and inconsiderately asserts: "*Natural good even of an inferior kind.*"

SECTION XI.

III. "It was objected to Mr. T.'s theory, that man by the fall has become wholly selfish, or the subject of self-love only, and consequently that all his moral actions are sinful." And if self-love be sinful, as we have attempted to

prove in the second section, to which the reader is now referred, his theory is groundless. For, he does not pretend that sinners are actuated by any higher principle than self-love.*

But, to do him strict justice, we will carefully examine his defence. He says, (page 79) "*My answer was built in a great measure on the plain distinction between self-love and selfishness.*" His distinction between self-love and selfishness, is a distinction without a difference, as every impartial and judicious person must acknowledge upon examination. For, he says, "*Self-love is that principle of rational nature by which human creatures love and wish well to their own private selves, and are led to seek their own happiness as an important personal good.*" This is his definition of self-love, and I freely adopt it. For to love one's own private self and to seek one's own personal good or happiness is certainly self-love and selfishness too; because a man cannot be selfish but in proportion to seeking his own private self, or his own private, personal happiness. To support this definition of self-love we have the coincident authority of President Edwards in his chapter on this subject.† The President objects to a common definition of self-love, namely, that it "*Is a man's love of his own happiness;*" because it is ambiguous, as the pronoun *his own*, is capable of two very different senses. Then he discriminates in the following manner: "1. Self-love may be taken for the same as loving whatsoever is pleasing which comes to this, that self-love is a man's

* But self-love is the sum total of all wickedness.

† Nature of virtue, page 145.

loving what he loves, which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty to will. But, 2. Self-love signifies a man's love to himself with respect to his *private interest*. By *private interest*, I mean, says Edwards, that which most immediately consists in those pleasures or pains that are personal." This is the President's view of self-love the source of iniquity. Accordingly he says, "As the love and joy of hypocrites are all from the source of self-love, so it is with their other affections." Since therefore Mr. T. calls that self-love morally good, which Edwards calls morally evil, the reader may judge what right he had to attempt to make the publick believe that the President's sentiments and his upon this subject are coincident.

But, to the law and the testimony. Let us compare that self-love which Mr. T. calls moral goodness, with that self-love which the bible reprobates, and ascertain the difference, if there be any, between them. What is the difference between men's loving their own private selves, which is his definition of self-love, and being lovers of their own selves? There is none at all. As the scripture therefore wholly condemns the lovers of their own selves, it equally condemns men's loving their own private selves. Farther, what is the difference between men's loving their own private selves or seeking their own personal happiness, and seeking their own and not the things of Jesus Christ? but, the latter is condemned and the former cannot be justified. Again, is not the self-love for which Mr. T. pleads directly the

reverse of Paul's charity? The love for which the apostle pleads seeketh not her own personal interest: but, the love for which our author pleads, seeketh her own personal interest. These are opposites; and as the former is holy, the latter must be sinful in every point of view. The self-love also which Mr. T. defines is diametrically opposed to this text; "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth." It is also equally opposed to this "Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others." To add no more; that man who loves and wishes well to his own *private* self and seeks his own happiness as a personal good, is hostile to the cross: and like an empty vine bringeth forth fruit only to himself. It is therefore evident that Mr. T.'s definition of self-love will not bear a scriptural test. It is also equally evident that he could not make self-love appear in any measure lawful and reputable, without confounding it with holiness. For, in p. 81, he gives us this illustration of their respective natures and mutual influence. As he says, "*As cohesion guards the welfare of individual bodies, and preserves them from dissolution, while gravitation makes all these individuals conspire to the general order and utility of the whole: so private self-love and general benevolence harmoniously subsist and operate together in the same subject, as every good man can testify, the one seeking and governing his personal welfare, while the other seeks the good of the whole system.*" 1. It is evident that the law of cohesion in the natural world, which governs individual parti-

cles of matter is designed to illustrate the nature of self-love: and 2. That the law of gravitation is designed to illustrate benevolence. But this confounds self-love and benevolence. It makes them exercises of the same nature. For every one who has a tolerable acquaintance with philosophy, knows that cohesion and gravitation are of the same nature. They are only different names for the same common law of nature which operates with greater or less influence upon every part of the whole globe, according to its state, figure and magnitude. The same law which unites the particles of water which compose a drop, unites the drops which compose the vast ocean, and all other things which constitue the material system. The nature of cohesion and the nature of gravitation is the same. Gravitation is nothing more than cohesion extended from small particles of matter to large bodies.* It is therefore evident according to Mr. T. that there is no differ-

* "The laws of the attraction of Gravitation.

1. It is common to all bodies and mutual between them. 2. It is proportional to the quantity of matter in bodies. 3. It is exerted every way from the centre of the attracting body in right-lined directions. 4. It decreases as the squares of the distance increase. Though we reckon this species of attraction different from that of cohesion, yet, when well considered, it may be found perhaps to differ no otherwise than as the *whole from the parts*; for the gravity of large bodies may be only the result or aggregate of the particular powers of the constituent particles which singly act only upon contact, and in small distances; but with their joint forces, in vast quantities, produce a mighty power, whose efficacy extends to very great distances, proportional to the magnitude of bodies."

Martin's Newtonian Philos. Lect. II. p. 43

ence between self-love and holiness except in degree. Self-love is that to holiness which particles of matter are to great bodies of matter: or as the part is to the whole. This is the language of the illustration. If it does not mean this, it is destitute of any meaning at all in the connexion. And Mr. T. may as well confess it as to deny it. For, since holiness belongs to the heart only, and a holy command can require nothing but holiness, it is evident that his theory is groundless, if self-love and holiness be not exercises of the same nature.

As Mr. T. to authorize his notion of self-love, refers to President Edwards without quoting a word from him; and assumes authority to charge me and others in my sentiments, with superficial reading upon this subject, I am reduced to the disagreeable necessity of giving the publick an opportunity to judge, whether we read Edwards more superficially than he understands him. The passage referred to is under the second sign of gracious affections. The President's design in this part of his excellent treatise is to distinguish between the love of christians and hypocrites, or between selfishness and benevolence.

He says, "That the supremely excellent nature of divine things, is the first objective foundation of saints' affections. Saints do not first see, that God loves them and then see that he is lovely; but, they first see that God is lovely and their hearts are first captivated with this view. Then consequentially they see God's

love and great favour to them. On the contrary the hypocrite lays himself as the first foundation, and lays on God as the superstructure: and even his acknowledgment of God's glory itself depends on his regard to his private interest. True gratitude, says the President, to God for his kindness to us, arises from a foundation laid before, of love to God, for what he is in himself. The gracious stirrings of grateful affection to God for kindness received, always are from a stock of love already in the heart established in the first place on God's own excellency. The saint who exercises gracious thankfulness for free grace, sees it to be glorious, whether it were exercised towards us or not, and delights in it as such, though his concern in it serves the more to engage his mind. And, self-love here assists as an handmaid, being subservient to higher principles to fix the attention and heighten the joy and love. God's goodness to saints is a glass that he sets before them, wherein to behold the beauty of his goodness. The exercises and displays of this attribute by this means are brought near to them, and set right before them. So that in a holy thankfulness to God the concern our interest has in his goodness is not the first foundation of our being affected with it, that was laid in the heart before in that stock of love which was to God for his excellency in himself, that makes the heart susceptive of such impressions of his goodness to us. Saints first rejoice in God as glorious and excellent in himself, and then secondarily rejoice in that so

glorious a God is theirs. They first have their hearts filled with sweetness from the view of Christ's excellency, and then they have secondary joy that so excellent a Saviour is theirs."

This is the President's view of the secondary, consequential love of saints: and, it is no more to Mr. T.'s purpose, asking his pardon, than the primary love of saints. For it flows from it, and is of the same nature. This secondary love under consideration is not that self-love which Edwards says in the same connexion: "Is a principle entirely natural, and as much in the hearts of devils as angels; but it is gracious love. It is the consequence or fruit of loving God for his own sake because he is infinitely excellent. Accordingly he says, (page 196) "True gratitude to God for his kindness to us arises from a foundation laid before, of love to God for what he is in himself. The hypocrite rejoices in himself: self is the first foundation of his joy. The saint rejoices in God, God is the joy of his joy."

In a word, it is evident that Mr. T. mistook this great and good man. For the secondary love of which the President treats, is the holy, grateful love of saints, and not the self-love of sinners. I therefore hope Mr. T. will understand the President before he refers to him any farther; or that he will generously quote him that he may be understood by others. For, every philosopher knows, that if the President's first principles, relative to human depravity and the nature of true virtue be correct that Mr. T.'s theory is totally incorrect.

In answering this plain question, "Is there any text of scripture which proves that sinners are the subjects of that self-love which is not hostile to the divine glory?" He says, "*It is easy to reply, that the Bible frequently supposes, and no where denies the existence and innocence of this natural self-love.*" Answer. If this be a reply, it is easy enough to make one: but, he must remember that it is equally easy to conclude, since he tamely drops the matter here, that the bible refuses to grant him any relief.

Farther, he was pressed with this question: "What is the moral differenee between the love of the Jews when they were engaged to put a temporal crown upon Christ's head, and their hatred when they crowned him with thorns?" This is his only answer: "*Their love might arise from a conviction excited by his doctrines and miracles.*" But this is nothing to the purpose. For I did not ask him what was the cause of their love and hatred: But, what is the difference between them? I therefore put the question again: "What is the moral difference between the desire of the Jews to make Christ King, and their desire to destroy him because he was *the* King?"

Another notable part of his defence now falls under examination. The impossibilty of there being any such exercise as selfishness was urged upon his principles of depravity. For, he contends that depravity strictly and radically consists in the privation of holiness. And if this be true that the privation of holiness be depravity, it is impossible to account for selfishness. For the privation of holiness will not

constitute selfishness, because privation is nothing. Nor will the innocent principles of human nature originate selfishness or account for it. But he replies as follows : "*Both together sufficiently account for it : for criminal selfishness is nothing, but natural self-love, unconnected with and unsubordinate to a principle of holy benevolence.*" Here he wholly supplants himself. For, 1. If selfishness be nothing but self-love disconnected with holiness, it follows that sinners are totally selfish. For, he grants that they have no holiness to regulate their self-love. Their self-love, according to him, is therefore nothing but criminal selfishness. For, he says, criminal selfishness is nothing but self-love unconnected with holiness. 2. It is also evident from his own concession that the moral goodness of sinners, for which he so vigorously pleads, is no better than criminal selfishness. For, it is nothing but the natural goodness of sinners, which is not regulated by holiness. We have not misunderstood him. For he says again. (page 83) " *The innocent principle of self-love, joined with the want of a governing principle of holiness will account for criminal selfishness, with all its evil exercises and fruits.*" What, I say, can be more obvious than that sinners are totally selfish, even according to his own concession, while he is pleading that they are the subjects of laudable self-love ? For, they have no holiness to regulate their innocent principles. Their innocent principles, as he expresses it, are joined with the want of a governing principle of holiness. Their innocent principles,

therefore, are totally selfish, which was to be proved. But the lasting honour of the demonstration belongs to the gentleman who says, "*That criminal selfishness is nothing but natural self-love unconnected with holy benevolence, and thus the innocent principle of self-love, joined with the want of a governing principle of holiness, will account for criminal selfishness.*"

IV. It was objected "The bible makes it the immediate duty of sinners to repent and believe: but Mr. T.'s theory makes something else their immediate duty, and furnishes the sinner with an excuse to delay." This objection to his theory has evidently proved a most gravelling one. But though in his first publication he laboured hard to invalidate it, he has in his last publication granted the full force of it. For, 1. He says (page 88) that sinners "*Attending means while impenitent implies a present want or delay of the end.*" 2. He adds (page 93) "*I grant they cannot in the same moment posses the end and barely use means to obtain it.*" I have only to observe, that more than this I do not wish him to grant: because more than this I do not assert. For, this is my objection, that using means to repent, before repentance, necessarily delays repentance as long as means are used impenitently: and, since he grants that "*Attending means while impenitent implies a present want or delay of the end, and that sinners cannot the same moment possess the end and barely use means to obtain it;*" it is evident that he grants the full force of the objection. Only turn the tables and the objection, and the grant are completely reversed. For,

the objection is the same in the words of the grant, and the grant is the same in the words of the objection. I therefore give him honour, because he richly deserves it. And my objection to his theory shall hereafter stand in the very words of his grant: namely, "*Attending means while impenitent implies a present delay of the end*" or sinners "*Cannot the same moment possess the end and barely use means to obtain it.*" But who needs farther evidence of the dangerous tendency of his theory? for, as sinners must delay repentance as long as they use means while impenitent, they must delay repentance as long as they follow his directions. For, he says, "*Something is enjoined on sinners which is antecedent to repentance: and must be previous to it.*" Mr. T. therefore can never call upon sinners to repent immediately without discarding his theory. For, that something which they are commanded to do before they repent, will always remain to be done as long as they continue impenitent. It is as absurd according to his theory to direct a sinner to repent immediately, as it is to direct him to go a journey of a hundred miles without taking one necessary step. And should he accidentally direct the sinner to repent immediately, the sinner might reply in his own words, that "*Something is enjoined on sinners which is antecedent to repentance*, and previous to it, and must therefore be done first, and why do you call upon me to repent immemediately? The sinner might also add, as "*Attending means while impenitent implies a pres-*

ent delay of the end; sinners cannot the same moment possess the end and barely use means to obtain it." Thus careless sinners may excuse their delay and plead their spiritual guide as an authority. For, that which they must do before they repent, and in order to repentance, will remain on hand as long as they continue impenitent.

As every impartial reader wishes to see what Mr. T. has to offer against the objection, after granting the whole force of it, I will disclose his pretended defence. He says, "*Their attention to the means, far from hindering their attaining the end is the only hopeful way to reach it.*" Answer. This I willingly grant, and this I never denied. I am sensible, as remarked in stating the question, and in answering his second argument, that it is a thousand times more probable, that awakened, attentive sinners will be saved, than that those will be saved who are inattentive and stupid. But what then? Does this prove that awakened, attentive sinners do not delay repentance who follow Mr. T.'s directions in doing things which are destitute of repentance? By no means. For, all sinners, both those who are more likely to be saved, and those who are less likely to be saved, delay the duty of repentance as long as they remain impenitent. And, every sinner, whether awakened or not, who acts according to his theory, will delay his repentance till the day of grace be past.

For, Mr. T. in this debate is an advocate for those duties, which are destitute of repentance.

Accordingly, he says, "*It is demonstratively certain that something is enjoined on sinners which is antecedent to repentance: for whatever is necessary in order to any end must in the nature of things be previous to it.*" As remarked then before, that some thing which is necessary for the sinner to perform before he repents to day will be equally necessary, to morrow, and next day, and even till repentance be hidden from his eyes. For the impenitent is as really hostile to repentance or inclined to delay it, at one time as another.

On the whole, when I get so bewildered and lost, as to assert that it is contrary to the course of God's gracious providence to save any attentive sinners, Mr. T. may pertinently attempt to prove the contrary, if proof be necessary in so plain a case. But since I have never hinted any thing of the nature, and only maintain in this connexion that sinners, whether the subjects of conviction or not, must inevitably delay repentance as long as they follow his directions in performing things which are destitute of repentance, I shall neither detain the reader nor myself upon it. For his granting the full force and intent of the objection relative to delays, and then substituting an objection of which I never thought nor dreamed, in order to support the reputation of his theory, is rather a motive to pity than argument.

But, lest Mr. T. should think he has proved that it is the sinner's duty to repent immediately, and perform duties immediately before he repents too, we will give what he offers, on the head of *two immediate duties*, a candid examination. For, we are not yet convinced, that

God requires any man to perform two actions immediately and yet commands him to do one of them before and in order to the other. This logic we cannot digest, and we think it ought not to be offered to common people. For they expect to be taught, and not to be perplexed by the violation of words and confusion of ideas.

To establish the doctrine of two immediate duties, he lays down the following rare positions.

1. "*We both agree that it is the present duty of all men to be legally perfect.* 2. *That it is the present duty of all sinners to exercise perfect repentance at once.* 3. *That it is the present duty of all to advance in a course of penitent exercises so long as their repentance and obedience remain imperfect.*" Then he concludes thus; "*Now here are a number of immediate duties and yet it is impossible they should all be practised at the same time. That is, a man cannot at the same time* 1. *be perfectly holy:* 2. *perfectly repent of all sin; and* 3. *continue in a progressive course of repentance. The practice of either of these duties is utterly inconsistent with the present performance of the others.*" Answ. Such metaphysics as these will not obtain, whether I be able to detect the fallacy or not. For it is an absolute contradiction in terms to talk of three distinct immediate duties. He may, with equal propriety and pertinency, say that it is A.'s immediate duty to pay his debts to B.: but since he has nothing to pay, it is his immediate duty to borow money;

but since he cannot borrow, it is his immediate duty to earn it, by his labour. That is, he must pay his debts without money, and borrow money to pay them, and earn money by his labour to pay them, all the same instant.

But we will examine the cases he puts. 1. He says it is the immediate duty of all men to be perfectly holy. 2. It is the immediate duty of all to be perfect penitents. 3. It is the immediate duty of all to advance in imperfect repentance. But where is the fallacy? it is obvious enough. For 1. It it not true, that it is a man's duty to be imperfect, or continue in a course of imperfect repentance. God does not require imperfection any more than he requires sin. God requires perfection and perfection only: and he can no more require less, than he can cease to be God. As imperfect repentance therefore is not required, because there is no imperfect command, one of his three immediate duties must be dropped inevitably. 2. His two other immediate duties are the same. For, there is no more difference between legal perfection and evangelical perfection, than there is between perfect holiness and perfect repentance. If a man should become perfectly holy, he would be a perfect penitent and *vice versa*. It is therefore evident, that from his three immediate duties, there is but one: and this is perfect obedience. This is the only duty of man. Neither more nor less than this can be required. Hence it is said "Be ye perfect————" That God accepts of the least degree of faith as a qualification for

pardon, for the sake of Christ, I do not deny, and trust I never shall. For the promises of the gospel are made indifferently to faith in Christ. It is not said the subject of perfect faith or a hundred degrees of faith only shall be saved: but he that believeth shall be saved. But though God accepts the smallest degree of faith in Christ as a saving qualification, all the commands and injunctions of the gospel as really require perfection, as the law. For, Christ is not the minister of sin. He did not come into the world to abate the demands of the law, but to magnify the law and make it honorable.

But, what if Mr. T. could prove, though the supposition be inadmissible and totally absurd, that God requires imperfect obedience as well as perfect, and that imperfect and perfect obedience both are immediate duties? Does it hence follow that God requires the sinner to repent before he does any thing else, and yet at the same time requires him to do somewhat before he repents? Does God require natural impossibilities? Does God require sinners to use means while impenitent to obtain repentance as an end, and yet command them to repent immediately or instantly? This our author does not believe himself. For, he says, "*I grant they cannot in the same moment possess the end, and barely use means to obtain it.*"

But the above difficulty, it seems, was anticipated, as pointed out in the dialogue; and he thus attempts to remove it, (page 86) "*If it be asked how can it be the present duty of sinners to repent, and yet to attend the means of repentance,*

since both cannot be performed at the same time? I answer (he adds) *this knot is easily untied by distinguishing between absolute, and conditional duties. Repentance of sin is the present absolute duty of all sinners; but the duty of seeking repentance is conditional only; that is, it takes place only on supposition of the present neglect of penitent exercises. Now two duties of these different kinds may be reasonably required at the same time: and, that for this plain reason, the conditional duty is required only in case, and so long as the absolute obligation is not fulfilled.*" But, asking his pardon, this is directly the reverse of untying the knot. For as the conditional duty, which is, using means while impenitent, is required no longer than 'till repentance takes place, it is naturally impossible that using means to repent and repentance should both of them be immediate duties; because the former ends before the latter begins. They do not co-exist any more than the motion and rest of the same body. The one precedes the other. Using means takes place first in the order of time, and continues no longer than till the beginning of repentance. He has therefore unhappily drawn the knot so tight and hard that it can neither be untied nor even cut by Alexander himself. For Mr. T. says, "*Attending means while impenitent implies a delay of the end: and, that sinners cannot the same moment possess the end, and barely use means to obtain it.*" For the detention of the reader in so plain a case, I ask pardon, and leave him to judge whether two duties, which cannot be performed at the same time, are both of them immediate duties?

The remaining branch of his defence against this objection must not be passed over without solemn notice. For, to bring the collected strength of his theory at once to the test, I struck a blow at the root by this practical and solemn question; for we are frequently called to address the last direction to the dying sinner namely: "What direction would you give a dying sinner? the last golden sands are falling, and you have time to give him but one direction only: and will you give him a direction which he can follow and be lost, or will you give him one which he cannot follow and be lost?" thus the question was carefully stated and explained in the dialogue, (page 123). And every one sees that it reduces him to an absolute dilemma. For 1. If he answers thus: "I would direct him to that duty which he could perform while an impenitent, the sinner is lost in following his direction, because from the supposition he has not time to hear and follow another. And, 2. If he answers thus: "I would direct him to repent and believe (as the bible does) he wholly gives up his theory. For, if it be improper to direct a dying sinner, who has time to hear but one direction only, to do any thing destitute of repentance, it is also improper to direct other sinners to any thing short of repentance. For living men are dying ones.

This glaring dilemma Mr. T. not only saw but most sensibly felt. For, to prepare the way for a specious answer, though I am sorry to say it, he has kept out of sight the real

state of the question. He professes to quote the question as stated and explained in the dialogue, but he does not. "*You ask*, he says, *what direction I would give a dying sinner?*" And here he stops! But this is but half of the question. For, the question, as stated and most carefully explained in the dialogue, was this, namely, "What *direction* would you give a dying sinner? the last golden sands are falling and you have time to give him but one direction only: and will you give him a direction which he can follow and be lost? or will you give him one which he cannot follow and be lost?" but let us now attend to his answer to the question. For he says, "1. *I would direct him to faith and repentance, as duties of absolute present obligation and infinite importance:* 2. *And I would open to him both the law and the gospel.*"—But HOLD, HOLD, Mr. T. it is time to stop! for the dying sinner to whom you had opportunity to give but one direction only, is dead. He is gone, as the case was stated. His state is fixed, and it is too late to open to him either the law or gospel. And all the directions and instructions which you have now to administer, are not to the living, but to the dead——but he goes on preaching to the dead, whom his theory will not injure. 2. "*I would open to him both the law and gospel*——3. *And from these represent and enforce, the necessity and duty, the nature, grounds and motives of that penitent, believing submission to God and his Son which the bible requires*——4. *I should think it needful too to teach and press upon his mind his dependance on free grace*

[illegible] *and his obli-*
[illegible] *accordingly, as*
[illegible] *Saviour who is*
[illegible] *as well as remission of*
[illegible] *as a spiritual*
[illegible] *first commanded merely in*
[illegible] *could not follow*
[illegible] Mr. T. does not
[illegible] *sinner is dead*: and that he
[illegible] *superior advantage of his*
[illegible] *considerations, that it is calcu-*
[illegible] *Jesus. But, he goes on*
[illegible] *which the sinner*
[illegible] *with the ne-*
[illegible] *over the pain before*
[illegible] *and admin-*
[illegible] *But it is needless*
[illegible] *address to the*
[illegible] *what directions*
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[illegible] *dying sinner who*
[illegible] *direction only from*
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[illegible] *advantages to*
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[illegible] *answer in the di-*
[illegible] *address the*
[illegible] *dying man, or a*
[illegible] *say, "Re-*
[illegible] *the Lord Jesus*
[illegible] *But if there be time to*
[illegible] *I must either be*
[illegible] *must be lost,*
[illegible] *must be lost; be-*
[illegible] *But such a di-*

rection only which the sinner cannot follow and be lost, Mr. T. could not give without discarding his theory; because, if it be not calculated for dying men, it is not calculated for living men. For both the living and the dying are under the same obligations to repent and believe immediately. Therefore since he thought it best to keep out of sight the real state, or cardinal circumstance of the question while professedly quoting it, and to answer it accordingly: and since charity biddeth me hope all things, I will hope for the best, and state the question again, namely: "WHAT DIRECTION SHALL BE GIVEN TO A SUSPENDED CRIMINAL WHO HAS TIME TO HEAR BUT ONE SHORT SENTENCE FROM MORTALS? Shall the direction be such that it is possible for him to obey it and be be damned? Let conscience judge: and I will abide by the result, and be for ever silent if it does not wholly destroy his theory and support mine. But what Mr. T. will do farther with this solemn dilemma, I cannot tell. For he expressly says, "*Attending means while impenitent implies a present delay of the end;*"* and that "*Sinners cannot the same moment possess the end (which is repentance) and barely use means to obtain it.*"† He also adds, "*It is demonstratively certain that something is enjoined on sinners which is antecedent to repentance.*" The conclusion is therefore two-fold. 1. That Mr. T. is self-inconsistent in ever saying that it is the sinner's immediate duty to repent. For, that which cannot in the nature of things be done till after something else be done, which is previ-

* Page 88. † Page 93.

for a heart thus to repent and believe, and his obligation and encouragement to seek it accordingly, as the gift of that All-compassionate Saviour who is exalted to grant repentance as well as remission of sins. I should esteem my business as a spiritual guide, very cheap and easy, if it consisted merely in giving him such a direction as he could not follow and be lost." But I wonder Mr. T. does not remember that the sinner is dead; and that he is now shewing the superior advantage of his theory from this consideration, that it is calculated to instruct the dead. But, he goes on still and compares the duties which the sinner must perform before he repents, with the necessity of Lot's travelling over the plain before he could reach the place of safety; and administers directions accordingly. But it is needless to quote any more of his long address to the dead. For I did not ask him what directions he would give the dead; but I asked him what DIRECTION he would give a dying sinner who has time to hear but one direction only from man.

The reader is now under advantages to judge why Mr. T. did not attempt to answer the question as stated and explained in the dialogue. For, if he were called to address the last short direction to a drowning man, or a suspended dying criminal, he must say, "Repent and believe, or believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," or the like. For, if there be time to give but one direction only, it must either be one which the sinner cannot follow and be lost, or one which he can follow and be lost; because there is no alternative. But such a di-

rection only which the sinner cannot follow and be lost, Mr. T. could not give without discarding his theory; because, if it be not calculated for dying men, it is not calculated for living men. For both the living and the dying are under the same obligations to repent and believe immediately. Therefore since he thought it best to keep out of sight the real state, or cardinal circumstance of the question while professedly quoting it, and to answer it accordingly: and since charity biddeth me hope all things, I will hope for the best, and state the question again, namely: "WHAT DIRECTION SHALL BE GIVEN TO A SUSPENDED CRIMINAL WHO HAS TIME TO HEAR BUT ONE SHORT SENTENCE FROM MORTALS? Shall the direction be such that it is possible for him to obey it and be be damned? Let conscience judge: and I will abide by the result, and be for ever silent if it does not wholly destroy his theory and support mine. But what Mr. T. will do farther with this solemn dilemma, I cannot tell. For he expressly says, "*Attending means while impenitent implies a present delay of the end;*"* and that "*Sinners cannot the same moment possess the end (which is repentance) and barely use means to obtain it.*"† He also adds, "*It is demonstratively certain that something is enjoined on sinners which is antecedent to repentance.*" The conclusion is therefore two-fold. 1. That Mr. T. is self-inconsistent in ever saying that it is the sinner's immediate duty to repent. For, that which cannot in the nature of things be done till after *something* else be done, which is previ-

* Page 88. † Page 93.

ous to it, is not an immediate duty. 2. It is equally evident that the sinner, whether living or dying, who steadily follows the direction of his theory, must inevitably be lost. For, that *something* which he says the sinner is bound to perform antecedently, and in order to repentance, will always remain to be done as long as sinners remain impenitent.—Alas, why do ministers give directions to sinners which cannot be supported by Christ and the apostles!

I have only to recall a question which was put to him in the Dialogue, and which yet remains unanswered: namely; "How much time has God granted sinners for the performance of duties which are destitute of repentance?" And, if Mr. T. cannot tell us what portion of life God has commanded every sinner to spend in performing duties which leave him in a Christless state, I advise him as a friend, to cast his theoretical idol to the moles and to the bats. For to repeat my objection once more in the very words of his grant, "*Attending means while impenitent implies a present delay of the end.*"

SECTION XII.

V. I objected to his theory on this principle "That moral goodness is holiness, and consequently that he has no more scriptural warrant to plead for moral goodness which is destitute of holiness, than he has to plead for holiness which is destitute of holiness." This objection I humbly conceive, stands in full force against his theory. For, he has repeat-

edly defined moral goodness, "*To be conformity to the moral law.*" But, conformity to the moral law is holiness. For, the moral law is a holy law. Moral goodness therefore which is conformity to the moral law, is holiness. This, if I mistake not, is conclusive reasoning. And, Mr. T. can never make any reputable defence against us till he can conscientiously drop the Calvinistic garb entirely, and say, with uniform Arminians, that sinners are the subjects of a small share of holiness, though not enough to denominate them good men.

If like ingenious, sensible Arminians, he were to take this ground explicitly, and not make a natural inability of the sinner's dependence like the Antinomians, his theory would be of a piece. But as now exhibited, it is a jumble of Arminianism and Antinomianism both. For, he pleads with the former, that sinners are morally capable of some conformity to the moral law; and he pleads with the latter, as will appear in the sequel, that they cannot repent because they are destitute of a principle of repentance, or because they are dependant.

But, we will attend to his method of defending his definition of moral goodness, in distinction from holiness. Who, he says. p. 101, "*Who does not see that conformity to the moral law admits of several respects and degrees? That there is a conformity which is sinless perfection; and a holy evangelical conformity which is not? And, is it not equally easy to see that there may be a conformity to the moral law in some respects short of gospel-holiness?*" I ask in turn; Who, except Mr. T.

can see that there is a conformity to God's holy law in any respect, which is not holy conformity? For, if every degree of conformity to a holy law, is not a degree of holiness, it will follow, that holiness is not conformity to a holy law but somewhat of a different nature. Mr. T. has no alternative now, but to commence a theological apothecary, and compose holiness of such a number of different ingredients, that he may accommodate the sinner with as many of them as are necessary to constitute moral goodness, though destitute of others, which belong to a holy action. He must split up holiness into as many distinct parts as there were predicaments or categories among the Peripatetic Philosophers. He must, say, according to the spirit of his logic and divinity, that holiness is compounded of

The { *Matter*, *Manner*, *Motive*, *Circumstance*, *End*, *Design*, *Substance*, *Principle*, *Objective goodness* & *Subjective goodness* } of an action.

This is a specimen of his language. These ten ingredients belong, according to his philosophy, to a holy action. But, with equal skill he might treat of the length, and breadth and depth and heighth of an action; and he should not leave us in the dark, or at liberty to guess, whether actions be square or round, soft or hard. For, I openly insist upon it, that

the moment he departs from the bible, and ventures to say that holiness is any thing but love, that he may as well say that it is composed of a hundred or a thousand ingredients, as to say that it is composed of ten. The matter of an action, the motive of an action, the end and circumstance of an action and the like, in distinction from the action itself, are but the learned gibberish of the schools. They communicate no light; and only serve as so many obscure phrases to ease absurdity. For, actions have neither motives, ends nor designs. Motives or designs belong to agents and not to actions, because between moral actions and moral motives, or between moral actions and moral ends there is no difference, as proved in the 5th sect. They are the same exercises of the agent. A holy action is not a composition of different ingredients. It is only an exercise of impartial love to God and man. Accordingly it is said, love is the fulfilling of the law.

Mr. T. will disapprove this as well as the rest of these disquisitions, and will probably reply. But, since his distinction between moral goodness and holiness depends upon this hypothesis, that holiness is a compounded substance, I demand his answers to the following questions.

1. What is holiness? 2. How many ingredients are necessary to constitute a holy action? 3. What are these ingredients? 4. Are they all of the same quality? 5. If not, how many different qualities of ingredients belong

to holiness? 6. What is the generical and specific difference between them? 7. How many, and which of the ingredients are necessary to constitute that conformity to the moral law which is moral goodness, but not holiness? For, if holiness be a composition of a number of ingredients, and moral goodness which is destitute of holiness, be composed of a number of the same, we grope in the dark till we know the different compositions of holiness, and those of them which are necessary only to constitute that moral goodness for which he is an advocate.

The labouring oar, in this case, belongs to him: for since he makes distinctions, he must shew us the grounds of difference. For we openly avow our ignorance of the difference between holiness and conformity to the divine law. Let Mr. T. define his scholastic terms and mark his meaning clearly to himself, and if we do not understand him we will bear the blame forever.

In further pursuing the point under consideration, I beg leave to ask, whether there is not as much reason to make a distinction between moral evil and sin, as between moral goodness and holiness? For, as holiness and sin are opposites, so moral good and moral evil are opposites. And, if there be actions which are morally good but not holy, so there must by parity of reason be actions which are morally evil, but not sinful. But as there are no actions which are morally evil but not sinful, so there are none which are morally good

but not holy. For, as the divine law forbids nothing but sin, it necessarily requires nothing but holiness, for these are opposites. Why then, says the inquirer, has a distinction obtained between moral goodness and holiness, and none between moral evil and sin? to answer this interesting question intelligibly, it is necessary to premise the following remarks. 1. It is a fact that sin frequently wears the garb of goodness. 2. It is a fact that most of the sins of men are committed under the garb of goodness. 3. It is equally evident, that those sins which are not committed under the garb of goodness are flagrant ones. 4. It is also evident that holiness has no end to answer under the appearance of sin. Men therefore have adopted the distinction between moral goodness and holiness in consequence of fondly judging according to appearance. For, though the garb of goodness has been too often stripped off by sinners, to leave any evidence that they wore it from sincerity of heart; yet it has hidden so many of their sins from the world, that it has laid a specious foundation for a distinction between those actions which have been apparently good and those which have been apparently evil. Sinners, therefore, have been called morally good only because they have not appeared morally bad. But, the moment we can prevail with ourselves to adopt Christ's rule, and judge righteous judgment, instead of judging according to the appearance, we shall discard the fond, and flattering distinction between moral goodness and

holiness. For the bible has no traces of it, and no moral characters, nor actions will be known at the judgment-seat of Christ but holy and sinful ones. And to plead the distinction now is to be wise above what is written.

But, says Mr. T. "*The scriptures frequently speak of a moral goodness distinct from holiness by representing one and another unholy person as doing right, as Amaziah, Jehu and others.*" Answer. This argument proves too much to be true. For if God's saying, that he did right proves that he was in any respect really obedient in distinction from apparent obedience, it proves that he was a good man. For inspiration, in giving the characters of Hezekiah, Josiah and other good kings, says they did that which was right in the sight of the Lord. Since, therefore, this mode of expression, "He did right," characterises good men, it is either evident that Amaziah was a good man, or that his character was only given according to his visible appearance. The truth is this, as fairly proved in the dialogue which Mr. T. has by no means invalidated, that God called every man a good man who appeared to be one before the world, till he appeared differently. God only gave characters according to visible actions. Nor was it possible for him to maintain the character of a just and righteous governor of the world before human observers, on any other principle. For, he had made a visible covenant with that people, and could not approve or disapprove their conduct, but according to their visible obedience or dis-

obedience. Let Mr. T. shew the possibility of a different method of administration, and he may perhaps say somewhat to the purpose: and till he does, silence is most honourable.

But, he recently pleads with uncommon zeal, that the "*Character of Amaziah was drawn after his death, when all the signs of a good heart and a bad one were at once before the eyes of the inspired historian.*" Answer. This we all know. But Mr. T. derives no help from this consideration. For, as the inspired historian was a most accurate one, he took his materials from the divine records which answered to Amaziah's *successive* actions from day to day through life. Inspiration has written his character as he formed it himself. But, Mr. T. replies: "*If a king were to keep a record of the successive actions of his principal subjects, and one of them exhibited great appearances of loyalty in the former part of his life, but in the latter pulled off the mask, and stood forth a finished traitor—would it be just for the monarch to direct this summary character to be published after his death, that he had done right in the eyes of his king, but not with a perfect heart?*" Answer. Yes, provided he should follow the impartial example of inspiration, and also publish the good and bad appearances of his life in the order he exhibited them, to support such a summary. Such a history would be impartial and a faint imitation of the bible. Hence, says a most celebrated writer on the divinity of the scriptures: "Every thing is told naked and unadorned, just as it

happened: and all who read are left to judge and make reflections for themselves: a method of writing which the historians never would have fallen into, had not their minds been under the guidance of the most sober reason, and deeply impressed with the dignity, importance, and truth of their subject."*

But Mr. T. subjoins, "*Admitting then for a moment, that God gave his character merely according to visible appearance, yet since these appearances were such at the time of giving it, as would have constrained any man of common sense and veracity, in your way of thinking, to have given a different character: shall we dare to impute to the unerring Spirit what would be deemed very blundering in a human historian?*" (p. 100.) Ans. No historian deserves the name of a blunderer because he paints characters from real life. And no history can be impartial which does not give us a just view of the *successive* actions of the men they profess to describe. It is because historians have taken such liberties to make or guess at men's lives instead of writing them just as they appeared, that the authority of history is so frequently and justly disputed. It is not the business of historians to judge of moral characters, but to write them just as they were formed, as to time and place, and leave others to judge. That history is the most impartial and the best, which comes the nearest to the life of the characters it professes to delineate. But, since Mr. T.

* M'Knight's Harmony.

refers to Arnold, and thinks we cannot expect a history of his patriotic splendor, since he is a known traitor, I will only observe that if that part of his life be omitted by historians, they will not give him his apparent due. And though his cotemporaries know his real character because they see his life, posterity will be ignorant of it except it be carefully delineated from beginning to end. It is therefore justly expected that all his military features be displayed by the pen of history as he exhibited them. In a word, whatever partial scribblers may do the judicious and accurate historian will write for posterity. And, after giving a summary of his character, as in the case of Amaziah, will give such a methodical view of his *successive* actions as Soldier, Captain, Colonel, General, Patriot, and Traitor, that unborn ages, while reading his history, will forget themselves and think they actually follow him in all his manœuvres upon the theatre of human life.

In the same manner while we read this summary character of Amaziah, that he did that which was right but not with a perfect heart, and then see this character verified by following him upon the page of divine history, first to the altar of God, and then to the altar of satan, we pronounce him a hypocrite. And what obedience is there to God in hypocrisy?

But Mr. T. replies again thus: "*It is very unnatural to apply the last branch of this account of Amaziah to the idolatrous part of his life: for, it is plainly with reference to his right conduct, that his heart is declared to be not per-*

fect." Ans. This is said rashly. For, 1. In his former publication against us he had said, "*These words are spoken of Amaziah, and they present us with his moral picture in miniature, or give us a summary view of his character.*" But, now he pleads to get rid of difficulties, that these words only present us with a view of part of his life. But, a summary part of his life, or a part of his moral picture in miniature, is a whole picture of confusion. For a summary view of a man's character is not a view of part of his character only, but is a concise view of the whole of it: and a miniature picture, though drawn within a small compass, is not half a picture, but a whole one. 2. There is nothing more unnatural in applying this clause of the verse "But not with a perfect heart," to the latter part of his life which was apparently wicked, than there is in confirming the truth of a proposition by proper evidence. For, as proved before, the pen of inspiration only gave visible characters upon visible evidence. And it never would have been said that Amaziah was destitute of holiness after his apparent zeal for religion, if there had not been publick evidence of his insincerity. It is therefore the latter part of his life only, which supports the assertion that his heart was not right. If he had not dropped the mask of religion at the close of his reign, which he wore at the commencement of it, inspiration would have said that Amaziah did that which was right, like David his father. It is therefore just as natural to apply the latter branch of his summa-

ry picture to the latter part of his reign, as to apply the former branch of it to the former part of his reign. For, if the latter part of his reign corresponded with the former, he would be compared with David; and if the former part corresponded with the latter, he would be compared with the worst of Kings.

On the whole, since God invariably treated Kings and people according to their visible deportment before the world: since right in the sight of the Lord, as he neither publickly approved, nor disapproved men aside from publick evidence of their good or bad conduct, is visible rectitude: again, since men's characters are drawn just as their cotemporaries saw them exhibited from day to day, it is evident that Mr. T.'s reasoning is not conclusive. For, if the most wicked kings of Judah and Israel had not exposed their wickedness to the eye of the world, and had uniformly worn the mask of religion to the end of life, they would have been styled good men, and must have been styled good men till the judgment of the great day, which will disclose the secrets of all hearts. To this sentiment there is no objection, but that which proves that the church of God was not and is not a visible church, but an invisible church; and that all the Jews, and others, who were ever called good men, have gone to eternal rest. But, these things no man can soberly assert. We must therefore conclude that God expressed his pleasure and displeasure respecting Amaziah, according to his visible, and not invisible actions; and that he was,

a royal hypocrite. For, the signs he gave of a good and bad heart both demonstrate his hypocrisy. To say that he did that which was right in the sight of the Lord, but not with a perfect heart; it is only saying that he was a hypocrite. For, God's eye, in giving visible characters only, terminated upon visible actions. God asserted nothing relative to characters but what he was able to prove by visible evidence, or testimony. God gave the characters of men upon the principle of visibility as he supports his own character.

SECTION XIII.

As Mr. T. in consequence of finding no text in the bible to support his theory, had laboured hardly to press moral goodness from some of the exercises of man, I carefully examined them all under the denominations of good, bad and indifferent. For, of more than these three classes of exercise man is not the subject.

1. Good exercise is holiness. But he grants that moral goodness is destitute of holiness!

2. Indifferent exercises are those which are merely intellectual or animal; such as natural conscience, natural understanding, natural sympathy, and the mere sensations of bodily pain and pleasure. But, moral goodness cannot be found in any of these, because they are all natural and not moral. It was hence concluded, that moral goodness, in his sense of the phrase, is nothing but mere imagination. But to prove that moral goodness is an exercise which is neither good, bad nor indifferent, he has advan-

ced a number of things which fall under examination.

1. He treats "*Of man as a moral animal*" and pleads that "*all the voluntary exercises of such a moral accountable creature as man, must be in some sense moral.*" Answ. This gives him no advantage. For there is no difference between man, considered as a moral animal, and man considered as a moral agent: and no one within my knowledge denies that the voluntary exercises of a moral agent are of the moral kind. What he attempted was, to charge me with confounding moral exercises with instincts. But, if he had only noticed these pointed words in the dialogue, namely, "That mere animal exercises, which do not in their own nature affect the rights of others, are not of the moral kind," he might have saved labour. For there is no more difference between these, and instincts, than there is between a moral animal and a moral agent.

2. To find something good in the sinner's heart which he acknowledges is destitute of holiness, he confounds head and heart. For he says, (p. 103) that "*The moral sense is a cordial as well as an intellectual exercise.*" And to prove that conscience is an exercise of heart he even has recourse to scripture. Accordingly he says, "*The bible frequently uses the term heart for conscience or the moral sense. Thus Job says, my heart shall not reproach me,*" that is, *my conscience shall never accuse me. So John speaks of the heart as condemning us, by which he plainly intends the testimony of con-*

The dispute is therefore ended. For the exercises he pleads for cannot be moral if they flow only from principles which are merely natural. But, says our author; "*I will venture to assert, that mere intellect or reason may both direct and prompt sinners to such actions as the law enjoins.*" Answer. I also will venture to assert the same: But, what then? Does this prove that sinners do what the law enjoins because reason points out their duty? if so the same argument will prove that sinners are holy. For reason directs them to be holy. This is nothing but begging the question. For Mr. T. has not yet proved that the law requires those exercises which flow from principles which are not moral. But, intellectual and animal principles are not moral principles. They are natural. They are the occasion of moral agency. For, if men were incapable of perception, and incapable of pleasure and pain, they could not be moral agents. But there is nothing moral in mere intellect or in animal nature. And, no exercises which spring from these sources only, are of the moral kind. For morality belongs to the heart only. Accordingly, says Christ, "Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or else make the tree corrupt and his fruit corrupt: for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth good things; and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things." These divine positions do not accord with Mr. T.'s method of process. For, he perplexes

himself by attempting to bring actions which are morally good, from principles which are not of a moral kind. He tries hardly, to fetch moral exercises from principles which are merely natural. But, moral exercises flow from a moral nature only. As the branch is like the tree, as the stream is like the fountain, so the volitions of men are like their hearts, or their moral natures.

Having examined what he says to prove that sinners are the subjects of a class of exercise which is neither good, bad nor indifferent, I beg leave to put a number of plain and interesting questions which I expect Mr. T. will answer as soon as leisure and ability will allow.

1. What right had he to say, that "*My scheme tells moral beings that millions of their exercises have no concern with any moral rule?*" For, in the 143d p. of the dialogue, treating of the animal sensations of men, I made use of these identical words: "But, though they are neither commanded nor forbidden in themselves, by the moral law, yet we must remember, that the moral agent is under the greatest obligations to improve them to the glory of the Creator as he is every thing else which he possesses." This observation was made to prevent his mistake. But in vain.

2. Since Mr. T. blends conscience and heart together, to support his theory, and yet supposes that they are different things in themselves, because one is put frequently for the other, I ask how far conscience and heart are distinguishable? when they are distinguishable,

and when they are not? for he has not told us.

3. If conscience be an exercise of heart, as well as an exercise of the head, I query whether every sinner, who has a rightly informed conscience, is not in the same proportion, the subject of right and holy exercises of heart?

3. I ask whether Mr. T. could have referred to President Edwards on natural conscience, as an authority that conscience is an exercise of heart, if he had properly understood him? for the President says, (p. 162*) "Natural conscience consists in these two things: 1. In that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be easy or uneasy in a consciousness of our being consistent or inconsistent with ourselves. Thus men's consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their judge by which they are acquitted or condemned. 2. Natural conscience consists in the sense of desert, consisting in a natural agreement between loving and being loved, between shewing kindness and being rewarded." This is the President's definition of natural conscience: and, it is evident, that instead of his blending it with the heart he makes it approve or disapprove the heart accordingly as the heart is conformed or opposed to the law of God. He therefore says in the next page: "Thus natural conscience, if the understanding be properly enlightened and errors and blinding stupifying prejudices be removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent

* Nature of Virtue.

with it, and joins its voice with it in every article." And a little after, while opposing the Arminian theory which involves the one under examination, the President adds; "But, if natural conscience and the disposition of the heart to be pleased with virtue, were the same, then at the same time, that the conscience was brought to its perfect exercise, the heart would be made perfectly holy. But instead of this, sinners shall be called to answer before their Judge: and their consciences will approve the dreadful sentence of the Judge: and wicked men will become very Devils and accordingly will be sent away as cursed." The publick may now judge whether Edwards would have reasoned in this manner, if natural conscience in his view were an exercise of heart as well as an exercise of the understanding?

5. I ask what is the difference between the mere animal sensations of man and his involuntary feelings and instincts? For, if Mr. T. cannot tell, he must withdraw his charge that I blend moral exercises and instincts together; and give things a different direction.

6. I ask how far that natural benevolence which he acknowledges belongs to the will, differs from true holiness?

7. Since he says, (page 109) "*That there is a moral goodness in the matter and manner of some human actions which are destitute of holiness:* I beg leave to ask what is wanting to constitute that action holy, which action is already right in matter and manner both. As hinted before, we must know how many ingredients

belong to a holy action; and how many of these are necessary to constitute an action morally good, though destitute of holiness. For if he dare not give us the means of knowledge he cannot expect that we should understand and improve his theory.

8. I ask Mr. T. what is necessary to constitute a moral agent? And I hope he will point out the difference between natural agency and moral agency; and the difference between natural good and moral good.

I put these questions for the sake of explanations, that we may ascertain first principles, and I may expect categorical answers. For as the celebrated Dr. Blair has it, "An honest man will never employ an equivocal expression, though a confused man may often utter ambiguous ones without design."

But, in the mean time, as Mr. T. has blended conscience and heart together to keep his theory in countenance, I will present the definition of conscience, as given by a number of learned characters, and examine the nature of it as exhibited by inspiration. President Edwards' definition of conscience we have had already. Calvin says, "Conscience is a certain mean between God and man. It is, as it were, a keeper joined to man to mark and espy all his secrets, that nothing may remain buried in darkness. Hence the old proverb conscience is a thousand witnesses." (p. 411.) The celebrated Cruden, says conscience is a particular knowledge which we have of our own deeds,

good and evil.* Locke says "Conscience is nothing else but our own judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions." Chapter 3. Dr. Clarke, on the evidences of natural and revealed religion, says, conscience is "Men's judgment of their own actions" p. 158. Dr. Tillotson says "Conscience is nothing but the judgment of a man's own mind concerning the morality of his actions: telling us what things are commanded by God, and consequently are duty; and what things are forbidden by him, and consequently are sinful." (p. 355.)† These authors, if we allow them any consistency, all make conscience a different thing from moral exercise.

They evidently suppose that the office of conscience is to concur with the law of God, and to approve or disapprove the exercises of men's hearts, or their moral actions accordingly as they agree or disagree with the law of God. They do not intimate by *these definitions* that conscience is an exercise of heart. Nor does

* Burlamaqui says; "conscience is properly no more than reason itself, considered as instructed in regard to the rule we ought to follow; and judging of the morality of our own actions, and of the obligations we are under in this respect by comparing them to this rule, pursuant to the ideas we entertain thereof."

Nat. & Polit. Law. Vol. I. p. 226.

† Bishop Butler says, "There is a principle of reflection in men by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. This principle in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience. For this is the strict sense of the word, though sometimes used so as to take in more."

Page 13, Sermons.

a sinful act? 4. Is a holy volition a sinful volition, and a sinful volition a holy volition? If then sinfulness is a sinful volition: if holiness is a holy volition; and if the same identical volition cannot be holy and sinful both, does it not inevitably follow that holiness and sin are never mixed in the same identical volition? If this is not demonstration, I will thank Mr. T. to point out the fallacy. And, if he cannot, he must be charged with advocating a theory which depends upon mixing holiness and sin as painters do colours, or as apothecaries do contrary ingredients. But, what fellowship hath light with darkness? and who can believe that any particular volition is made up, or composed of two contrary volitions? it is possible for the same person to be the subject of opposite volitions? But, is it possible for a person to be the subject of a volition, which is composed of two contrary ones? for to love and hate, to choose and refuse the same object in one and the same volition, it is the very first-born of absurdities.

We will close this section by examining the moral goodness of sinners before this inspired language recorded in the 78th Psalm. "When he slew them then they sought him: and they returned and inquired early after God. And they remembered that God was their Rock and the high God, their Redeemer. Nevertheless they did flatter him with their mouth and they lied unto him with their tongues. For their heart was not right with him, neither were

they stedfast in his covenant." Now let it be remarked, that seeking God, returning to God; inquiring early after him; and remembering that God was their Rock, and the Most High their Redeemer, is the highest pitch of that moral goodness of sinners, for which Mr. T. pleads. For such goodness as this only, Mr. T. is an advocate in the present debate. But according to the bible, it was nothing but solemn flattery and a refuge of lies. For thus saith the Spirit of inspiration: "Nevertheless, they did flatter him with their mouth and lied unto him with their tongues, for their heart was not right with him. Mr. T.'s reply to this is twofold: and one part of it destroys the other. 1. He pleads that this passage is "*Descriptive of the most treacherous and abandoned characters*," who, agreeably to what he says of the Pharisees, "*Neither had nor presented to God any serious desires of the blessings of his favour:*" and charges me with perverting scripture in consequence of ranking them with his most solemn and devout sinners. But, 2. Being afraid to trust this answer, he pleads that "*The charge of flattering and lying may be construed as referring to their after conduct in practically falsifying the serious resolutions, professions and vows which they made in time of danger and distress.*" Which of these answers he mostly depends on to support himself, I cannot tell. Nor is it of importance to ascertain. For, 1. If they were serious in their "*resolutions, professions and vows which they made in the time*

of distress," they belonged to his class of good sinners, and not to the class of hypocrites, who have no serious desires in their prayers, as he acknowledges respecting the Pharisees. His latter answer, therefore, destroys the former one. But, 2. To say that the charge of flattery and lying refers to their after conduct, will not stand the test. For, 1. It is just as evident from the passage, that they flattered and lied in the time of their distress, as that they prayed and vowed in the time of their distress. They are not charged with flattering and lying afterwards, but at the very time of their apparent devotions. But, 2. It is contrary to the common use of words to call breach of covenant flattering and lying; for breach of covenant is unfaithfulness. It is therefore evident that neither of his answers will obtain. For one of them destroys the other and the scripture destroys them both. It is as evident as any thing can be, that the men pointed out in the passage, were as really serious and solemn in their prayers and vows, as ever any sinners were under heaven: and it is equally evident, that God called that devotion nothing but solemn flattery and lying, which Mr. T. calls moral goodness.

But, lest it should be thought that Mr. T. is singular in his sense of the passage, namely, that the charge of flattering and lying may refer to their after conduct in their breaking the serious promises which they made in time of distress, it is worthy of notice, that Mr. Williams had advanced the same sentiment

in opposition to president Edwards. But the president viewed them as acting the part of hypocrites, because that at the very time of their distress they made their solemn promises and prayers without gracious sincerity. Accordingly he says, "It is mentioned as an evidence of their having lied or dealt deceitfully in their profession, that *their heart was not right with God*, and so proved not stedfast in God's covenant which they had owned."

Humble inquiry, p. 35; and truth vindicated, page 90.

SECTION XIV.

The natural ability of sinners.

As our reply to Mr. T. was introduced, by a disquisition relating to the total depravity of sinners; so, we close it by a disquisition relating to the natural ability of sinners. For, as he necessarily denies the total depravity of sinners to lay his specious foundation; so he necessarily denies the natural ability of sinners to raise his specious superstructure.

As the term ability is used in very different senses, the several acceptations of the word must be ascertained, and carefully explained. For, as there is a wide difference between natural good, and moral good, and between natural evil and moral; so, there is a wide difference between natural ability and moral ability. And, if we do not carefully mark the distinction between them, we shall blend and confound things which differ, and grope in the dark, instead of communicating light.

1. Then; what is natural ability? natural ability is the intellectual, and bodily strength of man to perform every action which God requires of him. Ability relates to action: and all men, according to this acceptation of the word, are able to perform what God requires. For, God is infinitely reasonable in his requirements. It is as much impossible for God to require more of us than we have intellectual and corporeal strength to perform, as it is for him to be unjust. There is a perfect correspondence between the commands of God, and the natural ability of the subjects of his command. Accordingly he does not command the idiot to be a philosopher; nor those who are naturally blind, deaf and dumb, to see, hear or speak. Nor does he require infants to do the work of men: for, they are unable. God requires no natural impossibilities. But, he requires those actions and those only, which men are able to perform if they choose to obey him. Accordingly he requires children to obey their parents; parents to provide for their children; and the rich to give to the poor. In a word, God commands all men every where to repent, and love him with all the heart; because they have natural ability to comply with the command. And, I may challenge an instance, either under the law or gospel, of God's requiring men to perform, that which exceeds their natural ability. The command of God never exceeds the natural ability of man. Accordingly he says, "Are not my ways equal? And, "If there be first a willing

mind it is accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not."

II. What is moral ability? As moral ability belongs to the heart of man only, and not to his natural faculties; it is obvious, that moral ability to obey God consists in a man's loving his commandments.

Accordingly, when we say that a good man is the subject of moral ability to love God, the import is this, that he actually loves him and keeps his commandments. For, as natural ability consists in having intellectual and bodily strength to perform every action required of man, it is evident, that moral ability must consist in a willing mind. It is probable, that Mr. T. will object to these definitions of natural and moral ability. But, until he defines and authorises *that ability* which neither consists in bodily and intellectual strength to perform what God requires, nor in the voluntary exercise of a moral agent, these definitions must obtain. For, what is the description of that ability which neither consists in bodily and intellectual strength, nor in voluntary exercise? If it is neither natural ability nor moral, according to the preceding definitions, what is it? And of what use is it in theology? For, it neither belongs to the head, hands, feet nor heart of man.

Having defined natural, and moral ability, the following inferences merit a consideration.

1. It is evident, that there is an essential and striking difference between natural inabili-

ty and moral inability. Some persons who are more loquacious than judicious, have openly asserted, that if man be the subject of an inability to repent, which the special operation of the Spirit only does remove, it may as properly be called natural inability as moral. They even plead that an inability is an inability! But, let us examine the sentiment. Is there no difference between natural inability and moral? Is there no difference between the inability of a man possessed of reason and bodily strength who says, "I cannot come to the marriage supper of the Lamb, because I have married a wife," and the inability of him who is destitute of reason and bodily strength both? Is there no difference between the inability of him who cannot speak, only because he will not, and the inability of him who cannot speak because he is naturally dumb? Is there no difference between the inability of the Israelites, to make the tale of brick without straw, according to the unreasonable command of Pharaoh; and their inability to follow Moses into the promised land, according to the reasonable command of Jehovah? The difference between natural inability, and moral, in these instances is obvious. For, in one case, the inability consists wholly in the will, and in the other it consists in the destitution of bodily strength.

But, to impress the mind with the glaring difference between natural inability and moral, we will display it in the light of an easy illustration.

Egenus was a poor man, and the subject of almost every want. For, in consequence of losing his interest by singular misfortune, and obtaining no relief in distressing poverty from his affluent connexions, he was obliged to ship himself on board a vessel bound to the South Sea. But, being unable, in consequence of bodily weakness to perform the business of a sailor, the captain despised him and like a man destitute of humanity, left him alone without the means of support, upon a desolate island. In this lonely and forlorn state he lived upon roots and vegetables several months. But, at length, as appears from his journal, he became dangerously sick; and stood in the greatest need of a physician. The journal contains his frequent desires to obtain the help of a physician. But, his painful wishes of this nature were in vain. For, he was out of the reach of human aid. The last thing noted in his journal is a deep and heart-felt lamentation, that he was under a natural inability to procure the assistance of a physician.

But, to turn the tables: Opulentus is a rich man. He is the child of fortune. He lives in the midst of affluence, and is surrounded with the most attentive friends and faithful domestics. He never needed any thing before, but a contented heart. But, he is now sick. And such is the nature of his disorder, that he must soon depart, if he does not make speedy application to a skilful physician. But, though he sees his danger; and though all his friends with great tenderness and affection urge the necessity of

calling the physician, who lives in the vicinity, he absolutely refuses to let him be called, because he cannot afford to discharge his reasonable bill. Opulentus loves his money more than he does his health, or even life itself. He cannot endure the thoughts of the Doctor's bill.

In this contrast of circumstances, and characters, we have a just view of the difference between natural inability, and moral. The inability of Egenus was natural, and the inability of Opulentus is moral. For, Egenus was willing to have the physician and was not able to obtain him, but, Opulentus is able to obtain him, and is not willing. One cannot do as he will, and the other will not do as he can.

2. It is evident, if we have justly displayed the difference between natural and moral inability, that the inability of sinners to repent and believe, is of the moral kind only. For they are moral agents. They are the subjects of God's command; and consequently have intellectual and bodily strength to do every thing which he requires. For, as God is a being of infinite rectitude, his commands are infinitely just. He does not require the improvement of more talents than he has given. Where he gives ten, he requires the use of ten; and, where he gives but two, or even one, he only requires answerable improvement. God is not a hard master, according to the charge of the slothful servant in the parable. For, he requires men to love that only which is lovely according to the measure of their natural abilities. It is there-

fore evident, that the inability of sinners to repent, is of the moral kind only. The inability of sinners to repent lies only in the aversion of their hearts or wills from repentance. They cannot repent and come to Christ, because they will not. Accordingly says Christ, "whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely:" and "ye will not come unto me that ye might have life." But to apply; sinners are all sick with the most dangerous and fatal disorder. And is there no balm in Gilead? is there no Physician there? why then are they not healed? is not Christ the great Physician of souls? and will he not speedily come without money and without price, upon the first and least holy desire? has he not promised, and will he not do it? why then do not sinners apply to him as he is graciously presented in the gospel? is it because they are the subjects of natural inability like Egenus, and cannot; or, is it because they are the subjects of moral inability like Opulentus, and will not? Egenus greatly desired a Physician, but was not able to obtain him; and Opulentus can obtain him but refuses. I ask again, is it the inability of Egenus, or is it the inability of Opulentus which illustrates the inability of sinners? for there is no other alternative relative to the sinners inability. There is no third kind of inability which is neither natural, nor moral: nor can natural and moral inability be blended to afford a different case, for they are not congenial. "For natural inability consists in being unable to do a thing when we cannot do it, if we will; because of some im-

peding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will: and moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination." Edwards on the Will, p. 34. And to attempt to blend, and compound natural inability and moral, to get a third kind of inability, it is going upon unwarrantable and forbidden ground. For, inspiration does not teach us that impenitence is blameless in proportion to the natural inability of sinners to repent, since natural inability is blameless. But the bible teaches us that impenitence is blameable, only because sinners will not repent. Opulentus is not partly innocent because he cannot have the Physician; and Egenus is not partly criminal because he will not have him: but, Opulentus is very criminal only because he will not have him; and Egenus is entirely innocent in this given case, because he cannot obtain him. For he actually desires his assistance. Nothing can be more contrary to scripture, and common sense, than to plead that sinners are the subjects of any inability to repent except that which consists in mere aversion from duty. For, impenitence is sinful, and inexcusable, and not innocent and excusable.

3. It is evident that Mr. T.'s theory makes sinners the subjects of natural inability to repent, and believe. Natural inability, I am confident, is one of his first theoretic principles. For, with what face can he direct sinners to perform actions which are destitute of holiness, if sinners have the same natural ability to perform holy actions, that they have to

do actions which are destitute of holiness? shall an undutiful child be directed to do that which is consistent with his undutiful temper, merely because he will not be dutiful? shall a disobedient servant be directed to do that which is compatible with his continuing disobedient, only because he will not be obedient? reason at once disclaims, and discards the thought. For, mere aversion from duty is no reason why children and servants should be directed to perform actions which are consistent with their aversion. To apply the matter then; shall sinners be directed to perform actions destitute of love, merely because they will not love God? shall they be directed to actions which are destitute of repentance, only because they will not repent? all men, not excepting Mr. T. at once disclaim the affirmative. For, aversion from love merely, is not a reason why a sinner should be directed to that which is destitute of love. The consequence is then obvious, that his theory involves the natural inability of sinners. For, natural inability and moral, comprise all the inabilities of which men are the subjects. There is no inability which is neither natural nor moral: nor, is it possible to frame a third kind of inability by compounding natural and moral inability. For, their natures, as just remarked, are very diverse. If then there is no inability except natural and moral; and if the moral inability of sinners is not the reason why Mr. T. directs them to perform actions which are destitute of holiness, it is

most glaringly evident that his theory takes it for granted, that sinners are the subjects of natural inability to repent.

But, it is needless to spend time in proving that his theory involves the natural inability of sinners. For, the tenor of his defence puts the matter beyond all doubt, as will appear from the following specimens. In the 96 page he says, "*This I think is too incredible to deserve, or need a confutation!*" what did I advance which does not deserve a reply? this is the sentiment, viz. "That the sinner is as able to repent as to do any thing toward it." Since then the extravagance and incrediblity of my sentiment is only this, that sinners have as much natural ability to repent, as to perform actions which are destitute of repentance, the consequence is plain, that his theory is just and credible in his own view, because they have not as much natural ability to repent as they have to perform actions which are destitute of repentance. They are according to him, therefore, the subjects of natural inability to repent; but, not to perform actions destitute of repentance. In the 85th page his theory evidently makes sinners the subjects of natural inability. For to establish the new doctrine of two immediate duties, he says, "*Let me just premise the important distinction between repentance considered as a requirement of the moral law, which binds the sinner to perfect repentance, without affording any strength to it; and as a prescribed condition of salvation; and granted to sinners by a divine influence.*" But, as

cording to this *important* distinction, the law requires that repentance of the sinner which exceeds his strength or natural ability. The sinner, therefore, is as destitute of natural ability to repent, as Egenus was to obtain a physician upon the desolate island. For, he who is bound by the law to perform that which he has not any strength to perform, is the subject of natural inability. Again he says, (p. 56) while speaking of sinners, "*They never can repent in an evangelical manner, until they see the obligations and encouragements to this exercise in a scriptural, convincing, effectual light.*" Now does he mean, that sinners never can repent until they actually do repent? This Mr. F.'s good sense forbids. The only alternative is then this, that sinners never can repent until they are the subjects of more previous convictions, motives and encouragements. To repent immediately, therefore, they have not natural ability. For, it is naturally impossible for them to do that immediately which must be deferred for the sake of some previous or intermediate steps. It is as much impossible, according to this doctrine, for a man to repent immediately, as it is to walk a hundred miles without taking the intermediate steps. Again, he pleads that "*The primary intention of such directions is, that they should attend them in the best manner they are able antecedently to faith and repentance.*" And, this evidently supposes that sinners are destitute of natural ability to repent immediately. For, why does he direct them to do as well as they can

while destitute of repentance, if they have as much natural ability to repent, as they have to do as well as they can while destitute of repentance? to the same purpose he says, "*These commands are designed to excite sinners to seek that grace which may enable them to a saving compliance.*" The implication is nothing less than this, that they have not natural ability to comply at present. For, if they must seek for assistance to enable them to comply, before they can comply, it is naturally impossible for them to comply immediately: and he frankly confesses it. For he says, page 93, "*I grant they cannot the same moment possess the end, and barely use means to obtain it.* If therefore sinners cannot repent the same moment, which they spend in actions which are previous to repentance, it is naturally impossible for them to repent immediately. Their natural inability to repent, therefore must continue just as long as their preparatory work, whether a moment, day, year, or the whole term of life.

There is one instance of this nature among many others, which I will mention, because it is the most notable. For, he says, while addressing the sinner upon the *singular utility* of duties destitute of holiness, "*Our scheme has this eminent advantage, that it points out to you the plain thro' which you must pass, in order to arrive at the city of refuge, and as it were compels your passage thro' it.*" It is needless to inform the intelligent reader, that he very improperly and injudiciously alludes to the conduct of righteous Lot, to illustrate the conduct

of the impenitent sinner. For the cases are by no means parallel. If he had compared the delaying sinner who is commanded to come to Christ immediately, with Lot's delaying wife, the comparison would be pertinent. But, 'till Mr. T. proves, that sinners ought to persevere in acts destitute of love, as Lot persevered in the plain, the allusion must be called improper and injudicious. For saints are not sinners.

But, to return, what, let me ask, can be said, which more fully proves that his theory considers sinners the subjects of natural inability to repent immediately? For, as it was naturally impossible for Lot to be at the mountain while he was travelling in the plain, or to be in two very distant places at the same time; so, it is naturally impossible for the sinner to repent while doing things which must be done before repentance. It is therefore evident that the boasted advantage of his scheme consists in making sinners the subjects of natural inability to repent immediately. For so happily displaying the *natural inability* of his theory, he has my cordial thanks: and I hope he will believe me while saying, that I am not conscious of any envious feelings, while he boasts of it as an eminent advantage. For, I cannot yet digest the doctrine of two immediate duties, especially when they must both be performed at distant places, and at different times, by the same person, and at the same time and place. But, this is the theoretic task of the man who must immediately perform duties destitute of repentance, and must immediately repent, or must be

in the plain, and at the distant mountain, the same instant. For natural possibility and impossibility are not the same.

We have now before us ample and demonstrative evidence, that his theory takes it for granted that sinners are as destitute of natural ability to repent immediately as Egenus was to obtain the physician. For, if they have natural ability to repent immediately, no possible reason can be assigned, why they should be directed to actions, which are destitute of repentance. Even Mr. T. himself grants that repentance supercedes the necessity of preparatory duties which are destitute of repentance. Accordingly he says, (p. 87) "*The moment any sinner truly repents he is no longer bound to perform any duties as means of repentance.*" His theory is therefore this, that sinners are bound to perform actions which are destitute of repentance, only because they have not natural ability to repent, any more than Lot had to reach the mountain without crossing the plain. For, neither he nor any other man will soberly say, that mere opposition to repentance is a reason why sinners should be directed to that which is consistent with their opposition. If Mr. T. only thought that sinners have as much natural ability to repent, as they have to remain impenitent, he would discard his theory in a moment. He would not give those directions which it is possible for any one to follow in a Christless state. For, to direct sinners to actions which they perform, while remaining God's habitual enemies, only because they will

not love him, it is nothing short of feeding their opposition against heaven. I have a much better opinion of Mr. T. than to admit the thought, that he directs sinners to actions destitute of love to God, only because they hate him. It is not the sentiment of his heart, that mere opposition to holiness is a reason why sinners must be directed to do as well as they can, while destitute of holiness: and it would be uncharitable and injurious to tax him with it. But, what follows? For, if moral inability be not the ground of directing them to actions which are destitute of holiness, natural inability must be the only ground: for, there is no other alternative; because natural inability and moral are the only inabilities of man. Natural inability, I am confident, is the most specious prop of his theory. But, natural inability is *too weak* to support a *heavy* superstructure of *duties* destitute of holiness. His grand prop therefore being removed, his theoretic building must fall to the ground.

But, Mr. T. will say, upon reading this section, that he does not dream of supporting his theory by the natural inability of sinners; and, that the sinner does not labour "*Under a natural impossibility with respect to exercising repentance or even perfect holiness.*" I readily grant that he has not adopted the phrase natural inability in the course of his defence; nor, do I believe that he even dreams, that his theory depends upon the doctrine. Mr. T. is a man of too much genius to plead that sinners are destitute of natural ability to perform what

God requires. For, a just command never exceeds the natural ability of the subject. Therefore,

4. It is evident that the natural inabi lity of sinners to repent and their dependence on the special grace of God for hearts to repent are precisely the same thing, or that he very unhappily confounds them or puts one for the other. For, while he uses the word dependence, it is very obvious to every discerning mind, that his theory intends natural inability. But, we all know that the dependence of man on God for repentance, and natural inability to repent, are not the same. For, we are absolutely dependent for hearts to repent; but we are not the subjects of natural inability to repent. The consequence is then plain, that Mr. T. unhappily mistakes the dependence of sinners for new hearts, for their natural inability.* We do not charge Mr. T. with designedly making a natural inability of dependence. But, we openly charge his theory with this gross, and most dangerous confusion. For, it is manifestly guilty: nor, do we assert this without ample evidence to support the charge. For, in p. 95, where he so keenly attacks my method of pressing the duty of immediate repentance, he says, "*Your representations seem constantly to carry this idea, that there is a kind of sovereign energy, an almost irresistible charm in the very sound of* "Repent and believe this moment." And, to

* Are not men entirely dependent in every action and thought? Who knows what will be his next motion or thought?

dispel the charm of this gospel direction, he flees to the sinner's dependence. For, he says, "*If we only bring into view his dependence on divine grace to enable him to these exercises, and so the importance and duty of seeking it, the charm it seems is at once broken!*" This is his method to break and dispel the charm: and it must be exposed because it also breaks and dispels the sinner's obligation to immediate repentance! For, since he says (p. 93) that sinners "*Cannot the same moment possess the end and barely use means to obtain it;*" it is obvious that repentance, which is the end to be aimed at by them while destitute of holiness, is not their immediate duty, and that they are excused from it according to his theory, just as long as they barely use means to obtain it, because they are dependent. Their dependence therefore is a natural inability. For, it is naturally impossible for sinners to repent, within the compass of that moment which is spent in exercises destitute of repentance. In the same page he continues his note of admiration and says, this is the plain implication of my doctrine, namely, that "*We must preach repentance merely as a natural duty, to be performed instantly by the sinner's own natural strength; else we in effect forbid and totally obstruct his penitent return to God, and tell him that he is under a natural and excusable inability to it!*" This representation would require amendments if his meaning were not obvious.

But to return; if my theory be wrong because it obliges the sinner to repent immedi-

ately, for this reason, that he has natural strength to repent; the consequence is plain that he thinks his theory is right because it requires actions destitute of repentance in consequence of the sinner's dependence. And, this makes a natural inability of dependence. For the grand scope of the admiration is to shew that the sinner is destitute of natural strength to repent immediately.

Again he says, (p. 87) "*It is the sinner's duty to consider his sad state, to seek the grace of repentance, till divine grace renews him, and not vainly to attempt to acquire it independently of the sovereign grace of the Most High.*" And, what is this but mistaking dependence for natural inability? for, if the sinner be not more dependent for repentance, than he is for a disposition to seek it while impenitent, why is he told to seek for it till Divine Power renews him, rather than to repent immediately? to the same purpose he adds, while treating of gospel-requisitions, "*These commands being founded on the mediatorial plan of mercy are designed to encourage sinners to seek that grace which may enable them to a saving compliance, and not to put them upon a vain and hopeless effort to believe of themselves independently of special grace.*" This also evidently makes a natural inability of dependence. For, if they are as dependent in one case as the other, it is as vain and hopeless to require them to seek that grace which may enable them to believe, as to require them to believe instantly.

Once more, when Mr. T. says, "*The moral law binds the sinner to perfect repentance without affording him any strength to it*," he fairly pleads the cause of the self-excusing sinner, who calls God a hard master, because he requires obedience of them who are absolutely dependent, and cannot obey.

His defence contains many things of the same nature. But it is needless to cite any other instances. For, it is sufficiently obvious that he thinks himself authorized to direct sinners to perform actions which are destitute of holiness, merely because they are dependent on God for new hearts. He therefore evidently confounds natural inability and dependence in a very arbitrary manner. For, they are not the same any more than natural ability and dependence, and must not be blended or confounded.

5. It is evident that Mr. T.'s theory saps the very foundation of moral obligation, and entirely exculpates delaying sinners: for it really makes them the subjects of natural inability, because they are dependent. Sinners are therefore as blameless for not repenting immediately, as they are dependent. But, they are entirely dependent, and consequently are entirely blameless. It is as naturally impossible, according to his theory, for sinners to repent immediately, as it was for Egenus to obtain the physician. For delaying repentance, therefore, they are not sinful; because no man is blameable for not doing that which exceeds his natural ability! this is the core of his theory,

which self-excusing, delaying sinners so much admire. For, it is as natural for sinners to plead that they cannot repent, because they are dependent, as it is for them to be the subjects of impenitence. It is not possible to advance a doctrine which more fully corresponds with the feelings of sinners, than the doctrine of their natural inability or excusable dependence. They love it with all their hearts: and always feel very uneasy when they are told that their inability to repent lies wholly in the mere opposition of their hearts. And, if Mr. T. had been the deputed advocate of the slothful servant mentioned in the parable, he could not please him better than by making a natural inability of his dependence. For what is more pleasing to the sinner, than to be told by his spiritual guide, that he cannot repent immediately; and that "*It is his duty to consider his sad state, to seek the grace of repentance till divine grace renews him.*" And since the sinner is willing to perform actions which are destitute of repentance, what is more grateful than to be told by his minister that this "*is the only way as things are, to reach it.*"* But, thus Mr. T. instructs poor *Admatolos*, who feels no difference between absolute dependence and natural inability; and warmly opposes God, because he commands him to do that for which he is absolutely dependent.

Nothing can be more evident than that Mr. T.'s theory of dependence, or natural inability destroys the duty of immediate repentance. But, lest he should conclude from my charging

* Page 134.

his theory with making a natural inability of dependence, that I hold that men are not dependent on the special grace of God for new hearts, the following declaration will be excused. I do not deny the dependence of men on the special grace of God for new hearts. But I am a constant advocate for the doctrine of absolute dependence. For, preservation, according to theology and sound philosophy amounts to constant creation. As God made us, so "In him we live and move and have our being." God by his common influences makes us the subjects of his common blessings; and by his special influences he makes us the subjects of his special blessings. And we are as dependent for the former as the latter. We are absolutely dependent in every instance, and yet entirely free. Hence, says the spirit of inspiration, "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling: for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure."

It is not departing from the doctrine of special grace, to prove in the face of his theory, that dependence is not natural inability. For, moral agency and absolute dependence are compatible doctrines: for men are both voluntary and dependent. But, it inevitably follows, from his theory, which makes a natural inability of dependence, that both saints and sinners are discharged from moral obligation. For, they are absolutely dependent.

The cause why men think they have more natural ability to perform common actions

than they have to perform holy actions, originates from forgetting that they are equally dependent in both cases. For, if we only remember that we have no strength to perform natural actions independently of God's common influences, any more than we have to perform holy actions independently of God's special influences, we shall not make a natural inability of our dependence in the latter case, more than the former. For why should men think that they have more natural ability to walk than they have to love Christ, if they are as absolutely dependent for strength to walk as for christian love? Since therefore we are as dependent on God's common influence for natural actions, as we are on his special influence for holy actions, we must not make an inability of our dependence in one case more than in the other. For, Christ obviously illustrates the natural ability of sinners to come to the marriage supper of the Lamb, by the natural ability of men to attend a common wedding: and, we cannot plead that sinners have less natural ability to repent than they have to perform common actions, without opposing his divine instructions.

Mr. T. will plead that sinners have a principle or natural power to perform common actions; but none to perform holy actions: but, this will not avail. For a principle or power of action in distinction from action, lies quite beyond the reach of description or conception: but, even granting the existence of such a power

it is a power which is absolutely and constantly dependent in every point of view upon the Creator.

Upon this supposition, therefore, sinners have as much natural ability to perform holy actions as to perform common actions. For the mode of dependence does not alter the reality of it.

As the motion of the last wheel in a most complicated machine as really depends upon the skill of the machinist, as the motion of the first which moves all the rest; so there is neither any power of action, nor principle of action, nor any thing else in man which is not constantly and absolutely dependent. For, there is nothing pertaining to man which is self-existent. He is absolutely dependent in every respect.

SECTION XV.

Several other Strictures on his Theory.

I. It is evident that the language of his theory does not correspond with inspiration. That Mr. T. never preaches the truth, I do not assert. For, I have frequently heard him address many excellent things both to saints and sinners. But this we affirm, that he invariably departs from the gospel when he preaches uniformly according to his theory; and, that he invariably departs from his theory when he uniformly preaches the gospel. For, not to repeat this, that the gospel calls upon sinners to repent immediately without the least delay, while his theory obliges them to perform actions destitute

of repentance: nor to recall this, that the gospel considers sinners the subjects of natural ability to accept of mercy, while his theory actually considers them the subjects of natural inability; it is obvious, that his sentiments cannot be expressed in the language of scripture. For, the bible says, "Make you a new heart and a new spirit—repent and turn—repent ye and believe the gospel—repent and pray—humble yourselves in the sight of God—cleanse first that which is within—seek first the kingdom of God—come unto the marriage" and the like. This is a specimen of God's method of addressing sinners: and no command can be found, as remarked before, from the Alpha to the Omega of the scriptures, which requires any actions but those which are holy, and will be acceptable at the great day. The bible in no instance requires any actions which men can perform and yet be lost. All the actions which God requires are connected with salvation. For, the promise of salvation is made to the least degree of faith, as well as to the greatest.

But Mr. T.'s theory directs sinners to no actions except those which are destitute of holiness. I do not say that Mr. T. himself never directs sinners to be holy. For he often departs from his theory, and gives sinners instructions which directly militate against it. But, this is the solemn fact that his theory which makes a natural inability of dependence presents the following method of instruction. I do not, "O sinner, direct you to repent;

for you cannot, because you are dependent: but, to consider your sad case, and seek the grace of repentance till divine grace renews your heart.* I do not direct you to pray in a holy manner: for you cannot, because you are dependent: but to pray as well as you can without holiness. I do not, like the apostle, direct you to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ; for faith is the gift of God, and you are dependent; but to seek for faith as well as you can while destitute of it. I do not call upon you to love God; for you cannot till he gives you a new heart, because you are dependent; but to do as well as you can without love. In a word, I do not direct you to do any thing to the glory of God, though Paul who was rather a legal preacher,† directs you to do every thing to his glory; for you have lost your power to obey, though God has not lost his right to command.

But, I direct you to be diligent in the use of means with such a heart as you have. For, "*Do not reason and conscience tell you that you ought to endeavour the performance of duty from innocent principles, not partaking of the nature of virtue or vice, rather than totally neglect it?*"§ Now, is this gospel preaching? Is there any thing like it in the bible? and is not this

* Mr. T. says, (p. 87,) "It is the sinner's duty to consider his sad state, to seek the grace of repentance, till divine grace renews him.

† Mr. T. charges me (page 95,) with LEGALITY, because I do not make the dependence of sinners a reason for their performing actions destitute of holiness.

§ Thus Mr. T. addresses Amartolos, page 132.

a just explanation of Mr. T.'s theory? It is, therefore, needless to add, that the language of his theory does not correspond with inspiration. For the gospel takes it for granted that sinners have natural ability to accept salvation, and never (in consequence of their dependence) directs them to actions destitute of holiness. Christ never teaches sinners, that they "*Ought to endeavour the performance of duty from innocent principles, not partaking of the nature of virtue or vice, rather than totally neglect it!*" For as it is impossible to commit sin except from a sinful principle; so it is impossible to perform duty except from a virtuous principle: and it is equally impossible to perform a moral action which is neither virtuous nor vicious, for there is no intermediate interest, which is neither publick nor private.

2. It is obvious that Mr. T.'s theory sets the law and gospel at variance. For the law requires nothing except holiness: but according to his theory, the gospel requires actions which are entirely destitute of holiness. He evidently makes the law a most rigid rule of life. For while treating of the gospel requisitions, he says, "*These commands being founded on the mediatorial plan of mercy, are designed to encourage sinners to seek that grace which may enable them to a saving compliance, and not to put them upon a vain and hopeless effort to believe of themselves independently of the special grace of God, which would turn the gospel into mere rigid law, insisting on the performance of perfect obedience, but offering no grace to encour-*

age or enable them to it." In the same period he also adds, "*The gospel is wholly designed for the relief and salvation of sinners.*" This is his view of the difference between the requirements of the law and gospel. And the law, it seems, according to him, is a very rigid and severe rule. For, it even requires men to love God perfectly, and will destroy them if they do not fulfil it. But this sentiment, in my opinion, is too deeply erroneous "To deserve or need a confutation." And, as it has been eagerly embraced, adopted, and naturalized, by the grossest Antinomians and Universalists, I shall pass over it. For, I only quote it here to shew that his theory sets the law and gospel at variance: and therefore involves things which he really disapproves. That I have not misunderstood him, it is evident from his own words. For in the 95th page he says, "*But were I proselyte to your divinity, my only direction to the sinner should be this, be perfect this moment.*" This shews plainly that his theory takes it for granted, that the gospel requirements are not so strict and rigid as the law. For he thinks himself authorized, by the mildness of the mediatorial commands, to direct sinners to actions which are not only destitute of perfect holiness, but even destitute of any holiness at all. It is therefore as evident as any proposition in nature, that his theory sets the law and gospel at variance. But, we know that Christ did not come into the world to abate, but to fulfil the law. For, he is not the minister of sin, as remarked once before. Though God

graciously accepts the lowest degree of faith as a qualification for pardon in the name of Christ, the requirements of the gospel are as strict and binding as the law. Neither the law, nor gospel, requires less of man in any respect than perfection. For Moses says, "Thou shalt be perfect with the Lord thy God:" and Christ also says, "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

3. It is also evident that his theory excludes the necessity of the atonement, even while he believes that no man can be saved without the atonement. For, if the dependence of men be a reason why they should perform actions which are destitute of holiness; they are under no obligations to be holy, for they are absolutely dependent and consequently entirely innocent and need no atonement. This is a natural consequence of his theory: he will therefore finally discard his theory, for he will not discard the atonement. That Mr. T. foresaw this fatal consequence, we do not believe. Nor do we believe as remarked before that he ever dreams of making a natural inability of man's dependence. For, he rather appears from his obscure manner of treating things never to have digested the consistency between moral agency and absolute dependence; nor the ground of difference between natural inability and moral. He handles these cardinal doctrines like a man whose first principles are neither fixed nor ascertained. Accordingly in the following question relative to inability, he evident-

ly confounds natural power with moral. For, he says, "*Are sinners under no obligations to act rationally as reasonable creatures, merely because they have no moral power to act spiritually as true christians?*" To act like true christians, it is to perform holy actions, and to act like reasonable creatures, according to Mr. T.'s theory, it is to perform actions which are entirely destitute of holiness. This is his view of the difference between acting like christians and rational creatures. And what is the import of the question? he does not surely ask, whether a man ought to address God in prayer without love, only because he hates him? for every one knows that hating God is not a reason that a man should pray without love. Yet this is the natural meaning of it. For there is no difference between hating God, and the want of moral power to love him. Every heart is as full of habitual hatred, as it is destitute of habitual love. His theoretic question is therefore literally this; "Are sinners under no obligations to perform actions which are destitute of holiness, merely because they are destitute of natural ability to perform holy actions? In different words containing the same idea, "Are sinners under no obligations to do what they can, since it is naturally impossible for them to do what God requires? stating the question thus accords exactly with the natural inability of his scheme. Accordingly he says when pleading for the propriety of directing sinners to use means while destitute of holiness. "*The primary intention of such directions*

is that they should use them in the best manner they are able antecedently to repentance :" and to the same purpose he says "*They never will nor can repent until they see the obligations, motives and encouragements to this exercise in a scriptural effectual light.*" In another page he tells the sinner, that using means destitute of repentance "*Is the only way as things are to reach repentance.*" In these instructions he does not mean that it is the duty of sinners to do as well as they choose without holiness, merely because they do not choose to be holy, and that they never will repent, as long as they refuse to repent; this I say is not his meaning. Mr. T. is a gentleman of too great a fund of good sense to argue in this manner. The consequence is then plain that according to his theory, men are destitute of natural ability to repent: and therefore instead of being sinners, they are the subjects of entire innocence, and stand in no need of atonement. For no man is sinful for not obeying that command which requires more than he has natural ability to perform. Natural inability needs no atonement any more than natural deformity. Nor does the dependence of sinners need an atonement any more than their creation. For, men are not sinful because they are creatures; but because they misimprove their talents.

4. It is equally obvious that Mr. T.'s theory tends to quench the conviction of sinners and to cherish a self-righteous spirit. For, in his last publication he not only pleads that "*There is a moral goodness in the matter;* but, "*That*

there is a moral goodness in some instances in the manner" of the sinner's actions. If sinners therefore not only perform right actions, but also perform them in a right manner, in some instances, they only need to be regenerated in part. According to this soothing doctrine, it is not necessary that all old things should be done away, and that all things should become new. For as far as their actions are right in matter and manner both, they are not born of the flesh, and do not need to be born of the spirit. They only need, according to this system of theology, to be amended or made better, in those respects, where they are deficient. This is the open face of his theory. And, has not this doctrine a most direct tendency to silence conviction, and induce sinners to view their characters in a false light? like a powerful opiate it certainly tends to create an inclination to sleep. For, though sinners are distressed in consequence of the total depravity of their hearts, finding that their minister dislikes even the sound of the doctrine of total depravity, they will naturally concur with him in judgment because his lips should keep knowledge, and probably lose their convictions. I will put a plain case. Amartolos is a distressed sinner: He comes to his minister and says; "I am a very sinful and exposed creature. My heart is full of opposition to God. I hate God because he commands me to love him with all the heart. I also hate Christ as the Jews did, because he will not save me unless I deny myself and submit to the divine will

without any reserve. I am a vile wretch; for I never obeyed the divine command in any instance. I never acted from proper motives. My heart is totally depraved. And what shall I do? what can I do?" the case is solemn and not uncommon. And what instructions shall his minister give him? shall he attempt to convince him that he is not totally depraved; and that he is the subject of those moral exercises which are right in matter and manner both? or shall he urge him because there is infinitely more wickedness in his heart, and infinitely more grace in the gospel than he has discovered, to flee immediately to Christ for salvation?

But let us attend to Mr. T.'s method of instructing the convinced sinner. "*Say not, Sir, that your heart is so totally depraved, that you can do nothing but sin. Perhaps the very sound of total depravity has a secret, undue influence upon you. But, remember the phrase is not the language of inspiration; but of human invention. Now do not reason and common sense tell you that you ought to endeavour the performance of duty from innocent principles, not partaking of the nature of virtue or vice, rather than totally neglect it? does not your own moral sense approve of the practice of justice, truth, and kindness to your neighbour? does it not pronounce this right and commendable, though performed only from natural principles?*" *Page* 132.

Thus Mr. T. instructs Amartolos. 1. He very carefully and tenderly guards him against the danger of believing that he is wholly sinful in all his moral actions. 2. He urges him to perform duties from principles which are nei-

ther virtuous nor vicious. 3. That it is better to attempt duty from such principles, than totally neglect it. 4. He inculcates duties destitute of holiness, because the sinner is willing to do them. For, he says, "*Let no pretence quiet you in the neglect of these duties, a serious attention to which is not only required, but is plainly within the reach of your present moral ability.*" But, I ask, does this instruction savour of the gospel? does Christ ever direct sinners to actions destitute of holiness because they are willing to perform them while unrenewed? does he ever warn them of the danger of believing that they are totally wicked? does he teach them to act from principles which are neither virtuous nor vicious? since therefore the carnal mind is enmity against God: since the sinners inability to believe is nothing but mere aversion from duty; and, since no phrase has been more frequently adopted by convinced sinners and the most pious and learned Calvinists to express the native vileless of the human heart, than total depravity; it is evident that Mr. T.'s scheme tends directly to silence conviction, and to cherish a self-righteous spirit. For, what sinner can believe that his heart is not wholly sinful; that he performs many actions which in some respects are right in matter and manner both; and that he ought to perform them because they lie within the reach of his present inclination and because repentance lies beyond it in consequence of his dependence; what sinner, I ask, can embrace these singular documents

without losing his conviction and entertaining wrong notions of his character? for natural inability exculpates; and that natural goodness which Mr. T. advocates, directly tends to make sinners believe that they are something when they are nothing. Thoughtless, secure sinners, and even those who are the subjects of common fear will eagerly embrace such flattering doctrine; but the subjects of genuine conviction will reject it. For they know from painful experience that it represents their hearts in a false light. In a word, since sinners who are destitute of conviction love to be told that they are not totally depraved, and that it is their duty to perform actions destitute of repentance, because they are dependent; and on the other hand, since sinners who are the subjects of genuine conviction really believe that they are totally depraved, and that God does not require any actions which are destitute of holiness, Mr. T.'s theory will live when conviction dies; but it must die when conviction revives. For the subjects of conviction anticipate the judgment of the great day, when, as inspiration now informs us, no actions will in any respect be approved, which are destitute of holiness.

5. Mr. T.'s theory, contrary to his intention and expectation, encourages hypocrisy under the name of duty. For what is hypocrisy, but a religious appearance without a religious heart? and what does his theory inculcate but those duties (as he is pleased to call them) which are destitute of holiness? as that piece

of money therefore having the stamp of true coin, must be reprobated for counterfeit, which will not bear a proper examination; so, that man is a hypocrite who performs those actions which have the appearance of love while he is destitute of it. No man can possibly be a hypocrite except by performing the externals of religion while destitute of love. Where shall we go to find hypocrites, if sinners be not of this class who perform the duties of his theory? for that class of sinners whose cause he advocates, appear in numberless instances to be zealously engaged in duty, and yet he confesses that they are destitute of the least degree of holiness. The bible invariably calls men hypocrites who appeared to others by their external actions what they were not at heart: but, Mr. T. calls men obedient characters in some respects, who follow his directions, though destitute of love. It is therefore evident that his theory obliges him to call many actions duties which inspiration calls hypocrisy. For, we have sufficiently proved that his distinction between obedient and disobedient sinners is totally groundless.

But farther, it is not possible, according to his theory, for the vilest sinner on earth to perform any action which is nothing but hypocrisy. For, amid so many ingredients which compose every duty of the moral law, though a sinner perform "*Any external commanded action*" from the basest motives or ends, he yet does some part of his duty. For Mr. T. as warmly contends for the objective goodness

of actions, as for the subjective goodness. Accordingly he says, (p. 19) in reference to a wicked debtor, "*Supposing him to pay a just debt only to gain a neighbour's confidence, that he may take the advantage of it to cheat and ruin him; (yet) that branch of this complex wicked action, which consists in paying a just debt, is objectively and immutably lawful and right in itself.*" But who can soberly think that there is any thing whatever which is "*Immutably lawful and right*" in a man's delivering money to a creditor with no other view but to cheat and ruin him! But this is the doctrine of his theory. It is therefore evident, that no sinner can perform an action which is nothing but hypocrisy. For a man cannot be a hypocrite except by performing some objective action which is the constituted expression of a good heart. But according to the bible, men perform that which is nothing but hypocrisy in thousands of instances. The Jews were charged with hypocrisy because they appeared before God like his professed friends, while their hearts were far from him. The Pharisees were treated by Christ as hypocrites, because they prayed without love. They appeared to others what they were not at heart. And Mr. T. has no way to answer this objection but by entirely giving up his definition of the matter of duty; and shifting his ground from the matter of an action to the manner of an action. For in the 18th page he says, "*What I contend for is, that the voluntary designed performance of something right in itself, and absolutely commanded by God*

is an act of duty." But justly fearing that this definition might be improved to support the prayer of the Pharisees in the face of scripture, because prayer is commanded, and because they voluntarily prayed, he says, "*The Pharisees neither had nor presented to God any real desires of the blessings of his favour.*" But this is giving up his theory of the matter of duty to support it. For real desires of the blessings of God's favour are no more included in his definition of an act of duty, than a cube or a circle. Real desires for the divine blessing are the exercises of good men and not of sinners. Noah, Daniel and Job never prayed more acceptably than when they really desired the divine blessing; If therefore, the Pharisees were hypocrites because they did not really desire the divine blessing, it is evident that all the prayers of the unrenewed are hypocritical. For no unrenewed person really desires the divine blessing: for the promise of salvation is made to those who desire or really desire the divine blessing: but salvation is not connected with the desires of the unrenewed.

6. The dangerous tendency of Mr. T.'s theory is evident from this consideration, that it forces him to misapply and pervert scripture. I do not say that he has knowingly perverted scripture to support his favourite scheme: for he most solemnly promises, while introducing his reply to the dialogue, that the bible shall interpret itself. But how far his application of inspired texts savours of this excellent rule, our impartial readers will judge from the following specimens. But,

1. He pleads that Christ's meaning in these words, "Cleanse first that which is within the cup and the platter that the outside of them may be clean also," is this: "*Let your first attention be paid to the contents of your cups and platters that they may be justly acquired,*" &c. But if we only turn to a parallel text in the 11th of Luke, we shall find that Christ directed them to cleanse their hearts first instead of their cups and platters. For, he says, "Ye Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness."

2. To disprove the doctrine of total depravity, as I think it is clearly demonstrated in Romans iii. Mr. T. says, this passage is "*Not an exact literal description of every unrenewed sinner, and all his moral exercises; but a just picture of mankind in the gross,*" or in general. But this sense of the passage is evidently false; for it entails the grossest absurdities and contradiction of terms, as every one must see who impartially attempts to read the passage according to it. "For we have before proved that all the Jews in general, and all the Gentiles in general are under sin. As it is written, there is none righteous in general, no not one in general. They are all in general gone out of the way; there is none in general that doeth good, no not one in general." Is it possible that this is the inspired sense? for, as the apostle does not shift characters, the word general must be carried through the passage in the following manner. "For we know that what

things the law saith it saith to those in general who are under the law, that every mouth in general may be stopped, and all the world in general may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh in general be justified. For by the law is the knowledge of sin in general." But as before remarked, it is needless to detain readers in general, or in particular with the gross absurdities of this construction: and, if Mr. T.'s theory was not embarrassed with the scripture doctrine of total depravity, he would not adopt it. For it destroys the sense of the passage.

3. To invalidate our argument that sinners are totally depraved from this text, "The carnal mind is enmity against God;" he pleads in the very style of Arminians that "*These words signify the actual minding of carnal things.*" But this gloss will not bear examination. For if the carnal mind only mean the actual minding of carnal things, and not the unrenewed nature of man, it is as necessary that christians should be born again as sinners. For the best christians in numberless instances, actually mind carnal things. But the apostle says to christians, immediately upon finishing the description of the carnal mind: But ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit; and this proves that the carnal mind is the unrenewed and the spiritual mind, the renewed nature of man. But Mr. T. was obliged to give this sense, to escape the doctrine of total depravity which destroys his theory. For if the carnal mind, which is enmity against God, is the

moral nature of sinners, the moral goodness of sinners for which he pleads, is nothing but moral evil.

4. To prove that God requires men to act from a less motive than his glory, Mr. T. appeals to the 5th commandment. But according to this the 5th commandment may be perfectly obeyed, without the least degree of holiness. For, length of days in the promised land is the only motive expressly annexed to it. But this proves too much to correspond with other texts of scripture. For, Paul says, children obey your parents in the Lord: and Moses says, "Keep all his statutes and his commandments which I command thee, that thy days may be prolonged." Mr. T. therefore must either prove that it is possible for men to obey perfectly, not only the 5th commandment, but all the commandments without the least degree of holiness; or he must confess that he was rather hasty in asserting that the motive annexed to the 5th commandment is "*Temporal good of an inferior kind.*"

5. He pleads differently from President Edwards, that the lying and flattery with which God charged Israel in consequence of acknowledging him as their Rock and Redeemer, may refer "*To their after conduct in falsifying the serious resolutions which they made in time of distress.*" But this construction will not bear the light. For the bible condemns them because they played the hypocrite at the time they prayed and made their vows. Accordingly we read "When he slew them then they

sought him, &c.—Nevertheless they did flatter him with their mouths and lied unto him with their tongues; for their heart was not right—the charge of flattery does not refer to breach of promise; for breach of promise is unfaithfulness. But it must refer to their hypocritical prayers and acknowledgments.

6. One text which he quotes to prove that God directs sinners to actions which are destitute of holiness is this, "Strive to enter in at the strait gait." But this is a misapplication of scripture. For graceless sinners never strive or agonize after holiness. This is impossible and absurd; for they hate it with all their hearts. They always resist the spirit. The best christians never do more than strive after holy things. The word strive is one of the most significant terms made use of in the bible to denote the vigorous exercises of christians. Accordingly Paul called upon his brethren to strive with him in prayer. And when he says, I have fought the good fight of faith, he uses the same original word which signifies to agonize or strive.

Farther, as heaven in scripture is compared with a great city; and as the christian warfare lies only in the way that leads to it; and as those and those only are blessed who enter in through the gates into the city, it is evident that the gate alluded to in the text is not conversion, but the gate of heaven. What Mr. T. says relative to the plural number in one case, and the singular number in the other, is mere trifling. For though John tells us that the ho-

ly city has twelve gates, no christian will improve more than one: and this he will find as strait as possible.

Again, that the striving directed to in the text is holy and not graceless striving it is obvious from this single consideration, that Christ says, "Many will seek but shall not be able;" which proves that those who strive will be able, and consequently that striving is holyness. The text in fact promises salvation to those who strive to obtain it: and consequently does not enjoin the striving of sinners. For God promises them nothing.

7. "I will yet for this be enquired of by the house of Israel to do it for them," is another text which he evidently misapplies. For, 1. The house of Israel was the captivated church then in Babylon. 2. This *blessing*, for which God says his people shall seek, was their restoration to the promised land, as any one may see by examining the passage. For the new heart which Mr. T. violently strives to make the antecedent to *this*, even in the face of plain grammatical construction, is ten verses distant. 3. The prayer which God promised to answer in their restoration, was godly prayer. "For thus saith the Lord, after seventy years be accomplished at Babylon, I will visit you and perform my good word toward you in causing you to return to this place. Ye shall seek me, and find me when ye shall search for me, with all your heart, and I will bring you again into this place whence I caused you to be carried away captive. *Jeremiah* xxix, 10.

In a word, since the house of Israel was the church: since their restoration is the antecedent to *this;* and since the plain and pointed condition of God's returning the captivity was humble and unreserved prayer, the text is nothing to his purpose, more than any promise in the Bible. His most unwarrantable and painful attempt to prove that the new heart is the antecedent to *this;* and that sinners while destitute of the least holy desire yet earnestly desire holiness and pray for it with all their hearts, neither deserves, nor needs any reply but lasting neglect. For, the new heart cannot be made the antecedent to *this*, without violating a first principle of grammar: and to suppose that men earnestly desire holiness and pray for it with all their hearts, while they are confessedly destitute of holiness, it is the first-born of absurdities.

8. He pleads from Christ's loving the young man in the gospel, that he commands and approves actions which are destitute of repentance or the least degree of holiness. But Christ's loving the young man will not support his theory, For, 1. If we suppose that Christ loved him upon the footing of his appearing to be a teachable, religious youth, as he ran after him, kneeled before him, and asked him to point out his duty; it will afford Mr. T. no assistance. For Christ always treated visible piety as real piety, because he was the visible Head of the visible church, as well as the invisible Head of the invisible church. And, as a visible head and teacher, he treated all men, Judas not ex-

cepted, according to their visible conduct. 2. If we suppose Christ loved him with the love of pity, because he saw his deception and danger; it will prove nothing in favour of Mr. T.'s theory. For Christ loved all sinners, even profligates, and wept over them because they have immortal souls. 3. The only alternative is this, that Christ loved him because he was better than other natural men. But this is a naked and unwarrantable supposition, though Mr. T. makes it to support his theory. For, all natural men are the subjects of the carnal mind, which is enmity against God; and though some of them are morally good in the vulgar or civil sense of the phrase, one is not better in the sight of God than another, for he determines men's real characters from the nature of their hearts and not from their visible actions. Christ approves no moral character now in any respect that he will not approve at the great day. For he is invariably the same. In a word, that Christ takes any delight in the characters of sinners who will not come unto him that they might have life, but choose death rather than life; it is not a doctrine of inspiration.

9. "Seek and ye shall find," is a text which he claims to support the propriety of directing sinners to actions which are destitute of holiness. But this is a great misapplication of scripture. For, the seeking enjoined by this text has the promise of salvation annexed to it.

10. He claims this also;" "Blessed is the man that heareth me watching daily at my gates, and waiting at the posts of my doors."

But this text was never inspired to support duties destitute of holiness. For he who waits at wisdom's gates, according to the sense of the text, is the subject of salvation. Hence it is said, "Wait on the Lord and he shall save thee."

11. Another scripture of the same import, which he misapplies is this, "if thou criest after knowledge and liftest up thy voice for understanding." But this is not the least akin to his theory. For the exercises intended by it, are of the gracious kind only. Accordingly Solomon says in the next verse, "If thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures, then shalt thou find the knowledge of God." Texts of this promissory class, Mr. T. depends much upon, as it is evident from his sixth argument. But it is dire necessity only, which reduces him to the extremity. For they are nothing to his purpose any more than the first verse in the bible, because they contain the promise of salvation to those who comply with the expressed condition. To make, therefore, any specious improvement of them, he must venture one step farther, and openly hold with uniform Arminians, that the obedience of sinners for which he pleads, is the budding of holiness; and that there is no difference between the obedience of saints and sinners except in degree. This would put his superstructure into some specious shape and form; and nothing would require examination but a few first principles. Nor do I think that Mr. T. would depreciate his judgment or the-

ology in the view of discerning minds, by frankly and openly pleading that the only difference between saints and sinners lies in degree. For, who can see any generical difference between the obedience of saints and sinners, if the obedience of both is conformity to the moral law? Who can discern the difference between a holy action, and an action which is right in matter and manner both? And what mortal can display the difference between "*The earnest desires, prayers and endeavours*" of sinners "*after the saving graces and blessings of the spirit*"* and the earnest desires and prayers of saints after the same things!

12. His construction of the humble publican's acceptable prayer, plainly discovers his pressing and extreme need of scripture to support his theory of duty destitute of holiness. For though Christ evidently chose a parable containing a contrast of characters, with a professed design to display the beauty of humility and the deformity of hypocrisy; though Christ presented the publican clothed with deep humility and sincerity, and the Pharisee clothed with nothing but pride and hypocrisy, yet Mr. T. takes liberty to say, that the Publican's "*Returning from the temple justified, is no proof that he went up to it in that state; but the story rather leads us to think that he there sought and first obtained this mercy.*" But, I

* *Our author says,* (*p.* 127) "Natural principles waked up by the motives of God's word, and the influences of his Spirit, frequently give rise to earnest desires and prayers after its saving graces and blessings."

wonder what Mr. T. sees in the story which makes him think so: and I beg leave to think differently till he gives a reason for his thoughts.

13. His construction of the parable of the prodigal son is equally notable and memorable. For he says, "*It is very plain that there was a train of serious inquiry in the prodigal, previous to his happy resolution of returning to his father; that he was led into this train by the concurring influence of divine providence and grace; that he acted a reasonable and incumbent part in entertaining and pursuing those reflections, which is conveyed in the expression of his coming to himself.*"

This is truly singular. For Christ does not deliver the parable to inform us how good the prodigal was before he was converted, but how bad: Not how serious, reasonable and incumbent a part he acted while he was distracted, or before he came to himself; but how unreasonable, undutiful and wicked a part he acted till he came to himself. Mr. T. treats him as a reasonable, thoughtful, serious character, in that very stage of his conduct where Christ treats him as a distracted, undutiful monster. The fact is this, according to the parable, that upon coming to himself, or being converted, he resolved to return and unreservedly submit to his father: and not that there was any goodness in him before he was converted, or any reason in his conduct when he was distracted. If Christ does not mark his conversion by saying, "When he came to himself; I wish to know what part of the parable does mark his conversion. For

the parable makes him a distracted vile wretch till he came to himself; and ever after this, it makes him a reasonable, penitent and dutiful son, whom the father met and embraced with all the fondness of a most affectionate and forgiving parent.

14. As many instances of his misapplying scripture have been noted in the course of the preceding sections, I will mention but one more. The apostle's meaning, he says, in these words, "Thou believest there is one God, thou doest well, the devils also believe and tremble," is plainly this: "*Thy belief, in this instance, is right and therefore good of its kind.*" Page 131. But who can soberly and impartially believe that *James* approved and commended the faith of sinners in any respect, by comparing it with the faith of devils? For nothing can be more obvious than that he made the comparison to reprobate and not to approve their faith in any respect.

This is a just view of Mr. T.'s method of handling scripture to support his theory. And whether the scripture will justify these constructions of scripture the judicious and impartial reader must determine.

My reply to Mr. T.'s defence against the dialogue is concluded. Whether I have quoted him genercusly: whether I have looked his arguments in the face: whether I have invalidated his reasoning and supported my own objections against his theory: in a word, whether my reply be candid and pertinent and calculated to promote the cause of truth, is

now cheerfully submitted to men of discernment who read debates for the sake of light and truth, rather than to gratify a captious detracting spirit. My venturing it abroad precludes the propriety of any laboured apology, respecting the method or style. But, I honestly ask the candour of all who have patience to read it. For it is no doubt defective in many respects. Agreeably to what was dropped in the first section, I have only to desire my Brother T. and every other reader to compare what I have advanced with the bible and to treat it according to the spirit there inculcated. For to the word of God and not to the partial feelings of men who cannot endure sound doctrine, I make my appeal; and from this endless source of instruction I hope to derive any needful defence of my theory. If I know my own heart, truth, and not victory, is my governing motive in the controversy.

In fine, may the Spirit of God inspire our minds with knowledge and our hearts with love: and put a period to this interesting debate in that manner which shall most advance the prosperity of the Redeemer's Kingdom.

SECTION XVI.

The publick having considered Mr. *Dana* as Mr. *Tappan's* partner in this dispute, in consequence of the time and pointed contents of his publication, I was obliged to take some notice of it in the dialogue. And, as Mr. D. has openly made himself a partner by his appendix to Mr. T.'s reply to the dialogue, I am now obliged to make it the subject of a number of strictures.

1. In a very soft and grateful manner he styles me Brother, with whom he hopes "*To live and die in the bonds of friendship.*" Upon this I have only to remark, that it has the appearance of ardent friendship. But,

2. In the next breath he unhappily forgets himself, and attempts a sneer respecting the mode of my reply. For though Mr. D. and Mr. T. had made a publick debate necessary; yet, instead of accepting my proposal to terminate it by an open correspondence, Mr. D. is pleased to call me a *challenger*, and says, "*What if a different mode should suit better? suppose, since there are such authorities for it, I should prefer the new mode of answering by dialogue? all can see the singular advantage this might give one for managing a debate.*" Here the good gentleman attempts to make the publick believe that I took undue advantage of Mr. T. by introducing him into a dialogue. But, he might with honour to himself have suppressed the insinuation. For controversial dialogues are approved and sufficiently authorized by men of reading and candour, even when the several parts

of the dialogue are composed by the same writer. But, Mr. D. knows from the advertisement prefixed to the dialogue, that I did not compose that part of it which I undertook to confute. For, the sentiments and arguments of Toletus were fairly quoted from Mr. T.'s publication, and properly distinguished by usual signs. It is in vain for him or any other person to insinuate that I fought with a man of straw of my own making, like some other dialogue-writers.*

3. Mr. D.'s tender plea for declining a controversial correspondence from the feelings of humanity, because he thinks Mr. T. is sufficient for me, I desire to leave, because I cannot confute. Such reasoning as this is too potent for me to attack. I therefore leave it in all its glory.

4. Mr. D. says "*Philalethes did know and is accountable for not remembering that I have*

* And though Mr. T. has been unhappily influenced to complain at the beginning of his letters, that a dialogue dispute "IS IN ITS VERY NATURE UNEQUAL;" and to insinuate and even to imply that I made Toletus "REPEAT IN DETACHED PARCELS ONLY," his printed sentiments, his memory must now be refreshed with this humiliating truth, that he frankly told me when I read the dialogue to him previously to sending it to the press, that he did not wish to be more generously or fully quoted. And, I have liberty to say, that there never was the gentleman's time to complain of being made a dialogue-party, or of partial, unequal quotations. For Mr. T. desired to examine the manuscript, and I gratefully spent a day in reading it to him in private, for the sake of suppressing every thing of a partial, unequal and personal nature. Why then does he come to complain at the late an hour, when many of his readers do not know but he has reason for it? But the memory of man is treacherous.

expressly declared against any persons looking on their inability to believe and repent in the light of a difficulty which excuses them." This intended reproof, to say the least, does him no honour as a disputant. For, I did remember that he frequently says that the inability of sinners is inexcusable and criminal. But what then? Does this prove that his theory is not chargeable with confounding natural and moral inability? Does Mr. D.'s barely saying, that he does not consider the sinner under a natural inability to repent immediately, prove that his theory is not guilty of the charge? By no means, as shall appear from the following considerations. For, 1. He pleads (page 42) the necessity of sinners taking sundry steps previously to repenting. 2. He pleads that this necessity is founded in the ordinary course of divine operation with them. 3. He pleads (page 43) that some sinners "*Have not a competency of doctrinal knowledge, and they must apply themselves to get it, or they never will be christians.*" 4. He contends that "*Others must go into a more serious and prayerful consideration of things.*" And, 5. He boldly asserts that, "*There are particular points of conviction, which from the nature of things, are of absolute necessity in order to a sinner's giving up himself to Christ.*"

These are Mr. D.'s theoretic positions. Now then; if there be a necessity; if there be an absolute necessity, according to the nature of things, of sinners taking sundry steps previously to repenting, as he constantly urges,

the consequence is undeniable, that they are destitute of natural ability to repent immediately. For not repenting immediately, therefore, they are not blameable; because no man is blameable for not performing that action immediately which must necessarily be deferred or postponed for the sake of previously performing other actions of a different nature. If the sinner must read more, and hear more, and pray more, and know more, and have more convictions previously to repenting, it is naturally impossible for him to repent immediately. Mr. D.'s theory, like that of his copartner in this debate, makes a natural inability of the sinner's dependence, for he makes the course of Providence a fatal bar in the way of the sinner's immediate repentance. But, this argument he must relinquish. For it proves infinitely too much for the safety of souls and the honour of God. With equal pertinency he may plead that it is the duty of many sinners to travel in the broad way which leads to destruction: for this is the course of Providence. If we make the Providence of God the rule of duty in one case, why not in another? Why not in all cases? Why cannot we prove according to this principle, that it is the duty of all sinners to delay repentance just as long as they do delay it, because long and even fatal delays correspond with the course of Providence! Why cannot we prove, according to this, that it was the duty of the Jews to harden their hearts and to make themselves more and more blind? For God in his Providence sent the Prophet to

them to effect this most dreadful purpose. But enough has been said, to prove that the Providence of God is not the rule of duty. For the Providence of God does not affect the liberty or moral agency of men: therefore, it is not the rule of duty. Accordingly, says president Edwards, "God has not given us his *Providence*, but his word to be our governing rule. God is a Sovereign in his dispensations. He bestowed the blessing upon Jacob even when he had a lie in his mouth. He was pleased to meet with Solomon and bless him while worshipping in an high place. He met with Saul while going to Damascus to persecute Christ. The conduct of divine Providence with its reasons is too little understood by us to be improved as our rule. God has his way in the sea, his path in the mighty waters, and his footsteps are not known. And he gives none account of any of his matters. But, God has given us his word to this very end, that it might be our rule: and therefore has fitted to be so; and has so ordered it, that it may be understood by us. And strictly speaking, this is our only rule. If we join any thing else to it, as making it our rule, we do that for which we have no warrant, yea, that which God himself has absolutely forbidden. "Add thou not unto his words, lest he reprove thee and thou be found a liar." Psalm xxx. 6.

5. It is evident that Mr. D. does not admire the harlot while pleading her cause, in the very words of his sermon. This he says "*Is ingenious; but the whole force of it lies in*

changing the question." But the good man is mistaking the matter. The question is not changed. For does he not plead for the propriety of prayers which are made upon natural principles merely? Does he not say in the 9th page of his sermon, while distinguishing between the right and wrong prayers of sinners "*Is there nothing beside wicked principle in them? is natural conscience wicked principle? is the natural principle of self-preservation wicked principle? they have these to name no more: and it is not for nothing that the God of nature hath implanted them. They are in all men a check upon the evil propensities of the heart: they are also prompters to action, by which even the wicked are sometimes put upon doing what ought to be done: and in particular upon praying to God for needed mercy of a temporal nature.*" This is Mr. D.'s divinity. Thus he teaches sinners to pray from natural principles: and to pray for needed mercy of a temporal nature. And though I introduced the harlot praying her injured Prince to save her from death, and praying from natural principles too, in the very style of his sermon, he says, I have changed the question. But how is the question changed? For, is it not as proper for the impenitent harlot to pray her injured husband to save her from death, because death is painful and dreadful, as it is for an impenitent sinner to pray God to save him from eternal death because it is most dreadful? Is not the principle the same in both cases? why then does Mr. D. approve the prayer of the impenitent, and disapprove the prayer of the harlot? why does he like one and dislike the other? for, both act

upon his "*Natural principle of self-preservation.*" If it were possible for sinners to pray from natural principles, with natural exercises merely, and not moral ones, his natural theology might obtain: but it is not. For sinners are moral agents: and all their prayers are of a moral nature. He must therefore either reject all the prayers of the impenitent, or approve the prayer of the harlot.

6. To obtain relief, he says the same method of illustrating may be practised upon my theory. But this is another great mistake. For my theory does not plead for animal prayers, but for christian, holy prayers. When I get lost, and plead, that animal exercises, or any other exercises are duties, except holy exercises, he will have opportunity to expose my theory, as I have exposed his theory: but while I make the word of God my only rule, and plead only for those exercises which God will approve at the great day, it is impossible for him to expose my theory. For as *some* philosophers say, "Ridicule is the test of truth." But,

7. The most notable part of his appendix now presents. He says, "*The allegory from first to last keeps out of sight the object of prayer.*" Here the preacher seems to forget his own Sermon, and the teacher his own instructions. For the allegory is obviously founded upon the object of prayer as he has displayed it in his Sermon: for speaking of sinners he says, (p. 9) "*Is there nothing beside wicked principle in them? Is natural conscience wicked princi-*

ple? Is the natural principle of self-preservation evil principle? They have these to name no more. By which even the wicked are put upon doing what ought to be done: and in particular upon PRAYING TO GOD *for needed mercy of a* TEMPORAL NATURE." Thus Mr. D. teaches sinners to pray from the natural principle of self-preservation: and to let him and others see the natural features of his praying sinner, I introduced the harlot, begging her injured king to save her life. She fetches her plea from the very bowels of his theory. She prays, according to Mr. D. not from the principle of lust, which at the present time, is under a check, but, she prays from the innocent principle of self-preservation. And why does Mr. D. say, without reviewing his sermon, that the "*Allegory from first to last keeps out of sight the object of prayer?*" For it certainly keeps it constantly in sight, upon a first principle of his sermon. As the sermon was preached to support those prayers which are supposed to be made from natural principles, or the principle of self-preservation; so the harlot is fairly presented, as praying and begging upon his natural principles, and even in the natural, expressive, and persuasive language of his sermon.

The allegory I find does not please Mr. D.: and no wonder. For it reduces him to the dire necessity of approving the harlot's prayer or of discarding the first principle of his theory. But I will add no more: for Mr. Dana is my friend and brother: and I generally love to hear him preach, because he rarely indeed

builds his sermons upon those principles which are destitute of real obedience. For he is tender and affectionate, and is blessed with a happy talent to convince sinners and to edify saints, and to advance the glorious cause of his Master.

"*Because we both our errors have,*
"*We pardon give and pardon crave.*"*

A number of centuries past, there reigned a celebrated Prince in the East, whose administrations wore every mark of perfection. He treated his obedient subjects as children, and they honoured him as the most kind and indulgent parent. Though naturally calculated for social happiness in the most intimate connexions, yet for a number of years he preferred a single to a married life. But, concluding that it would add lustre to his crown, sweeten his enjoyments, and promote the interest of his kingdom, to enter into wedlock, he resolved to marry the first suitable character which would accept of his offer. The mistresses of fortune did not glance their emulous eyes at the matchless dignity of his character, without his notice: but, like a Prince of consummate honour, he treated them all with proper regard and friendly neglect. The fading beauty of the world made no impression upon his heart, because he was wholly intent upon the unfading glory of the Divine Kingdom. Contrary to the pride and ambition

* Bishop Reynolds' translation of the motto in the title page.

of other Princes, he was willing to wait upon poverty itself, to obtain a bride of a meek and humble character. At length he saw her and loved her: for heaven ordained it so. But, to prove the sincerity of his affection, she was in captivity. This humiliating circumstance, however, instead of abating, rather heightened his laudable desire, and led him to devise a method of ransom. The method was wisely adopted and nobly executed, though at greater expense than can easily be conceived. As soon as she was liberated from her captive confinement, he gave her the most generous opportunity to be acquainted with his character. His superior wisdom, and unrivalled dignity, were the least she could discover: and to entertain the deepest gratitude for his singular attention and friendship, was the lowest profession she could make. But, while she acknowledged her obligations; to render them as easy and grateful as possible, he frequently informed her, the pleasure he enjoyed in effecting her deliverance, was greater to him than the advantage of it could be to her. Upon a suitable acquaintance, as his increasing love waited with pleasing impatience to complete her happiness, by making her the joint partaker of the interest of his crown and enjoyments, he made her the offer of marriage. The proposal was too generous not to be truly affecting. Some of the tender emotions were excited. He saw the grateful confusion of her face; and desired her to treat the matter without the common reserve. She modestly replied, I have no objection except that of my own unworthiness.

But, this to him was rather a motive: and under all the honours of royal espousals she became his bride. She was the wife of his youth, and commanded his first and best affections; and every circumstance relative to their marriage was fraught with the richest prospect of mutual and lasting delight.

But how can I give the history of this royal pair any further? nature itself will blush, and every generous feeling will kindle up to a flame to revenge the wrong. For the solemn covenant she made to be his pure and spotless bride, never reached her heart: she therefore hastened an opportunity to prostitute herself, not only to the vilest of his subjects, but to the dregs of the human race. The worthy king felt the unequalled injury of his bed with a bleeding heart. The wound was too deep to be healed, by any application short of her real repentance. To think of exposing her guilt and dissolving his connexions was painful; he therefore employed all the motives of bleeding friendship, to reform and reclaim her. But, she heard his melting reproofs with great disobedience and contempt; and not only so, but gave herself up to the guidance of impure desires and affections, to such a degree, that she presently stripped off the jewels and ornaments, with which he had hidden her poverty and adorned her person, to increase the number of her lovers. Upon this evidence of her ripening guilt, he sent an officer to inform her, that nothing remained but the most shameful death, if she would not return immediately and humble herself before him,

and ask his pardon for the nameless abuse she had committed against his bed. She heard the threatening, but was so lost in the gratification of lust, that she was incapable of perceiving the danger to which she stood exposed: and told the officer, that she loved strangers, and after them she would go. But, no sooner was this hardened declaration made, than she was arrested, and condemned to die according to the threatening.

When the blushing day of execution arrived, her dormant fears were put in motion, and fully expressed. The king of terrors appeared in a new and terrible form. There appeared no way to look for relief but to apply to the Prince, and this she rather feared, in consequence of the shameless abuse for which she was condemned. But, conscience told her he was the most propitious, and her fears compelled her to ask liberty, to address him upon the subject of her hastening death. It was no sooner asked, than granted; she therefore immediately flew into his presence, and threw herself prostrate at his feet, and in the utmost confusion and distress, implored his protection. He saw her humble posture, he heard her doleful cries, and wept over her as Christ did over Jerusalem, when the Roman eagle was about to light upon her devoted walls: but, concealed his tears, and asked her whether she was willing to forsake, and confess her shame, and return to the duties of a chaste and obedient wife? The Prince graciously informed her, that he was ready to forgive her, whenever she was ready to be for-

given: but as she presented her thanks, before any appearance of repentance, he told her, that pardon could not be obtained at so cheap a rate, because it followed, and never preceded repentance and confession.

As conscience began to assume its office, she replied, after a little distressing thought, I am willing to do every thing in my power, but how can I repent while I feel an aversion from you, and a delight in strangers? I love your assistance in time of difficulty, for I have experienced it before, but your company and character I cannot esteem. And what shall I do: for even now under the raised stroke of death, I cannot possibly wean my wicked heart from lust. Who, Sir, can alter the heart but God who made it? I pray you therefore to adopt some method, by which you can grant me present relief at least. He heard her with the deepest indignation of soul; and told her, she never appeared to him in a more hateful point of light. You are, said he, an adulteress, a shameful adulteress still, and I loath your request; for, you slight and despise the love of a tender husband, who has done every thing to redeem you, and prefer the communion of strangers. She interrupted him, and said, you injure me greatly, Sir, you injure me; for though I have a heart of natural lust, which I cannot possibly overcome any more than I can make a new world, I am not at present, acting in the character of an adulteress. I am not gratifying the principles of lust. They are now under restraint: the flame of criminal desire is now pent

up and confined. It is not like a harlot to fear and tremble and pray in this serious, solemn manner. That I have acted the open part of an adulteress, I do not deny, but I am so far from the indulgence of a lustful heart at present that the influence of lust is suspended. And I wish to God to be delivered from its reigning power. Let a poor sorrowful creature plead a moment. Harlots are wicked we know, but "*The* wicked do not always act in character as such. Depraved as they are, it is not the evil principle in them which prompts them to action in every case. It is not that which accounts for all their prayers, or determines the nature and quality of them. Is there nothing beside wicked principle in them? is natural conscience wicked principle? is the natural principle of self-preservation evil principle? they have these to mention no more: and it is not for nothing, that the God of nature has implanted *them*."* These with submission are the principles which have the governing influence of my present conduct. And do I act like a harlot? But, give me leave, as hateful as I appear, to put this question: "Whether, if a person does not act from the highest principle, it is a sin for him, to be actuated by any other with which the Creator has endowed him?"* I do not deny, but I have an habitual aversion from your bed: but, do I now express it? For, it is very evident "A person may have habitual enmity to another in a high degree, and yet not act it out in

* Excellent speech becometh not a fool: But do not these speeches become the queen?

every thing towards him. The King replied, I cannot bear the voice and pleas of a whorish woman any longer: for you render yourself more and more hateful to my sight. She resumed her natural plea, and said, to what extremity am I driven! I do not ask you to listen to the voice of a harlot, but, "The question is this, whether the voice of nature shall be suppressed? It is but the voice of nature, it is true; the voice of natural distress." And shall it not be heard, when a remedy from natural evil is so needful? I have acted like a depraved creature, but I do not at present: For, depraved nature left to itself would never put on this humble appearance, and utter these earnest cries for deliverance. The Prince could bear no longer, and said, you appear no better than satan did when he prayed not to be tormented before the time: if, his prayer was worthy of being heard, so is your's. For, as it was his fear of deserved punishment which made him pray so earnestly, so, it is your fear of death which makes you pray at present. Your eyes and heart are full of adultery, and all your desire at heart is to be saved from punishment, and live in sin.

Upon the arrival of the officer, and seeing the King's inflexible determination to grant her no respite from sudden execution, without the deepest repentance of heart, her distress became intolerable: she therefore cried with the most piercing voice; O that the ears of majesty were open to my cry, for it is not the cry of a harlot; but the distressed voice of nature itself! It is

the voice of a poor criminal, going not only to the place of execution, but immediately from that into hell: and what shall I do? What can I do? I cannot alter my heart; for my heart, like your's, is in the hand of the Lord. If you cannot grant me a reprieve, give me a respite, and if you cannot give me a day, for mercy's sake give me an hour. Perhaps I shall, I hope I shall repent and return to my duty; but I cannot alter my heart. O Remember how you have loved me, and what you have done to redeem me; and help me at this dying moment. I have no where else to go for relief: my life is wholly suspended upon your sovereign pleasure. If I could repent I would: but since I cannot plead repentance and hearty reformation as the grounds of some relief, shall the cries, the doleful cries of nature be rejected—— Will my Lord and King hear this praying voice grow faint in death, and see me expire and grant no relief? O help me, help me; for there is no other help to implore.

The *King* of KINGS heard her, but as his patience was worn out with her abomination, it kindled up into burning wrath, and he said: "Hear O heavens; and give ear O earth—For, I have redeemed thee. I sware unto thee, and entered into covenant with thee, and thou becamest mine. I clothed thee, I covered thee with silk, I decked thee also with ornaments: and thou givest thy gifts to all thy lovers, and hirest them that they may come in to thee. Wherefore O harlot hear the word of the Lord. I will judge thee as women that break wedlock

are judged, and I will give thee blood and fury. I will laugh at your calamity and mock when your fear cometh; when fear cometh as desolation, and destruction cometh as a whirlwind.

He then turned to the waiting officer, and said, Her sins have reached unto heaven, and God hath remembered her iniquities. Reward her, and double unto her double according to her works. She shall be utterly burned with fire. For strong is the Lord God who judged her.

The story is solemn and effecting, but what is the application.

It is easy, and not remote. For, as the prayer of the impenitent harlot was displeasing to the noble Prince, who waited to forgive her, so the faithless prayer of the impenitent sinner who exactly resembles her, is displeasing and abominable to the Prince of Peace.

A SUMMARY NOTE.

If we believe, that sinners are totally depraved or that all their moral exercises are hostile to God and holiness—If we believe there is no obedience to God in mere external actions—and also that sinners have natural ability to love God, but will not because they hate him—If we believe that the word of God and not his providence is the only rule of direction to sinners, we shall not dare to direct them to perform any moral actions which are destitute of holiness. For the word of God directs men to no actions except holy actions. Let us then follow the inspired example and diligently use scriptural means to impress the minds of sinners with a view of their duty; and direct them to nothing but holiness. For they have no time allowed them by God for actions which they can perform and yet be lost.

CONCLUSION.

A PRACTICAL ADDRESS TO SINNERS.

My Fellow Mortals,

Having closed my reasoning respecting your *duty*, I must now reason with YOU; and persuade you to embrace it. For the design of the Book is to advance the glory of God in the salvation of your souls. With answerable exercises of heart, therefore, please to attend to the things which belong to your peace. For life is short and uncertain, and delays are dangerous and commonly fatal. Receive and improve this address, therefore, as though death were to make the next.

1. Then, please to remember that you are moral agents. God has made you rational, accountable beings. For "There is a spirit in

man: and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." You are raised far above the rank of irrational creatures, in point of capacity. For you have judgment to know, and bodily strength to perform every thing required of you. You are therefore under the greatest obligations to be perfect: and no possible reason can be assigned for the least moral defect, or deviation from the divine law. "For the law is holy, and the commandment holy, just and good." But,

2. Please to remember, with the deepest humility of soul, that you are sinners. You were made to love God with all your hearts; but instead of loving him supremely, you love yourselves supremely. For selfish gratification is your only employment. You eat and drink, lie down and rise up, and labour and do every thing else to promote your own separate and forbidden interest. For you are lovers of pleasure, more than lovers of God. You are the subjects of the carnal mind, which is enmity against God in every point of view. And hence God disapproves all your moral actions now, and will

disapprove and totally reject them in the judgment of the great day. "For shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" But,

3. Lest you should be left to follow the multitude and excuse yourselves in consequence of the connexion between the sin of Adam and his posterity, please to remember that your wicked nature is your own in the most personal sense. For, though we are sinners in Adam; though there is an established connexion between the sin of Adam and the sin of his posterity; though all the children of men are by nature totally depraved in consequence of Adam's sin; yet sin is a personal quality. And, as your hearts and souls are your own, and not the hearts and souls of other men; as your thoughts and volitions are your own, and not the thoughts and volitions of others: so your sin and evil nature is your own, and not the sin and evil nature of another. As the branch is like the tree, so your nature is like the nature of Adam, because you are his posterity: but yet it is personally your own, and not another man's. According-

ly, the bible does not furnish an instance of a good man's confessing the sin of Adam. But, the bible is full of evidence that good men confessed their own personal wickedness. David in his penitential confession evidently refers to the established connexion between the sin of Adam and his posterity. For, he says, with the note of attention "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." But he does not confess the sin of Adam, any more than the sin of Seth: nor will any other man who is the subject of a proper share of conviction. For sin is a personal quality and cannot be transferred from one to another, any more than the heart or soul of one man can be transferred to another. These things I observe, to dispel that darkness which broods upon the minds of those who love to confess Adam's sin because they do not love to confess their own: and to convince you that without speedy repentance, you must be condemned and destroyed for your own, and not for the sin of another. For the time is short: and the Great Judge of both the quick and the dead, will not

say to those on his left hand depart ye cursed: For I was hungry and *Adam* gave me no meat; I was thirsty and *Adam* gave me no drink: but he will say depart: for I was hungry and ye gave me no meat; I was thirsty and ye gave me no drink. Without a Saviour therefore, you must stand nakedly exposed to all the vengeance of the divine law, which requires perfect obedience, upon the penalty of endless damnation.

4. It is therefore worthy of your grateful notice and of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life." And Christ himself says, "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." Are not these things, O sinners, worthy of your most grateful notice? For when it is infinitely just and righteous for God to divest you of every enjoyment and to let you fall beneath the weight of his inflexible justice, into the dreadful furnace of his eternal wrath; when

all the angels of heaven would celebrate his praise for spending his infinite vengeance upon your miserable souls, he is pleased to open the bosom of his boundless love, and to send his only Son to make you the heirs of eternal life. This is the love of God. This is infinite love. And nothing less than the vast difference between heaven and hell, the eternal happiness of Saints, and the eternal misery of sinners can display the glory of it to advantage. Could we look with these mortal eyes beyond the grave, and estimate the endless joy of saints, and the endless anguish of sinners, we should possess more adequate views of the love of God to this perishing world. For his love is proportionate to the intolerable destruction from which christians are redeemed, and to the unfading glory with which they are crowned. Let then O sinners, the boundless love of God induce you to give him your hearts without the least delay. But,

5. Let also the matchless love of Christ impress your minds, and melt down your hard, adamant hearts into a state of unfeigned sorrow

in consequence of sin. For though Christ while infinitely happy in the bosom of his Father, had a clear and full view of the enmity of the world, and of the whole scene of his sufferings from the manger to the tomb, he yet most gratefully undertook to glorify God in the redemption of man. "Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, sacrifice and offering, thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared me: in burnt offerings and sacrifices for sin thou hast had no pleasure. Then said I, Lo I come, to do thy will, O God." This is the language of Christ in the full view of all his sufferings. "For your sakes he became poor that ye through his poverty, might be made rich." For sinners who deserve nothing but the depth of hell, he was laid in the manger: for sinners he was driven by the most bloody persecution from his native land, while a weeping infant; for sinners he endured the most bitter contempt and reproach from the leaders of the Jewish nation: for you he went about doing good, both cold and hungry, not even finding a place to rest his weary head and limbs; for you he

went into the garden and sweat great drops of blood; for you he was betrayed by one of his family, and denied by another; and to save you from the vengeance of Heaven, he was arraigned before the bar of wicked men, and was unjustly condemned and most cruelly and wantonly crowned with thorns: in a word, for you he carried the cross, and fainted under it, and was nailed to it, and in the most shameful manner was suspended between two malefactors: and after enduring the hidings of the father's face, to glorify God in the salvation of your precious and immortal souls, he prayed for you and gave up the Ghost! O the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, of the love of Christ! and will you, O sinners, still reject him! will you refuse eternal salvation, when the only alternative is, eternal destruction! you will, some of you, being strangers to genuine conviction, plead that you cannot embrace Christ. But, I ask why? Is it because you are destitute of moral agency, or is it because you have no heart to love and embrace him who is altogether lovely? you dare not say that you are not moral agents: for you are the

subjects of intellectual and bodily strength to do all that God requires. God requires no more than you have natural ability to perform. He only requires the improvement of those talents which he has given you. He therefore says that a man is accepted according to that he hath, and not according to that he hath not. The only cause therefore, why you do not come immediately to Christ, is your aversion from him. You do not come because you will not, and not because you are willing and cannot. Therefore, says Christ, "Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life: and this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil." You greatly desire Christ to save you from hell, but you do not desire him to save you from sin. But, you must remember that Christ saves no man from hell who is not willing to repent and be saved from his sins. For his name is called Jesus because he saves his people from their sins. Retaining therefore your present unwillingness

of heart to give up yourselves unreservedly into the hands of God, in the name of his Son, you have nothing to expect but the eternal wrath of the Great Jehovah. For God will admit no impenitent into Heaven. If you will not come to Christ, you must be driven from the presence of God by the dreadful and intolerable weight of his vengeance to eternal, never ending destruction. For he that believeth not shall be damned. Improve this address as though the next were to come from the bar of God. You have now an opportunity to make your peace with God. But to-morrow it may be eternally too late. You have long abused the patience of God: you have long resisted the strivings of his spirit. And you may remember that God says, my spirit shall not always strive with man. Repent then immediately, lest God should soon destroy you, or leave you in his wrath only to fill up the measure of your iniquities to prepare you for a more awful and dreadful destruction.

To conclude, therefore in the language of Inspiration: I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you life and death, blessing, and cursing. Therefore choose life." For, "The Spirit and the bride say, come. And let him that heareth say, come. And let him that is athirst come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely." AMEN.